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Introduction 
 
 
     The modern corporation (or company and any other form of business association) 
has the attributes of legal personality and shareholders’ limited liability. The attribute 
of legal personality allows the corporation to have rights, own assets, contract and be 
liable for its acts.1 The attribute of limited liability, on the other hand, limits 
shareholders’ liability for the corporation’s acts merely to the extent of their 
contribution to the corporation’s assets.2 These attributes of the modern joint stock 
corporation have been key for the development of modern society. However, 
corporate personality and limited liability have also made the joint stock corporation a 
suitable device for the practice of fraudulent acts. Therefore, the piercing3 of the 
corporate veil is a means to prevent and punish the use of the corporate personality for 
fraudulent purposes.4  
 
     The piercing of the corporate veil sets aside the corporation’s legal personality in 
order to make shareholders liable for the corporation’s acts.5 Although this may 
appear to be an easy task, it is far from so. In fact, there is a dilemma about whether 
or not to ignore the corporate personality. This dilemma arises from the fact that the 
purpose of the corporate entity is to protect investors from a risk that involves a 
commercial adventure via transferring the risk of an enterprise to creditors and third 
parties. Indeed, the corporate entity can be used in ways that may produce an unfair 
result and consequently enable fraud. Undisputedly, unfairness is present when a 
corporate entity defaults but if the corporate personality were easily disregarded every 
time unfairness and fraud are argued, there would be no benefit from its use. 
Moreover, investors would hesitate before participating in risky enterprises were their 
assets to be exposed and thus all socio-economic benefits would be lost. 6   
                                                        
1
 See, Ivamy, H. Dictionary of Company Law. London: Butterworths; 1983. At page 43 
2
 Ibid 
3
 English lawyers often use this term interchangeable with lifting. 
4
 There may be other grounds for piercing the corporate veil. However, the majority involve fraud. 
Therefore, in this thesis I focus mainly on piercing the corporate veil in the context of fraud.  
5
 Ibid 
6
 The author David Millon states that limited liability provided by the corporate personality produces 
unfairness in some circumstances. However, limited liability enables aggregation of large amounts of 
capital from numerous small investors. If liability were not limited, even a small investment could 
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     The piercing of the corporate veil first took place in Anglo-American 
jurisdictions.7 Consequently, the piercing of the corporate veil has been studied 
mainly in Anglo-American jurisdictions. Other regions, such as Latin America, could 
be considered as having been neglected and thus little regarding corporate personality 
issues in this region has been written. There are strong reasons for this region not to 
be the subject of attention in this context; for example, slow economic and legal 
development due to political and economical instability. Definitely, if a country is not 
prosperous, the use of the corporate personality is not common and corporate 
personality issues are therefore not frequent.  
 
     In the last two decades, however, some countries across Latin America have 
gained political stability and experienced steady economic growth.8 Consequently, the 
corporate personality has played an important role in the development of Latin 
America.9 Indeed, as a vehicle for investment, it has facilitated the development of 
infrastructure.10 In addition, small entrepreneurs have found the advantages of the 
corporate personality and limited liability particularly convenient. 11 Nonetheless, the 
use of the corporate personality has also given rise to common corporate personality 
issues.12 Consequently, measures to deal with corporate personality issues have been 
taken.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
render a shareholder liable for a substantial corporate obligation. Thus, many people would be reluctant 
to risk their personal wealth in exchange for the prospect of only a modest return. At best, limited 
liability encourages investment that otherwise would not occur. Millon, D. Piercing the Corporate 
Veil, Financial Responsibility and the Limits of Limited Liability. SSRN eLibrary. 2006. Available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=451520 [last visit may 30, 2013] at page 1312 
7
 The modern joint stock corporation has its origins in England, where the Medieval corporation was 
first used as a device for commerce. However, the joint stock corporation has been used to greater 
extent in the U.S.A.. Consequently, the modern joint stock corporation can be considered as having 
been developed in Anglo-American countries. Moreover, as the piooners on the use of the modern joint 
stock corporation, Anglo-American jurisdictions were the first to experience the effects of corporate 
personality issues, a fact that makes Anglo-American jurisdictions the first to experience the dilemma 
that surrounds the piercing of the corporate veil. See, Chapter One, at page 24 
8
 Latin American economic expansion has been a product of institutional and political changes brought 
about by national and international factors such as the globalisation process and democratisation of 
Latin American countries. Bertola, L. & Ocampo, J. The Economic Development of Latin America 
Since Independence. United Kingdom: Oxford University; 2012. At page 258 
9
 Villegas, C. Tratado de las Sociedades. Chile: Editorial Juridica; 1999. At pages 29-35 
10
 ibid  
11
 ibid 
12This statement is supported on the premise that only in prosperous countries the corporate personality 
is of common use. This premise is discussed and proved througout this thesis.  
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     The piercing the corporate veil in Latin American jurisdictions, with emphasis on 
Panama, is the subject of study in this thesis. The desire to engage in this study 
derives from the lack of research on this subject. The piercing of the corporate veil is 
a relatively recent subject in Latin America and there has been little research about 
the methods used by countries in the region. Moreover, I have emphasised Panama 
due to the relevant role of the corporate entity in this country and the lack of an 
approach to deal with corporate personality issues. Panama is a Latin American 
country that is currently experiencing a steady economic growth and with it the use of 
the corporate entity has become more common. Panama presents a case study due to 
the environment in which the corporate personality has been developed. Indeed, the 
corporate personality and all related aspects are addressed in accordance to each 
jurisdiction’s legal and economic framework. In the case of Panama, this jurisdiction 
has developed as a financial offshore service centre. The Panamanian corporate entity 
is known for being a convenient device to conduct business strategies such as lower 
transaction costs, reduced taxation charges and the protection of assets.13 Besides the 
benefits available for foreign and national entrepreneurs, the incorporation of 
Panamanian companies is a profitable business for the government, law firms and 
banks. Consequently, discussing the piercing of the corporate veil has been ‘taboo’ 
among many different sectors of Panamanian economy/society. There is a common 
perception that should an exception to the corporate personality exist, it would 
dramatically undermine the Panamanian corporate entity.14 However, the Panamanian 
Supreme Court of Justice15 has not been blinded by this belief and has ignored the 
corporate personality when it has been evidently misused. In the little Panamanian 
case law existing with regard this context, the Panamanian Supreme Court has 
emphasised the fact that it will not allow the use of the Panamanian corporate 
                                                        
13
 See, http://www.offshorepanamaniancorporations.com/#panamanian-offshore-corporations [last visit 
july 25, 2013] 
14
 See,  http://www.laestrella.com.pa/online/impreso/2011/10/18/sociedades-anonimas-pero-sin-el-
velo-del-anonimato.asp [last visit july 25, 2013] 
15
 The Supreme Court of Justice is the highest judicial authority in Panama. The Supreme Court of 
Justice has jurisdiction over the Republic of Panama’s territory and is located in Panama City. The 
Panamanian Supreme Court of justice is composed of four chambers and nine magistrates. The First 
Chamber has jurisdiction over civil matters, the Second Chamber has jurisdiction over penal matters, 
the Third Chamber has jurisdiction over administrative matters and the Fourth Chamber deals with 
“negocios generales” (special matters). The Panamanian Supreme Court of Justice also has jurisdiction 
over constitutional matters, the “Pleno de la Corte”, which is the gathering of the nine magistrates, is 
the means through which the Supreme Court of Justice defends and enforces the constitution. See, 
http://www.organojudicial.gob.pa/tribunales/corte-suprema-de-justicia/ [last visit august 20, 2013] 
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personality to conceal fraudulent acts.16 Certainly, Panama is a jurisdiction that seems 
to be pro-corporate personality but the reflections of the Panamanian Supreme Court 
feed the premise that possible exceptions to the corporate personality are likely to be 
introduced in this jurisdiction.  
 
    Panama follows the civil law tradition, a legal tradition that adheres to positive 
law.17 Consequently, an exception to the corporate personality is likely to be 
developed in positive law. This belief is supported by the fact that those Latin 
American countries that have introduced the piercing of the corporate veil (Colombia, 
Argentina, Chile and Brazil) have done it through a statutory rule.18  
 
     This thesis follows the belief that the problem does not lie in the drafting of the 
statutory exception, but in the ability of civil law judges to interpret and reflect over 
the statutory rule. Civil law tradition is known for its tendency to adhere to statutory 
rules and a judge’s limited capacity to correctly interpret and go beyond the 
boundaries of positive law; an aspect of the civil law tradition that is incompatible 
with piercing the corporate veil. Whether the corporate entity has been improperly 
used is something that cannot be described nor summarised in a statutory rule. The 
use of the corporate personality produces circumstances that cannot be predicted nor 
foreseen. Thus, in order to determine whether there has been fraud or an abuse of 
rights, the judge needs judicial creativity in order to assess the facts specific to the 
case and the applicable law. 
 
     One should not omit the fact that civil law tradition is strict for the sake of legal 
certainty. To confer the civil law judge judicial discretion is against the principles of 
this legal tradition. Nonetheless, throughout the development of this legal tradition, 
principles to soften such rigid civil law have been developed. An example of this is 
                                                        
16
 See, Chapter Four. At page 174-177 
17
 The adherence to positive law is one of the characteristics of the civil law tradition. In the civil law 
tradition it is considered that legal certainty is achieved through positive law. In the interest of legal 
certainty, Judges are prohibited from making the law; legislation should be clear, complete and 
coherent in the interest of certainty. The intent on making the law free of personal interpretation by a 
judge prevents the concurrence of personal biases that can distort the administration of justice. 
Perdomo, R. & Marryman, J. The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of 
Europe and Latin America 3rd Edition. California: Standford University Press; 2007. At page 48  
18
 Latin America is a region that follows the civil law tradition due to colonial influence. This region 
was mainly colonised by Spain. Consequently, the legal framwork of Latin American countries has 
been heavily influenced by Spanish civil law.  See, Chapter Five. At page 188-192 
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the principle of sana critica, which is a procedural principle founded on a set of rules 
which aims to guide reasoning.19 However, to what extent can the Hispano-American 
principle of sana critica  supplement an approach to pierce the corporate veil in a civil 
law jurisdiction such as Panama?  
 
     In this thesis, the principle of sana critica is proposed as a means to supplement a 
potential approach to deal with corporate veil issues in Panama.20 The proposal to use 
sana critica derives from the belief that sana critica was developed in a drive to make 
civil law tradition less strict, not by giving excessive judicial discretion to the judge 
but rather by encouraging the use of legal reasoning over any mechanical application 
of the law. The proposal of using sana critica  to support an approach to deal with 
corporate personality issues is a personal initiative. I consider sana critica is 
unappealing to other academics since it is a procedural principle. However, I regard 
sana critica as something more than a procedural principle. Sana critica is composed 
of values that can most definitely supplement an approach to deal with corporate 
personality issues in a Latin American civil law country such as Panama.   
 
Justification  
 
     There is a lack of research regarding the piercing the corporate veil in Latin 
America. The little research on this subject has been mainly descriptive. My research 
is important because it sheds light on the “Latin American piercing of the corporate 
veil”. My research does not merely describe the “Latin American piercing of the 
corporate veil”, but also studies its rationale and foundation. In my research I have 
noticed that the rationale for piercing the corporate veil and the influence of legal 
tradition have not been properly addressed. These are two aspects I personally 
consider to be key in the understanding of piercing the corporate veil. Firstly, a 
remedy that can distort the legal framework for companies cannot be applied without 
justification. Such a remedy must be introduced in accordance to a legal need. 
Secondly, the influence of legal tradition cannot be omitted. Legal tradition 
establishes the principles on which a legal system is structured. Consequently, when 
                                                        
19 See, Chapter Five.  At page 187 
20 See, Chapter Five. At page 205-209 
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introduced the piercing of the corporate veil must be compatible with the principles 
established by legal tradition.21   
 
    I consider the omission of these two aspects as the cause for the lack of 
understanding the piercing the corporate veil in Latin America. Moreover, the 
omission of the role of legal tradition has created an erroneous belief that Latin 
American countries have borrowed or copied the Anglo American doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil.  
 
    Throughout my research I stress the rationale behind the “Latin American piercing 
of the corporate veil” and the influence that legal tradition has. My objective is to 
demonstrate the originality and creativity of Latin American jurisdictions when 
dealing with corporate personality issues. Moreover, I wish to stress the differences 
that exist between “Latin American piercing of the corporate veil” and the Anglo-
American doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.  
 
    My research question derives from an interest in proving the originality of Latin 
American means of dealing with corporate personality issues. Throughout my 
research regarding the Anglo-American doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, the 
role of judicial creativity and the use of equity have interested me. These two aspects 
have led me to consider whether civil law tradition is a concept equivalent to common 
law equity or one that could at the very least provide the judge with a degree of 
judicial creativity. The principle of sana critica commanded my attention and inspired 
my research question.  
                                                        
21
 For example: the civil law tradition is strict for the sake of legal certainty. To confer the civil law 
judge judicial discretion is consider undermines legal certainty. The adherence to positive law is a 
principle on which the civil law tradition has been structured.  
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Methodology  
 
 
     I consider the piercing of the corporate veil to be a remedy that has resulted from 
the imperfection of economic development and has been implemented in accordance 
to the legal framework and needs of each jurisdiction. I have developed this personal 
concept about the piercing of the corporate veil from the following premises:  
  Only in prosperous Latin American countries is the corporate personality of 
common use. The frequent use of the corporate personality makes corporate 
personality issues common. Thus, it is more likely that in prosperous countries 
does an approach to deal with corporate veil issues exist.  
  Legal tradition and politic-economic factors are determinant when it comes to 
piercing the corporate veil, thus rendering the piercing of the corporate veil a 
remedy developed in accordance to the individual needs of each jurisdiction.  
  
     Throughout this thesis I demonstrate these premises and not only do I validate my 
argument about piercing the corporate veil, but also the rationale of my research 
question. Indeed, the proposal to use sana critica derives from my belief that each 
jurisdiction develops its approach to corporate veil issues by using tools already 
provided by its legal system. Sana critica is a tool that exists in the Panamanian legal 
framework and this thesis argues its suitability to be applied in this context.  
 
     In order to prove the premises that are the basis of my thesis, I have engaged in a 
comparative law study.22 Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Brazil and Panama are the 
Latin American jurisdictions studied in this thesis. Spain is the Continental 
Jurisdiction included in this thesis. England and the U.S. are the common law case 
studies in this context.  
                                                        
22
 For the purpose of this research I have used the ‘functional method’. Based on this method I have 
used the Anglo-American approach to deal with the corporate veil as template. The objective is to 
determine whether Latin American jurisdictions use the same method as Anglo-American jurisdictions, 
or whether Latin American countries have a different approach to achieve a similar result. Functional 
comparative law focuses on the means used by different jurisdictios to deal with an especific issue.  
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     The piercing of the corporate veil is a recent subject in Latin America and 
consequently there is a lack of material and research. Consequently, the inclusion of 
four Latin American jurisdictions in addition to Panama was decided in order to have 
a more consistent comparative study. Moreover, Latin America, Argentina, Colombia, 
Chile and Brazil are the jurisdictions that have dealt with corporate veil issues to a 
greater extent. Consequently, the study and comparison of these jurisdictions have 
provided an idea about a uniform trend followed by Latin American countries, which 
is the use of statutory rules based on traditional legal concepts to deal with corporate 
veil issues. However, although these jurisdictions follow a similar method, the 
concepts that have been used and the extent to which exceptions to the corporate 
personality are used varies in each of these jurisdictions.23 Panama is, I personally 
consider, likely to follow this trend and in this thesis sana critica is regarded as 
suitable in this context.  
 
     Latin America follows the civil law tradition due to a concurrence of different 
factors. A relevant factor was the influence of Spain during the colonial period. Latin 
American countries (with the exception of Brazil) were originally Spanish colonies 
and have their legal roots in Spanish legislation. Moreover, the concept of sana critica 
has been developed by Spanish Courts and adopted by Latin American countries. For 
comparative purposes, the study of Spain contributes to this thesis as in Spain the 
piercing of the corporate veil has been developed differently compared to other Latin 
American countries. Certainly, this fact triggers the following question: why have 
Latin American countries not used the Spanish approach as a model? The answer to 
this question is based on the uniqueness of each jurisdiction when it comes to dealing 
with corporate personality issues. Each jurisdiction may have a different legal need 
based on economic and political factors. This consequently influences the method 
used to deal with corporate personality issues.  
 
    I have dedicated a section of this thesis to comment upon general aspects of the 
corporate personality in Latin America. The attribute of corporate personality and 
limited liability is not exclusive to the joint stock corporation as other types of 
                                                        
23
 See, Chapter Three. At page 111-116 
Page 15 of 239 
 
business association with these attributes have been developed throughout the years. 
The sociedad de responsabilidad limitada, sociedad por acciones simplificadas and 
sociedad unipersonal are examples of business entities used in the jurisdictions 
subject of study.24 I have dedicated a section to define these business entities because 
in some of the jurisdictions studied in this thesis, they are commonly used. Therefore, 
the exception to the corporate personality has been aimed at these business entities 
rather than the joint stock corporation.  
 
    The Latin American countries addressed in this thesis have used traditional legal 
concepts and principles to draft the statutory exceptions to the corporate personality. 
Hence, before engaging in comparing the different approaches, I have established the 
definition and purpose of these concepts. It is also important to add that the 
jurisdictions subject of this research are Spanish-speaking countries, with the 
exception of Brazil. However, language does not represent a strong barrier since legal 
concepts and doctrines have a similar orthographical basis.  
 
     Regarding case law, researching cases about corporate personality in Latin 
America was a challenging task. Data bases such as 
http://www.organojudicial.gob.pa/ (a Panamanian data base), 
http://www.cortesuprema.gov.co/ (a Colombian data base) and 
http://www.poderjudicial.cl/ (a Chilean data base) among others provide few cases 
that directly deal with rasgado del velo corporativo (the piercing of the corporate 
veil) or levantamiento del velo corporativo (lifting the corporate veil). This can be 
attributed to the fact that piercing of the corporate veil is a relatively new concept in 
Latin America. Thus, some of the relevant corporate personality cases do not overtly 
address the concept of piercing the corporate veil. In order to find some of the cited 
cases in Chapters Two and Three, I used alternative terms such as persona societaria 
(a term equivalent to the concept of corporate entity) and inoponibilidad de la 
persona jurisdica . Additionally, I also sought cases cited by Latin American 
authorities in decisions where piercing of the corporate veil was unequivocally 
addressed. 
  
                                                        
24 See, Chapter Three. At page 111 
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    This thesis deals with piercing the corporate veil in Latin American jurisdictions. 
Nonetheless, the parent jurisdictions of the modern corporate entity and the first to 
experience corporate personality issues cannot be ignored. England and the U.S. have 
been included as part of this study. These jurisdictions follow the common law 
tradition. The common law tradition is a legal tradition that has allowed judges the 
ability to critically assess the concept of corporate personality. However, English and 
American courts have different opinions regarding piercing the corporate veil. On the 
one hand, the English courts are reluctant to ignore the corporate personality and seek 
alternative means, while on the other hand, the U.S. courts are more open to reflect 
and consider ignoring the legal entity.25 My objective is not to repeat previous studies 
about piercing the corporate veil in Anglo-American jurisdictions; rather, it is to 
compare the Anglo-American and Latin American methods employed to deal with 
corporate personality issues and in turn support my statement regarding the influence 
of legal tradition over this subject.  
 
     Currently, there is an erroneous misconception that piercing of the corporate veil is 
an American practice adopted by Latin American jurisdictions.26 One of the key 
purposes of my comparative study is to disprove this statement by presenting the 
differences between the Latin American and Anglo-American methods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
25 See, Chapter Two. At page 106 
26
 The author Jose M. Bello, in his paper regarding the piercing of the corporate veil in Latin America, 
considers the piercing of the corporate veil as a concept borrowed by Latin American jurisdictions. He 
states that “the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has been trying to make its way through Latin 
America.”  This belief is not shared in this thesis due to the fact that the corporate personality is a 
universal concept; a point addressed later in more extent.  
See, Bello, j. An Overview of the Doctrine of the Piercing of the Corporate Veil as Applied By 
Latin American Countries: A U.S. Legal Creation Exported to Civil Law Jurisdictions 
[Argentina/Mexico/United States/Venezuela]. ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law. 
Volume 14, Issue 3. At page 628 
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Thesis Structure  
 
     This thesis is composed of five chapters. The first chapter addresses general 
aspects regarding the piercing of the corporate veil. The rationale for this chapter is to 
give a brief overview of piercing the corporate veil and address basic aspects that will 
be covered in this thesis; for example, piercing the corporate veil in corporate groups 
and piercing the corporate veil in the context of privately owned companies. 
Additionally, reasons for not covering points such as piercing the corporate veil in the 
context of public companies will be mentioned.  
 
    The second chapter is dedicated to studying the piercing of the corporate veil in 
England and the U.S.. These jurisdictions are the parents of the modern corporate 
personality and general aspects about piercing the corporate veil derive from these 
countries. Thus, Chapter Two can be regarded as a continuation of Chapter One. My 
purpose is to present the Anglo-American piercing of the corporate veil for it to be 
contrasted in Chapter Three. Chapter Two starts by addressing the piercing of the 
corporate veil in England and the reasons for the current position of English courts 
over this matter. The second part of this chapter is dedicated to the U.S. and its 
approaches developed in order to deal with corporate personality in that jurisdiction. 
This chapter concludes by stating the reasons why these jurisdictions have different 
positions regarding this subject.   
 
    The third chapter will cover the piercing of the corporate veil in Spain and Latin 
America. This chapter starts by addressing general aspects of the corporate 
personality in Spain and Latin America as well as civil law concepts and principles 
used by these jurisdictions when dealing with corporate personality issues. The 
second section of this chapter is dedicated to Spain and corporate personality issues in 
that jurisdiction. Following, is the third section which starts by making a brief 
comment about the reasons for choosing the jurisdictions subject of study before 
continuing by addressing Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Brazil individually. This 
chapter ends by making a comparison between the methods used by Spain and the 
discussed Latin American jurisdictions.   
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    The fourth chapter is dedicated to the main case study, Panama. In this chapter, 
basic aspects of the Panamanian corporate entity in addition to the way in which 
Panamanian authorities have dealt with corporate veil issues to date are addressed.  
 
    Finally, the principle of sana critica  will be explained in the fifth chapter. The 
origins and rationale for the existence of sana critica and the reason to consider it 
suitable for supplementing an approach to deal with corporate veil issues. In addition, 
each of the rules on which sana critica is founded will be explained as well as the 
influence these rules have had over judges´ thinking and judgments. This chapter ends 
with a suggestion for the development of an approach to deal with corporate veil 
issues in Panama. 
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CHAPTER I: General Aspects of the Piercing of the    
Corporate Veil 
 
 
       The piercing of the corporate veil can be defined as the attribution of liability to 
shareholders for the corporation’s acts in circumstances where the corporation has 
been used for fraudulent purposes.27 Indeed, this sounds simple but it is not. The 
rationale for the use of this remedy is primarily the prevention and punishment of 
fraud. However, in this context what can be considered as fraud? The corporate 
personality can be used in ways that may produce an unfair situation and in turn give 
basis to argue the existence of fraud. However, to what extent can acts under the 
cover of the corporate personality be considered as fraudulent?  
 
      The objective of this chapter is to present the origins of piercing the corporate 
veil, the reason to use this remedy and the advantages and disadvantages regarding 
this practice of the piercing the corporate veil. By establishing the basics of the 
concept of piercing the corporate veil, one is allowed to introduce the subject of this 
thesis, the principle of sana critica . In this chapter, the reader will be introduced to 
this civil procedural principle and the motive for considering this principle as suitable 
for the development of an approach to deal with corporate veil issues in a civil law 
jurisdiction such as Panama.  
 
    In addition to the concept of piercing the corporate veil and the principle of sana 
critica, this chapter also seeks to cover key aspects of the corporate personality that 
have generated debate in this context such as corporate groups and privately owned 
and publicly owned companies. As an introductory chapter, it intends to present basic 
concepts and personal observations that will be addressed more extensively later in 
this thesis.   
                                                        
27
 There are other grounds on which is justify piercing the corporate veil. However, fraud is the most 
common. Scheneeman, J. The Law of Corporations and other Business Organizations. 6th edition. 
The U.S.A: Delman Cengage Learning; 2012. At Section 7.6, page 271 
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1.1  The Concept of Legal Personality, Limited Liability and the 
Corporate Veil 
 
     The corporation has the attributes of legal personality and shareholders’ limited 
liability. Based on these attributes, the corporation is an independent legal person with 
the capacity to act in the commercial and legal world and be held liable for its own 
acts. This means that shareholders are free from any liability derived from acts made 
by the corporation under its name. Moreover, the corporation is also free from any 
liability derived from acts of a shareholder. The fact the corporation is an independent 
entity with capacity to contract and own assets produces advantages such as the 
reduction of transaction costs.28  Furthermore, investors’ assets are safer because they 
are economically liable only for the extent of their contribution to the corporation’s 
assets.29  
 
     Legal personality and limited liability can be described as the foundation of 
modern Anglo-American corporation law and furthermore, the corporation law of the 
civil law tradition countries.30 However, it is important to understand that legal 
personality and limited liability are different concepts. In the early days of the modern 
joint stock corporation, this type of business association received the attribute of legal 
personality but it did not provide shareholders with limited liability (explained in 
greater detail in Chapter 2). The fact that the fiction of legal personality allowed a 
group of investors to be identified under a common name did not mean that the 
investors would have limited liability. Therefore, the concept of limited liability was 
introduced.31 The purpose of creating a general rule of limited liability was to increase 
the advantages of trading under corporate form by limiting the shareholders’ liability 
only to the extent of their contribution in the corporation’s assets.  
                                                        
28
 For example; the investors’ ownership interest is represented in shares, which can be transferred 
without the need to transfer the business itself. Consequently, capital can be raised from investors over 
time, while avoiding costs of transferring the assets when new shareholders join the company. See, 
Mevorach, I. Insolvency within Multinational Enterprise Groups. New York: Oxford University 
Press Inc; 2009. At page 41 
29
 The limitation of liability has significant economic advantages such as a decrease in the need of 
shareholders to monitor the managers of the companies in which they invest because the financial 
consequences of company failure are limited. Consequently, investors can diversify their investment to 
different enterprises. See. Goddard, D. Corporate Personality-Limited Recourse and its Limits. 
Gratham R. and Rickett C. Corporate Personality in the 20th Century. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press;1998. At page 17 
30
 See, Rosas, J. La Persona Juridica Societaria. Mexico: Oxford University Press;  2001. At page 5 
31
 See, Chapter Two. At page 20 
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     The concepts of corporate personality and limited liability are summed up in the 
metaphor of the “corporate veil”. This metaphor was created in American courts and 
consists of there being an imaginary veil that separates the existence of the company 
from that of its shareholders.32 The existence of the corporate veil is strongly 
supported in law and jurisprudence in common and civil law jurisdictions. The 
acceptance of the corporate veil has been based on the socio-economic benefits it has 
produced. It allows easy gathering of capital due to the safe environment it creates for 
investors, which in turn has allowed technological innovation and the development of 
a necessary infrastructure for countries to develop. However, the corporate veil has 
not only produced economic advantages. It has also been used to practice fraudulent 
acts. Trading under the corporate form creates a situation whereby shareholders can 
actively participate in fraudulent acts. As a consequence, “the piercing of the 
corporate veil” has been introduced in order to counter the misuse of the corporate 
veil.  
1.2 What is “Piercing the corporate veil”?  
 
 
     In this thesis piercing the corporate veil is defined as the means to ignore the 
corporation’s legal personality and hold shareholders liable for the acts and 
obligations of the corporation.  
 
     Originally, company law in common law and civil law jurisdictions did not include 
an exception to the corporate personality and limited liability.33 The early issues that 
required ignoring the existence of the corporate veil were addressed through 
                                                        
32
 See, Barsallo, P.  La Doctrina del Velo Corporativo. Revista LEX.( Issue 160). 1996.  At page 162 
33
 It is important to add that unlike legal personality, limited liability usually is not mandatory for all 
corporations. Limited liability is a concept separate to corporate personality. Consequently, it is 
possible to deal with liability issues without affecting the integrity of the corporate personality. A 
common way is to contract around limited liability; for example, a creditor that contracts with a 
company is actually contracting with the company and not with the shareholders. Therefore, the 
creditor and the company are the parties of the contracts, not the shareholders, who would be regarded 
as third parties in this situation. The creditor, however, can seek personal guarantees from shareholders 
in order to secure his credit. Consequently, if the company defaults, the creditor can recover his credit 
from the shareholders without affecting the corporate personality. This fact describes a means to deal 
ex-ante with liability issues. However, in corporate veil issues, usually no preventative measures have 
been taken by the plaintiff, thus the lack of an statutory exception to the corporate personality and 
shareholders limited liability creates a difficult situation. 
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traditional legal concepts and legal devices that could be applied depending on the 
circumstances of the case (this point will be addressed more extensively throughout 
this thesis).34 Gradually, approaches35 to deal with corporate veil issues have been 
introduced; nonetheless I have to point out that the legal tradition followed by a 
country is a factor that has influenced the way an approach to pierce the corporate veil 
has been developed in each jurisdiction. This premise is developed from the fact that 
judges in common and civil law jurisdictions have a different degree of freedom in 
using critical thinking. On the one hand, the common law judge has the ability to act 
beyond the boundaries of statutory law, which has been useful in dealing with 
corporate veil issues. Consequently, common law jurisdictions have relied on 
doctrinal approaches to deal with corporate veil issues. On the other hand, in civil law 
jurisdictions the piercing of the corporate veil has been addressed in an alternative 
way due to the limitations of the civil law judge to act beyond a statute. Civil law 
jurisdictions have relied mainly on statutory exceptions to the corporate personality.  
  
     The piercing of the corporate veil has a different basis depending on whether it is 
applied in a common law or civil law jurisdiction. However, there is a factor that 
common and civil law jurisdictions share, the rationale to apply this remedy: “the 
prevention and punishment of fraud”.36  
 
     The prevention and punishment of fraud have been the justification for the creation 
of an exception to the corporate veil. However, in the context of the corporate veil, 
the definition of fraudulent behavior varies across common and civil law jurisdictions. 
There is not a concrete definition of what can be seen as fraudulent behavior. 
Consequently, it can be considered that each jurisdiction uniquely engages itself in 
determining what can be viewed as fraud in this context.  
 
                                                        
34
 See, Chapters Two and Three. 
35
 Examples of approaches to deal with corporate personality issues are the American doctrine of 
instrumentality and the Argentinean inoponibilidad de la persona juridical. Each is explained in 
Chapters Two and Three, in addition to the approaches used by other jurisdictions studied in this thesis.  
36
 I regard the prevention and punishment of fraud as the rationale for piercing the corporate veil. 
Certainly, each jurisdiction has a different legal system and needs. However, the concept of corporate 
personality and all it entails is universal. In common and civil law jurisdictions, the corporate entity is 
recognised but its existence has been questioned mainly on grounds of fraud. Other issues that do not 
necesarily involve the concurrence of fraud have also triggered the debate over the corporate 
personality. Nonetheless, fraud has been the main reason to consider this action. This is an argument 
that I will discuss throughout this thesis and support with my comparative study. 
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     I regard piercing the corporate veil as a remedy that each jurisdiction has 
developed individually. Piercing the corporate veil has been shaped in accordance to 
the social, political and economic factors of a particular jurisdiction. The differences 
regarding the application of this remedy can be appreciated in Chapters Two, Three 
and Four, where the piercing of the corporate veil in England, the U.S., Spain, 
Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, Chile and Panama is presented.  
 
     It should be added that in both common and civil law jurisdictions, the piercing of 
the corporate veil has been a controversial subject. The corporate personality has 
gradually gained relevance due to the socio-economic benefits it produces. 
Consequently, in common law and civil law jurisdictions, a tendency to preserve the 
corporate veil has been developed. This tendency has been founded on the fact that if 
the corporate veil could be easily pierced, there would not be any point in 
incorporating a company, as every claim against the company would most probably 
jeopardise the investors’ assets.37 Consequently, investors would be reluctant to 
participate in risky enterprises and the socio-economic benefits produced by the 
corporate veil would be lost.38 Therefore, in most jurisdictions piercing the corporate 
veil is considered a last resource.39   
1.2.1 Origins of the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil  
 
     The piercing of the corporate veil has its origins in the advent of the modern joint 
stock corporation. As mentioned in the first section, the joint stock corporation is 
considered a person, an entity with capacity to act in the legal world and to be liable. 
However, the corporate entity is not a creation of our times. The legal entity known as 
corporation was created in Europe during the Middle Ages but its use was limited to 
                                                        
37
 Piercing the corporate veil is a remedy that has countered centuries of legal decisions that clearly 
state that the corporation is a separate legal entity and its owners are not responsible for debts or 
judgments against it. This remedy definitely undermines the corporate personality and the benefits it 
produces. See, Bevans, N. Business Organization and Corporate Law. U.S.A: Thomson Delmar 
Learning; 2007. At page 275  
38
 The author Joel Moskowitz considers there is fear among small businesses in regard to the dramatic 
consequences of piercing the corporate veil. This fear is founded on losing all assets due to unlimited 
liability. This fear prevents investors from engaging in what may be considered risky enterprises. See, 
Moskowitz, J. Environmental liability and Real Property Transactions. 2nd Edition. New York: 
Aspen law & Business; 1995. At page 100-102 
39 See, Kraakman, R. & Others. The Anatomy of Corporate Law; A Comparative and Functional 
Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2009. At page 139 
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political and religious purposes.40 During the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 
the English and Dutch “chartered companies” received the attribute of legal 
personality and had their capital constituted in shares.41 Although it could be 
considered a cousin of the modern joint stock corporation, the use of chartered 
companies was limited only to merchants that had political connections.42 It was not 
until the Nineteenth Century with the advent of industrialization that the medieval 
corporation developed into the modern joint stock corporation.  
 
     To take a medieval institution such as the corporation and mould it into a 
commercial device was an English initiative. The industrialisation of manufacture 
created the need for large amounts of capital that few entrepreneurs could afford. The 
creation of partnerships was a solution to satisfy the needs of capital. However, the 
traditional partnerships lacked legal personality and involved high transaction costs as 
well as legal expenses.43 Moreover, partners were exposed to the financial risk of the 
enterprise.44 The creation of a type of business association with legal personality and 
limited liability for its members became necessary. Therefore, the first English 
                                                        
40
 The first form of corporation was not created for the practice of commerce; rather it was created to 
protect the interests of monasteries and municipalities by the use of the advantages of legal personality, 
which would not be affected by sickness or death. The attributes of corporate personality helped to 
avoid complications such as the succession of assets; for example, in the case of a religious institution 
such as an abbey, if the abbot died the passing of the order’s land to the new abbot would discontinue. 
However, by conferring the legal personality to the abbey, this complication was avoided because as a 
fictitious entity it was not subject to mortality and was considered a person capable of owning property. 
Pope Innocent IV (in the 12th Century) was the individual who proposed the “fiction theory” in order to 
address the legal personality of the corporation. In the fiction theory, Pope Innocent IV addressed the 
corporation as an entity and gave the following definition: 
 
“The corporation is a separate and distinct social entity, but its legal personality is a mere fiction 
conceded by the state or created by law” 
 
   Originally the corporate fiction was aimed at religious institutions but later the use of this entity was 
expanded to public institutions such as municipalities and universities. Consequently, a fiction created 
with a religious connotation gradually became a tool for political ends. See, Sesarego, C. Naturaleza 
Tridemensional de la Persona Juridica. Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de la Pontificia 
Universidad Catolica de Peru.(No 15) 1999. At page 2 - 5. See also, Brunetti, A. Sociedades 
Mercantiles. Tomo I. Colombia: Editorial Juridica Universitataria ; 2002 At page 83. See also, 
Dewey, J. The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality. Yale Law Journal. (Volumme 
XXXV) 1926. At page 665-668 
41
 See, Iwai, K. The Nature of the Business Corporation: Its Legal Structure and Economic 
Functions. http://iwai-k.com/NatureofBusinessCorporation.pdf [last visit 30 may, 2013] At page 5 
42
 Ibid 
43
 See, Micklethwait, J. and Wooldridge, A. The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary 
Idea. U.S.A: Modern Library; 2003. At page 39 - 40 
44
 Limited liability is not included in a partnership. In this type of association each partner is jointly and 
severally liable for the debts and obligations of the partnership while he or she is/was a partner. See, 
Digman, A. & Lowry, J. Company Law. 7th Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2006. At page 
4  
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Companies Act was enacted in 1844.45 It introduced the joint stock corporation as a 
type of business association with the attributes of legal personality. Shareholders’ 
limited liability was a feature introduced later in 1855 with the Limited Liability 
Act.46  
 
    While the joint stock corporation was gaining relevance in England, in continental 
Europe other types of business association, which also included the attributes of legal 
personality and limited liability, were being developed. Examples are the French 
Société Anonyme (S.A),47 the German Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung 
(GMBH)48 and the Spanish Sociedad Anónima (S.A)49. Certainly, the creation of a 
legal entity that confers limited liability was a breakthrough in countries experiencing 
the boom of industrialisation. However, with the introduction of the joint stock 
corporation (and comparable types of business associations in other jurisdictions) in 
the commercial context, abuse of the attributes of legal personality and limited 
liability also existed.  
 
      The idea of piercing the corporate veil originated in the courts of the U.S..50 The 
U.S. is the jurisdiction that has substantially dealt with corporate personality issues.51 
                                                        
45
 The 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act is the basis of the current U.K. framework for companies. This 
Act addressed basic aspects of the joint stock company such as: incorporation by simple registration, 
provided safeguards against fraud by insisting on full publicity and provided a Register of Companies 
to hold the public documents provided by the companies. See, Idem. At page 17 
46
 The 1855 Act allowed the limited liability of members of a company as long as requirements were 
fulfilled. This Act established shareholder limited liability in its Section 8; “If any execution, 
sequestration or other process in the nature of execution, either at law or in equity, shall have been 
issued against the property or effects of the company, and if there cannot be found sufficient whereon 
to levy or enforce such execution sequestration or other process may be issued against any of the 
shareholders to the extent of their portions of their shares respectively on the capital of the company 
…”. 
47
 The French Société Anonyme was introduced in the French Code of Commerce enacted in 1807. 
However, the attributes of legal personality and limited liability in addition to capital requirements 
where establishes in the loi de mai de 1863 and the reforms in 1867.  
48
 The German Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung or limited liability company was introduced in 
Germany in 1892. 
49
 In Spain the use of business associations became common during the colonial expansion (from 
Sixteen until Seventeen Century). However, the concept of corporate personality and limited liability 
became subject of interest in 1869 and 1885 when reforms to the Spanish code of commerce were 
made.  
50
 A pioneer in the study of this legal phenomenon is the American author Maurice Wormser, who 
addresses this subject in his paper “the veil of the corporate entity”. See, Figueroa, D. Levantamiento 
del Velo Corporativo LatinoAmericano; Aspectos Comparados con el Derecho Estado Unidense. 1st 
Edition. Chile: Editirial el Jurista: 2011.  
51
 Professor Robert Thompson, in an empirical study about the piercing the corporate veil, concluded 
that piercing of the corporate veil is one of the most litigated issues in Company law in the U.S.. In 
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This can be attributed to the relevant role that the corporate personality (first the 
chartered company and later the joint stock corporation) has played in the 
development of the infrastructure of the country.52 The fact that the corporate 
personality became common use soon produced circumstances (fraud and tort 
liability) that triggered the question: to what extent should the veil of incorporation be 
preserved? The U.S. doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is the result of attempts to 
answer this question.   
 
      Although the idea of piercing the corporate veil originated in the U.S., its 
company law has not included a specific rule that allows its application. Rather, the 
piercing of the corporate veil has been applied through a standard developed from 
jurisprudence dealing with this issue. This standard requires the concurrence of three 
elements:  
  Control by the shareholders over the company to the point that it cannot be 
considered an independent legal person 
  Wrongful or fraudulent conduct by the part of the shareholders  
  Connection between the excessive control over the company and the harm or 
loss suffered by the claimant  
 
     This standard has been addressed under the names of instrumentality and alter ego. 
However, the fact that corporate entity issues have been managed through a doctrinal 
                                                                                                                                                              
his study, Thompson used a pool of 1,600 cases. He found that in 636 cases the veil had been pierced 
and that in 947 cases it had not. The 636 cases represent 40%, which can be considered a high figure if 
it is compared with other jurisdictions in which the veil is not frequently or never pierced. The 
Academic Peter Oh, two decades after Thompson’s study, refreshes this subject with a new study based 
on 2,908 cases. He found that the veil had been pierced in 50% of the cases. Both studies included 
Federal and State Courts. Naturally, they classified the cases in accord to authority and 
type. However, for the purposes of this thesis I cite the general figures in order to support the statement 
regarding the American authorities' acceptance of a remedy such as piercing the corporate veil. See 
also, Thompson, R. Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study. Cornell Law Review. (Issue 
76) 1991.  See, also, Oh, P.  Veil-Piercing. Texas Law Review, Vol. 89, p. 81, 2010; U. of Pittsburgh 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2010-06. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1557972 [last 
visit 8 august, 2013] 
52
  See, Micklethwait, J and Wooldridge, A. Supra note 43.  at page 57 -78 
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approach has been the subject of criticism by a sector of the U.S. academia and 
judiciary.53 
 
     The criticism of the mentioned standard has been based on the vagueness of the 
factors that compose it; for example, there is not a parameter to determine excessive 
control over a company nor is there a clear definition of what can be considered as 
fraudulent conduct in this context.54  Therefore, the piercing of the corporate veil is a 
remedy that has been applied on a case-by-case basis, a factor that has generated 
uncertainty.55 However, despite criticism, the U.S. doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil has been a subject of interest for academics and judiciary in other common and 
civil law jurisdictions.  
 
    Currently, the idea of piercing the corporate veil has become universal. Moreover, 
academics and courts in different jurisdictions have used other terms to address the 
piercing of the corporate veil. In English, it has been addressed as lifting / peeping 
behind the veil, penetrating the corporate veil, or ignoring the corporate veil. In 
Spanish, it has been referred to as levantamiento del velo corporativo, rasgado del 
velo corporativo, inoponibilidad de la persona juridical. In Portguese, it is regarded 
as desconsideração da personalidade juridical or descortinamiento do véu 
corporativo. Certainly these different terms in different languages make reference to 
the same remedy: the disregard of the legal entity in order to hold shareholders liable 
for the corporation. However, each legal system has individually developed its own 
method for dealing with corporate veil issues. The piercing of the corporate veil may 
be triggered by a circumstance that in other jurisdictions may not be regarded as a 
factor that could trigger the application of this remedy.   
                                                        
53
  See, Chapter Two. At page 82-85 
54
 See, Strasser, K. Piercing the Veil in Corporate Groups. Connecticut Law Review. (Issue 37). 
2005. At page 645-646 
55
 Ibid  
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1.2.2  The Reverse Piercing of the Corporate Veil 
 
     The occurrence of fraudulent behavior is the main trigger for piercing the 
corporate veil. However, the scope of this remedy has gradually expanded to cases 
that do not necessarily have a fraudulent element.  
 
     The scope of this research is the piercing of the corporate veil in the context of 
fraud. However, there are cases involving a compensation claim or tort damages in 
which the corporate personality has been disregarded without the occurrence of 
fraudulent behavior. I wish to briefly mention that currently the piercing of the 
corporate veil is not only practiced in the context of fraud since from this fact a 
phenomenon worthy of comment can be derived: “the reverse piercing of the 
corporate veil”. In a case involving the reverse piercing of the corporate veil, the 
affected party would not be a creditor; rather, the shareholders themselves would 
present the claim. In this type of case, the shareholders would seek to disregard the 
corporate personality when the corporate entity had become an obstacle for the 
shareholders to recover compensation from circumstances such as an insurance claim 
or expropriation by the government.56 
 
    The reverse piercing of the corporate veil has been controversial in the U.S., where 
courts have considered that “shareholders cannot have it both ways”.57 Entrepreneurs, 
when trading under the corporate form, create a veil that they fiercely protect. They 
therefore cannot dispose of their veil whenever they see fit, as doing so would affect 
the integrity of the corporate personality.58  
     
    In other jurisdictions discussed in this thesis, England, Spain, Argentina, Colombia, 
Chile, Brazil and Panama, the reverse piercing of the corporate veil has not been an 
                                                        
56
 The author Michael Gaertner defines the reverse piercing of the corporate veil as an attempt by 
shareholders, or the corporation itself, to pierce the corporate veil existing between the corporation and 
its shareholders. See, Gaertner, M. Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Corporation 
Owners have it Both Ways? William and Mary Law Review. (Volume 30) 1989. At page 667 
57
 See, e.g., In re Beck Indus., 479 F.2d 410, 418 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973).  
58
 See, Gaertner, M. Supra note 56. At page 682 
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issue. In the case of England, although English authorities are generally reluctant to 
ignore the corporate personality, in relevant cases such as DHN Food Distributors v 
Tower Hamlets London Borough59 and Smith, Stone & Knight v Birmingham 
Corporation60 judges have considered ignoring the corporate personality in favor of 
the shareholder owners (the facts of these cases will be presented in Chapter Two). As 
will be addressed in Chapter Two, English judges have different opinions regarding 
this subject. Whilst some judges are strictly in favour of the corporate personality, 
others may disregard it without considering whether the remedy is in favor of the 
shareholders or creditors. In Spain and Latin American countries, on the other hand, 
corporate personality issues are relatively recent and the dilemma of piercing the 
corporate veil has not considered whether shareholders can benefit from this remedy. 
In fact, some relevant corporate personality cases have been based on the reverse 
piercing of the corporate veil. Some examples shall be provided in Chapters Two, 
Three and Four, where the disregard of the corporate personality individually in each 
jurisdiction is addressed. 
 
1.2.3 The Piercing of the Corporate Veil, a Private Law Remedy 
 
 
     This thesis regards the piercing of the corporate veil as a remedy applied in the 
context of private law. I consider in public law cases there is not a real piercing of the 
corporate veil. I support this statement on the rationale of public law, which is to 
regulate the relations between individuals and the state and also enforce public 
policies. In corporate veil cases where the State is a party and a public policy is in 
jeopardy, the concept of corporate personality is likely to be ignored.61 An example is 
a case involving the policy aimed at the protection of public interest in free 
competition. To have free competition provides the consumer with better prices and 
entrepreneurs will look to improve the quality of their products. If the corporate 
personality is used to engage in monopolistic practices, it is used in a way whereby it 
is in detriment to public interest as the policy involved promotes free competition. 
                                                        
59
 DHN Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1 WLR 852 
60
 Smith, Stone and Knight Ltd v Birmingham Corporation. [1939] B.C.L.C. 480 
61 In Chapters Two, Three and Four I emphasise and present cases that support this statement.  
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Monopolies produce an increase in product prices and innovation is limited.62 
Therefore, in order to enforce its policy regarding free competition, the state takes 
measures such as ignoring the corporate entity in order to sanction the thoughts that 
crafted a scheme aimed at creating a monopoly. 
 
     Courts in some jurisdictions have even established that corporate personality is 
irrelevant in public law cases. In Colombia, for example, the Colombian Supreme 
Court,63 in dealing with a Recurso de Casación Penal involving an issue of a 
company used to hide assets product of illicit activities, came to the conclusion that 
for criminal law proceedings, the veil of incorporation does not has relevance.64 It can 
be considered that this statement of the Colombian Supreme Court is one of the basis 
on which Colombian policy makers later developed the Estatuto Anticorrupción 
(addressed more extensively in Chapter Three). Another example can be found in 
Panama. In a case involving the use of the corporate entity to obstruct judicial 
enquires and to hide assets derived from illicit activities, the Panamanian Supreme 
Court of Justice concluded that the corporate personality is disregarded if it obstructs 
an investigation in which criminal proceedings depend (addressed in greater detail in 
Chapter Four).65 Certainly, an academic or judicial authority may make reference to 
the concept of piercing the corporate veil in areas of public law such as criminal and 
tax law. However, no real corporate personality dilemma exists in this context since 
the corporate personality is likely to be ignored when it contradicts a public interest 
represented in a public policy.  
 
 
                                                        
62
 In contemporary economics, monopoly is treated as a source of inefficiency. Lee, D & Mckenzie, R. 
In Defense of Monopoly, How Market Power Foster Creative Production. U.S.A: University of 
Michigan Press; 2008. At page 1 
63
 The Supreme Court of Justice is the highest judicial body in civil and penal matters and issues of 
criminal and civil procedure in Colombia. The Supreme Court of Colombia is not the highest authority 
in regards to the interpretation of administrative law, constitutional law and the administration of the 
judiciary. The Court consists of twenty three magistrates, elected by the same institution in list 
conformed by the Superior Council of the Judiciary for individual terms of eight years. The Colombian 
Supreme Court is divided in five chambers (Sala): Sala plena, Sala de Gobierno, Sala de Casacion 
Civil, Sala de Casacion Laboral y Sala de Casacion Penal. http://www.cortesuprema.gov.co/ 
64
  “El que para efectos comerciales y civiles la persona juridical sea un ente distinto de sus socios, es 
una verdad que no trasciende el ambito penal…” See, Corte Supreme de Justicia de Panama, Sala 
Penal, auto 7183 del 20 de enero de 1993 
65
 See, Sentencia, Pleno de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. 29 de enero de 1991  
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     In contrast to public law cases, in private law cases the political state is not a party. 
The concept of private law makes reference to the area of law that usually deals with 
the relationships between individuals that are of no direct concern of the state.66 The 
modern concept of corporate personality was created mainly for commercial purposes 
and the piercing of the corporate veil was originally created to address issues that 
derived from the relationship among private individuals (the corporation and other 
traders). The dilemma about whether or not to ignore the corporate personality was 
triggered because the fact that an individual requests the court to ignore the corporate 
personality demands the judge to omit a policy that is aimed at economic welfare. 
Common and civil law jurisdictions recognise and tend to preserve the corporate 
entity as part of a policy aimed at economic development. This fact is justified with 
the objective of the corporate personality; to encourage investment by diminishing the 
risks that involve every commercial adventure. This objective is achieved by 
transferring the risk to creditors and tort victims. Undeniably, a degree of unfairness 
exists but the corporate entity is part of a development policy that is supposed to 
benefit economic welfare. On the other hand, it cannot be said that there is not a 
public interest in an individual’s claim to pierce the corporate veil. In this context, the 
public interest lays in preventing and punishing the wrongful use of the corporate 
entity. However, to trade using the benefits of the corporate personality tends to 
produce unfair situations for creditors, tort victims and in some cases to shareholders, 
which are not necessarily derived from the wrong use of the corporate personality. 
Therefore, different approaches (addressed later in Chapters Two and Three) to deal 
with corporate veil issues have been developed in order to determine whether the 
policy supporting the corporate personality should be ignored or not. In other words, 
the interest of an individual (or a small group) has to be balanced against a public 
interest represented on the policy that supports the existence of the corporate 
personality. 
 
     The corporate personality has not only been discussed in the context of 
commercial relationships but also in the context of family and labour law.  Family and 
labour law deal with relationships between private individuals and consequently the 
first thought would be that these two areas are part of the private law ‘branch’. 
                                                        
66
 See, Martin, E. A Dictionary of Law.6th Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2006 
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However, there is a strong public interest that makes the piercing of the corporate veil 
more likely in these two areas than in commercial law. The public interest lies in the 
fact that in modern societies, aspects regarding children’s and workers’ rights have 
gained relevance. In family law, a common misuse of the corporate entity has been 
the use of the corporate entity as a means to hide assets that are part of a matrimonial 
regime in order to avoid the distribution of those assets. In labour law, the corporate 
veil (in some circumstances) obstructs workers from receiving compensation because 
the corporate entity has run out of assets and shareholders have had their liability 
limited to their share in the company.  
 
    The jurisdictions studied in this thesis have adopted a similar position about the 
corporate personality in family and labor law; they generally ignore the corporate 
personality in this context. Later in Chapters Two, Three and Four, it can be noted 
that relevant precedents in this subject have been developed in family and labor law. 
  
     The Latin American jurisdictions studied in Chapter Three are those that have 
dealt with corporate personality issues in a more substantial manner. Moreover, these 
jurisdictions have introduced an exception to the corporate personality in private law 
statutes. In England, the U.S. and Spain, the piercing of the corporate veil has also 
been addressed from a private law perspective. The fact that exceptions have been 
drafted in the context of private law strengthens my notion of piercing the corporate 
veil as a private law remedy.  
 
      It cannot be denied that in modern common and civil law jurisdictions, in public 
law statutes such as tax law, bankruptcy law and environmental law, direct exceptions 
to the corporate personality have been introduced. As previously mentioned, I 
personally do not see a real dilemma regarding the piercing of the corporate veil in 
this context. However, the existence of a direct exception in a public statute is, I 
believe, to “emphasise the priority of a public interest”. This thesis focuses on the 
piercing of the corporate veil in a private law context for reasons already explained. 
Nonetheless, in Chapters Two, Three and Four some public law statutes (such as tax 
law, environmental law and bankruptcy law) have been included as they contain 
exceptions to the corporate personality. The inclusion of these statutes is to provide 
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evidence of my thought regarding the tendency of the state (in civil and common law 
countries) to ignore the corporate personality when a public interest is at stake. 
 
     The function of the state is to protect the public’s interest.67 Consequently, a 
fiction like the corporate personality created for the interest of a small group of 
individuals will not be protected by the state if this is used against public interests.  
 
1.3 The Effect of Piercing the Corporate Veil over Aspects of the 
Modern Corporate Personality  
 
     The concept of piercing the corporate veil has been explained together with its 
roots in the concept of corporate personality. However, I cannot omit the fact that the 
concept of corporate personality is not what it used to be in its early days. This 
concept has changed together with markets and commercial practices. Without doubt, 
the piercing of the corporate veil has also been present throughout this process of 
change and generated debate in modern aspects of the corporate personality such as 
corporate groups and private and public companies. 
1.3.1 The Piercing of the Corporate Veil in the Context of Corporate Groups  
 
     A corporate group is not a new company nor has it legal personality.68 It is a 
concentration of companies that may be the result of different circumstances such as 
the creation of new companies, international mergers or joint ventures.69 A corporate 
group can be defined as two or more companies that operate under a similar directive 
in order to achieve a common objective. 
 
     Each company that is part of the group has a legal personality and independent 
existence. However, in order to achieve the common objective, the companies 
forming the group accept operating under the direction of a parent company that 
establishes the policies and the strategy that the subsidiaries have to follow.  
 
                                                        
67
 I regard the protection of public´s interest as one of the functions of the state and public policies are a 
means to perform this duty. 
68
 Eisenberg, M. Corporate Groups. Gillooly, M.The Law Relating to Corporate Groups. 
Australia: The Federation Press; 1993. At page 2- 7 
69
 Ibid 
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     Traditional company law has been the subject of criticism because it tends to apply 
the same rules of a natural person shareholder to the corporate entity in its role as a 
shareholder.70 This lack of distinction can be attributed to the fact that in the early 
days of the joint stock corporation only natural persons had the right to be 
shareholders; a company was not allowed to own shares of another company.71 
Therefore, company law was developed as a body of law to deal with companies 
formed by individual investors. Moreover, early cases involving the disregard of the 
legal entity were based on making a natural person liable for the debts of the 
company.72 It was not until the late Nineteenth Century that companies were allowed 
to own shares of another company.73 
 
     The role of a corporate entity as a shareholder tends to differ from the role of the 
natural person shareholder. On the one hand, the corporate entity is not an individual 
investor; rather it is a group of investors that trade under the corporate form. 
Moreover, a parent company creates, operates and dissolves subsidiaries primarily as 
part of a business strategy in pursuit of the business goal of the larger enterprise, 
which the parent and all the subsidiaries are pursuing together. On the other hand, a 
natural person as a shareholder is an individual investor that seeks to profit from its 
investment and whose role may be passive or active regarding the companies’ 
management.  
 
     Currently, when corporate groups operate through a network of subsidiaries 
organised under the laws of many different states; they are referred to as multinational 
                                                        
70
 The author Philip Blumberg considers that limited liability for corporate groups emerged from an 
historical accident. The author considers that the application of liability to insulate from liability parent 
corporations as well as ultimate investors apparently occurred unthinkingly as a consequence of the 
recognition of the separate legal entity of a corporation from its shareholders.  He considers there was 
no consideration over the aspects that involve a parent-subsidiary relationship. See, Blumberg, Ph. 
Accountability of Multinational Corporations: the Barriers Presented by Concepts of Corporate 
Juridical Entity. Hastings Internationa and Comparative Law Review. (Issue 24). 2001. At pages 207 
to 304. See also, Fuentes, C. Acercamiento al Concepto de Grupos Empresariales: Concurrencia de 
Elementos para su Existencia. Revist@ e-Mercatoria, (Vol. 8, No. 1) 2009. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1493764 [Last visit 30 may, 2013] 
71
 See, Blumberg Ph, Ibid 
72
 See, Blumberg Ph, Ibid 
73
 Corporate groups emerged in the U.S. with the liberalisation of state corporation laws. The first state 
that authorised corporations to acquire and own shares of other corporations was New Jersey in 1889. 
See, Blumberg, Ph. The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations. Delaware 
Journal of Corporate Law.(Volume 15) 1990. At page 325 
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enterprises.74 Moreover, nowadays the corporate group is the dominant form of 
enterprise organisation in the largest worldwide markets.75  The popularity corporate 
groups have gained also makes corporate veil issues more common in this context.   
 
    As has been mentioned, a corporate group is not a new company with legal 
personality; each company that is part of the group is an independent legal entity.76 
The relationship between the parent company and the subsidiary derives from the 
parent company’s role as shareholder of the subsidiary. Consequently, the parent has 
liability limited only to the extent of its contribution in the corporation assets. The 
piercing of the corporate veil has been applied to establish a parent company’s 
liability for its subsidiary.  
 
     The following parameters are used to determine a parent company’s liability: the 
degree of control of the parent company over the subsidiary, the non-compliance with 
corporate formalities and the lack of the subsidiary’s independent objective. These 
can be considered as universal parameters.77 The control of the parent company over 
the subsidiary varies depending on the type of activity and business strategy; for 
instance, to hold a parent company liable on grounds of control might be a difficult 
task. Therefore, this argument must be supplemented with other circumstance such as 
a lack of compliance with corporate formalities.  
 
     I divide corporate formalities into two types: formalities for incorporation and 
management formalities. On the one hand, formalities for incorporation are the legal 
formalities established in company law that must be adhered to in order to create a 
company. The disregard of the legal entity does not apply in this context because if 
                                                        
74
 Vandekerckhove, K. Piercing the Corporate Veil. The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International; 
2007. At page 5 
75
 Ibid 
76
 However in the case DHN Foods distributor, Lord Denning challenge this notion of corporate 
groups. See, Chapter Two. At page 51 
77 An example to support this statement is in the cited English case Smith, Stone and Knight Ltd v 
Birmingham Corporation and the Argentinean Case Cia. Swift de la Plata Sa S/ Quiebra C/ Deltec 
Arg. Y Deltec Internaciona l. These two cases happened in different jurisdictions. Moreoever, both 
jurisdictions follow a different legal tradition. However, courts in both countries regarded control of the 
parent company over the subsidiary, the non-compliance with corporate formalities and the lack of the 
subsidiary’s independent objective in order to decide wheter or not to ignore the corporate personality. 
I used only two examples, but later in Chapters Two and Three I address cases in other jurisdictions in 
which this set of factors have been used to deal with corporate groups in this context.  See, Chapter 
Two at page 49 and  Chapter Three at page 138 
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the legal requirements are not followed, the company would not exist. Management 
formalities, on the other hand, are the formalities that must be adhered to by the 
company’s managers and shareholders.  
 
     Management formalities, such as the lack of accountability registers and lack of 
records regarding the board of directors´ meetings, may be determinant to pierce the 
corporate veil in the context of corporate groups.78 The lack of accountability register 
may create confusion between the finances of the parent and the subsidiary companies 
while the lack of a record of meetings may give grounds to deduce that the subsidiary 
has not an essential organ (director’s board) for its legal performance. The lack of 
compliance with management formalities may create grounds to consider that the 
subsidiary is not an independent legal person. In addition, as a company the 
subsidiary has to have a specific objective established in the Articles of Association. 
Certainly, this can be regarded as part of the formalities for incorporation. However, 
although the objective of the subsidiary is established in the Articles of Incorporation 
this (in some circumstances) is not followed. In the context of corporate groups, a 
subsidiary that lacks an objective independent from that of the group cannot be 
regarded as a legal person. The lack of an independent objective can be considered to 
have derived from the excessive control of the parent company over the subsidiary. 
Later, in Chapters Two and Three, it can be appreciated that the courts in the common 
and civil law jurisdictions subject of this study have considered these factors in order 
to shape their decision over a parent company’s liability case. 
                                                        
78
 Idem, at page 20-23 
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1.3.1.1 Single economic unit   
 
    The fact that the corporate group is based on multiple legal entities acting as a 
single unit gives rise to another means to deal with a parent company’s liability, 
which has been addressed as a “single economic unit”. The single economic unit is a 
tool that can be used to ignore the corporate personality. This is based on the fact that 
a group of companies act as a unit in order to achieve a common objective and 
consequently should answer as a unit for the obligations of the members of the group. 
79
 
    The single economic unit can be considered as a means to deal with the group 
structure and may differ from the traditional piercing of the corporate veil. Certainly, 
by disregarding the legal personality of the companies forming the group, a sole unit 
is rendered. However, a single economic unit does not depend on the concurrence of 
factors required as standard; rather, a single economic unit usually occurs for 
purposes of the interpretation of a statutory rule or contractual clause.80   Moreover, 
the application of the single economic unit approach tends to be straightforward 
because the statutory rule or contract clause may have been drafted without 
considering the principles on which the structure of the corporate group is founded.81 
1.3.2   The Corporate Veil in the Context of Private and Public Companies  
 
     The corporate entity can exist as a private company or public company. A private 
company is one whose shares do not trade freely in impersonal markets and are 
owned by a small number of persons.82 A public company, on the other hand, is a 
company whose shares are offered in a capital market to the public.83 In the U.S., 
England and Spain, public companies are part of business culture. These countries 
have gradually developed capital markets in which corporate entities can participate. 
In Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Brazil and Panama, however, the growth of public 
companies is quite recent. Latin America is a region that has started to experience 
                                                        
79
 See, Cheng, T. Piercing the Corporate Veil Across the Atlantic: A Comparative Study of the 
English and the U.S. Corporate Veil Doctrines. Available 
at:http://works.bepress.com/thomas_cheng/3  [last visit 30 may, 2013] at page 4 - 15 
80
 See, Vandekerckhove K, Supra note 74. at page 5 
81
 Idem, at page 6 
82
 See, Kraakman, R. & Others. Supra note 39. At page 2 
83
 Ibid 
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economic growth since the late 1980s. Before this period, capital markets were small 
or non-existent in the region. Consequently, public companies are not part of business 
culture in Latin America and thus corporate entities are commonly private.84 
      
     The disregard of the legal entity is a remedy aimed at making shareholders liable 
for the acts of the corporate entity. In order to apply this remedy, the concurrence of 
fraudulent behavior on the part of the shareholders is required. Certainly, the 
fraudulent shareholder must have a degree of control over the company’s 
management in order to achieve its fraudulent purpose. This degree of control is 
commonly achieved in privately owned companies in which shareholders tend to have 
an active role in management. In fact the relevant cases dealing with corporate veil 
issues (which I present later in this thesis) in the U.S., England, Spain, Argentina, 
Colombia, Chile and Brazil have involved privately owned companies rather than 
public companies.  
 
     This does not mean that the disregard of the legal entity cannot be applied to 
companies that go public. However, it is not common. The shareholders of a public 
company tend to have a passive role regarding management. The daily management 
of the company is a task performed by hired professionals who make up the directors’ 
board.85 Consequently, directors will face liability if the company defaults due to 
negligence, reckless management or fraud.86 Certainly the corporate entity has 
personality and assets different from those of the directors. However, hired directors 
may not be shareholders. Consequently, they may not reap the benefits of the 
corporate veil. Corporate governance standards, accountability regulations and 
insolvency laws are some of the methods used to deal with the directors who are 
responsible for the performance of the corporate entity.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
84
 See, Reyes, F. A new Policy Agenda for Latin America Company Law: Reshaping the Closely-
Held Entity Landscape. University of Tilburg. 2011. Available at 
http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=115302 [Last visit 13 june, 2013] At page 15 
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 Clarke, T. Corporate Governance: Comparative approach. U.S.A: Routledge; 2007. At page 33- 
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86
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1.4 The Influence of Legal Tradition over the Piercing of the 
Corporate Veil 
 
    The legal tradition followed by a country is an influential factor in the development 
of an approach to deal with corporate personality issues. The concept of legal 
tradition makes reference to a set of customs and practices used by society to deal 
with issues among its members.87 In modern civilization the common law and the 
civil law are the most influential legal traditions due to historical factors.88  The legal 
tradition establishes the basic rules and principles that the judiciary will follow when 
dealing with legal issues. However, each society has different legal needs, thus each 
will use the rules and principles of the legal tradition in accord to these internal needs. 
From a legal tradition, a legal system is created and this in turn creates the 
environment in which concepts such as piercing the corporate veil are going to be 
developed.  
 
     In this thesis it is argued that Latin American countries have developed their own 
approaches to pierce the corporate veil, rather than borrowing the American doctrine.  
This statement derives from the fact that there is a misconception regarding the 
piercing of the corporate veil. Indeed, some Latin American academics consider that 
the American doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has made its way to Latin 
America.89 I cannot deny the fact that the American doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil has been a subject of interest for Latin American academics and judiciary.90 
                                                        
87
 The author, Patrick Glenn, in his work “Legal Traditions of the World” explores the concept of 
tradition and its influence on current legal practice. He focuses on aspects such as customs, religion and 
regional practices as the basis of current legal traditions. See, Glenn, P. Legal Traditions of the 
World (4th Edition). New York: Oxford University Press; 2010 
88
 There are other legal traditions such as Islamic legal tradition and Hindu legal tradition. However, 
the civil and common law traditions are currently the prevalent legal traditions due to factors such as 
colonial expansion of European empires. Powerful European countries such as the U.K., Spain and 
France, exported the common law and the civil law tradition to different regions of the world. After the 
colonies gained independence, they kept the legal traditions introduced by the colonising countries. As 
a result we have common and civil law as the most relevant legal traditions. See, idem. At page 361 
89 The author, Jose M. Bello, in his paper regarding the piercing of the corporate veil in Latin America, 
considers the piercing of the corporate veil as a concept loaned to Latin American jurisdictions. He 
states that “the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has been trying to make its way through Latin 
America.”  This is a statement which is not shared in this thesis, due to the fact that the corporate 
personality is a universal concept. A point addressed later in more extent.  
See, Bello, J. Supra note 26. At page 628  
90
 The authors Perez and Diaz are some of the Latina American academics that have developed an 
interest on the study of the American doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Perez, R. Una Vision 
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However, the Latin American countries that have introduced an exception to the 
corporate personality have structured this in accordance with the principles and 
internal beliefs of the civil law tradition.91 The relevance that legal tradition has had 
over the development of piercing of the corporate veil in different jurisdictions is one 
of the core points addressed in this thesis. This point is one of the aspects on which 
my research question has been structured.    
  
1.5 The Principle of Sana Critica; how does it fit in this context? 
 
     The civil law is a legal tradition that adheres to the strict application of statutory 
rules for the sake of legal certainty; to confer judges with judicial discretion is against 
the basis of the civil law tradition.92 However, throughout the Twentieth Century the 
civil law tradition has been in the process of becoming more flexible. Indeed, the law 
that composes the legal framework of civil law tradition countries can be compared to 
a raw material that needs to be processed in order to properly use it. Positive law is a 
human creation and is consequently imperfect. Positive law has loopholes and 
undefined concepts; policy makers cannot predict all series of circumstances that may 
concur on a legal dispute. Thus, the Principios Generales del Derecho (legal 
principles) appear as the means to process positive law and make it suitable to 
society’s legal needs. Legal principles can be used for this task because they are 
composed of a series of principles with the aim of the fair administration of justice. 
The principle of sana critica is part of this group of legal principles and can be 
defined as a principle that encourages legal reasoning. Sana critica  is a tool for the 
interpretation of law that is based on rules that support the use of common knowledge 
and logic. Indeed, sana critica helps the rational application of positive law by 
providing the civil law judge with the ability to critically assess the facts of the case. 
  
                                                                                                                                                              
Dual de la Doctrina del Levantamiento del Velo de la Persona Juridica. Revista del Instituto de la 
Judicatura Federal No 25. 2008. See also Diaz Olivo, C. Mitos y Leyendas Acerca de la Doctrina de 
Descorrer el Velo Corporativo. Revista Juridica de la Universidad de Puerto Rico (Volume 73: No. 
2) page 311-91. 2004 
91
 The civil law tradition is characterised for its formalist nature, which contrasts with the flexibility of 
the common law. In Chapter Three I will address aspects of the civil law tradition that have influenced 
the piercing of the corporate veil in Latin American jurisdictions.  
92
 Perdomo, R. & Marryman, j. Supra note 17. At page 48  
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     In this thesis, I have turned my attention to the principle of sana critica, rather than 
looking to traditional concepts already used by other Latin American civil law 
jurisdictions to deal with the corporate personality. In order to deal with corporate 
personality issues the substance rather than the form must be examined and for this 
task legal reasoning is required. I consider sana critica can provide the necessary 
support for the proper application of piercing the corporate veil in a civil law country 
such as Panama. I support this belief on the fact that Sana critica is composed of a set 
of rules that I address as “rules of critical thinking”. These rules allow a degree of 
discretion but at the same time prevent personal bias (I will address each of these 
rules and their potential role in Chapter Five).  
Chapter Conclusion  
 
    The corporate entity was a perfect invention. Indeed, it allows the rise of capital to 
support ambitious enterprises. However the entrepreneur that uses that vehicle often 
found ways of misusing it, particulary for fraud. The advent of corporate groups and 
the increase in the use of the corporate personality have both made corporate veil 
issues more common. Thus, the existence of a remedy such as the piercing of the 
corporate veil has become necessary. However, it cannot be ignored that the piercing 
of the corporate veil is a remedy developed individually by each jurisdiction in accord 
to its internal and legal needs. The individuality of each jurisdiction in this context 
and the influence of legal tradition are the basis on which I have structured my 
research question. In the following chapters evidence of each jurisdiction’s 
individuality and influence of legal tradition will be provided.  
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CHAPTER II: The Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil 
in England and the U.S 
  
 
     As mentioned in the first chapter, the piercing of the corporate veil is originally an 
Anglo-American doctrine. The fact that England and the U.S. were the first to use the 
corporate personality as a device for commerce, they were thus first to experience the 
dilemma about whether or not to pierce the corporate veil. The focus of this research 
is to study the piercing of the corporate veil in Latin American civil law jurisdictions. 
Certainly, a different setting from that presented in common law jurisdictions such as 
England and the U.S.. However, the piercing of the corporate veil is originally an 
Anglo-American remedy and consequently a study of the way in which the corporate 
veil has been dealt in these jurisdictions is imperative.  
 
    The U.S. and England are both common law tradition countries. This legal 
tradition, which combines the applications of rules of common law and equity, allows 
the judge to use critical thinking when the positive law does not provide an answer to 
an issue or its strict application may produce an unfair result. This has been a great aid 
for common law judges when dealing with corporate personality issues. Indeed, in 
England and the U.S. no direct exception to the corporate personality has been 
introduced. Therefore, when an issue involving the corporate personality has arisen, 
the common law judge has used his power to personally assess whether to ignore or 
preserve the statutory rule supporting the corporate personality. As a result, case law 
regarding piercing the corporate veil contains a diversity of opinions regarding this 
subject. From case law, doctrinal approaches to deal with corporate personality issues 
have been developed. However, although England and the U.S. follow the same legal 
tradition and additionally critical thinking has been key to deal with corporate veil 
issues, the piercing of the corporate veil has been addressed differently in both 
jurisdictions. In this chapter, besides general aspects of piercing the corporate veil, the 
path that each jurisdiction has taken regarding the application of this remedy will be 
addressed. Moreover, a personal analysis about the factors that have contributed to a 
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different application of piercing the corporate veil in England and the U.S. shall be 
presented. 
2.1  Piercing the Corporate Veil in England 
 
     Disregard of the legal entity has been a controversial subject in English company 
law. In fact the English judiciary has been characterised for being less willing to 
pierce the corporate veil than has the U.S..93 The perception of England as a 
jurisdiction willing to preserve the corporate personality can be attributed to the fact 
that less direct approaches to deal with corporate veil issues have been applied by 
English courts. However, before addressing the methods used by the English judiciary 
to deal with corporate veil issues, I will proceed to address the case Salomon V. 
Salomon Co. Ltd, which can be considered the precedent that created the foundation 
of the current position of the English courts with regard to the piercing of the 
corporate veil.  
2.1.1 The case of Salomon  
 
     English company law authors regard the case of Salomon V. Salomon Co. Ltd 94 as 
the landmark in the preservation of the corporate entity’s integrity and autonomy.95 
This precedent created the foundations of the current position of the English judiciary 
in regard to the corporate personality.  
 
    This case presented an early and I dare to say simple scenario, if compared to the 
modern corporate structures. Mr. Aron Salomon was a boot maker, who carried out 
his business as a sole trader. One day he decided to enjoy the benefits of limited 
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 See, Cheng, T. Supra note 79. At page 3  
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 Salomon V Salomon & Co [1897] A.C. 22 
95
 The case of Salomon has been perceived by academia as a landmark of the corporate personality in 
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liability and created a company called “A Salomon & Co Ltd”, to execute the 
bookmaking business.  The members of the company were his wife, his daughter, four 
sons and himself. Each subscriber took a £1 share.  Mr. Salomon sold his boot making 
business to the company for £39,000. Part of the purchase price was used by Mr. 
Salomon to subscribe for a further 20,000 £1 shares in the company. However, 
£10,000 of the purchase price was not paid by the company; rather this was given to 
Mr. Salomon in a series of debentures, which in turn gave Mr. Salomon a guarantee 
for the debt. In other words, he had preference over other creditors in case the 
company defaulted, which is indeed what happened. The business of A Salomon & Co 
Ltd failed, and the company went into liquidation. As a creditor with preference, Mr. 
Salomon claimed for his credit. However, this payment would have left the company 
without enough assets to cover debts to other creditors. Consequently, Mr Salomon’s 
claim was challenged by the company’s liquidator, who claimed that Mr. Salomon 
should answer for the debts of the company. The plaintiff argued that the company 
had conducted the business as an agent of Mr. Salomon and consequently he was 
responsible for the debts incurred in the course of the agency. The First Instance 
Court decided in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore Mr. Salomon appealed. Although 
Salomon & Co was properly incorporated, the Court of Appeal considered this fact 
not to be relevant.96 Instead, the Court of Appeal focused on whether the sale of Mr. 
Salomon’s business to Salomon & Co was valid; should this transaction be supported 
to enable Mr. Salomon to defeat the creditors and under the debentures appropriate 
the assets to himself?97  
 
      Based on the facts of there not being a valuation of stock, account of profits and 
non- influential members of the company (shareholders were considered as dummies 
used by Mr. Salomon to comply with a statutory requirement), the Court of Appeal 
decided that Salomon & Co was a sham created by Mr. Salomon to defeat creditors.98 
Therefore, the remedy provided by the Court of Appeal consisted of two options: (1) 
Mr. Salomon had to indemnify the company against the debts and costs; (2) or the 
Court could declare the sale of the business as invalid, set aside the agreement and 
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debentures and order Mr. Salomon to repay the money of the sale.99 Certainly, both 
options were aimed at setting aside the corporation’s legal personality and made Mr. 
Salomon liable for the debts of the Company.  
 
     The House of Lords, however, rejected the decisions made by the First Instance 
Court and the Court of Appeal. The existence of Salomon & Co Ltd’s personality was 
preserved. Their Lordships held that there was nothing in the Companies Act that 
prohibited what Mr Salomon had done, Lord Macnaghten, Lord Halsbury and Lord 
Herschell: 
 
“It is not contrary to the true intent and meaning of the Companies Act 1862 for a 
trader, in order to limit his liability and obtain the preference of a debenture-holder 
over other creditors, to sell his business to a limited company consisting only of 
himself and six members of his own family, the business being then solvent, all the 
terms of sale being' known to and approved by the shareholders, and all the 
requirements of the Act being complied with.” 100  
 
      The decision made by the House of Lords in the case of Salomon, indeed, defined 
the effects of the corporate entity.101 It was established that the mere wish to trade 
using the corporate entity in order to get the benefits of limited liability is not itself to 
be regarded as fraud.102 The whole purpose of incorporating a business is for its 
member[s] to avoid incurring further personal liability.103 To presume the creation of 
a company as fraudulent would defeat the whole notion of the separate existence of 
the company and make it impossible for small private companies to function in a 
different way to partnerships. However, it was clear from the decision in Salomon that 
had there been evidence of fraud their Lordships would not have recognised the 
company as a separate entity.  
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     In addition, in the Salomon Case, it was clarified that being a controller member of 
a company does not in itself make the company an agent of that member, (although 
the sole objective of the company is to benefit the member[s]).104  Consequently, the 
creditors that accept trading with a corporate entity also accept the risk that should the 
company default they cannot reach the shareholders assets. Therefore, creditors have 
the obligation to establish adequate protections to have a higher probability of 
recovering their credit in case of default.105 
2.1.2 The Effects of the Salomon’s Precedent  
 
     Based on the precedent of Salomon, the English judiciary has established that the 
only condition to enjoy the benefits of the corporate entity is that the company be 
properly created by registration. The Companies Act 2006 give the register power to 
refuse to register a company not created for a lawful purpose.  In principle, the 
English judiciary will not allow the use of the corporate entity for fraudulent 
purposes. However, the piercing of the corporate veil is not common in this 
jurisdiction. I personally consider that the English approach to corporate personality 
cases involve an extension of liability rather than piercing the corporate veil. As will 
be shown throughout this section, the English judiciary has opted for not affecting the 
integrity of the corporate personality.  
     Certainly, since the decision on the Salomon case English authorities have crafted 
exceptions to the corporate personality. These main exceptions have been developed 
under the concepts of “sham”, “agency” and “single economic unit”. However, 
although these exceptions are currently valid and applicable, none of these have been 
widely applied. 
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2.1.2.1 Sham Exception  
 
     The Case Gilford Motors v Horne,106 is an early corporate personality case on 
which the obligations of a natural person are extended to a corporate entity and it is 
justified through an argument based on the concept of sham. In this case, the 
defendant was accused of using a company called “JM Horne & Co Ltd” to avoid the 
effects of a covenant to not compete with his ex-employer. The defendant did not hold 
shares or a position in the company. Instead, his wife and an employee held shares 
and were the directors of the company. However, the defendant had a strong influence 
over the management of the company. Therefore, based on the fact that Mr. Horne 
sought to avoid the covenant through a company (that he indirectly controlled) the 
court considered the company to be a “mere cloak or sham”.107 It was believed that 
even if a company was properly incorporated, its legitimacy would be doubted if it 
were suspected of being a device to conceal an illegitimate purpose. However, the 
outcome of this case was not the piercing of the corporate veil. Rather the effects of 
the covenant were extended from Mr. Horne to the Company JM Horne & Co Ltd, 
and the integrity of the corporate personality was preserved.  
     The precedent established in Gilford Motors v Horne created the basis for the 
concept of sham to become an available argument against wrongdoers who sought 
cover behind the corporate personality. In the case Jones v Lipman,108 the argument of 
sham established in Gilford Motors v Horne was again used to deal with the 
fraudulent use of corporate personality. In this case the defendant agreed to sell some 
land but later he decided not to complete the sale. The defendant decided to transfer 
the property to a company, of which he and his lawyer were the shareholders and 
directors. The court regarded this company as “the creature of the defendant, a device, 
a sham”.109 However, rather than piercing the corporate veil, the court decided to 
make the company a second defendant. Furthermore, both defendants were obligated 
to complete the agreement between the claimant and the first defendant.  
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     Although the outcome of the cited cases did not result in the piercing of the 
corporate veil, it can be considered that the relevance of both precedents derived from 
the fact that the scope of the sham exception was defined. Indeed, from this point the 
judiciary started to consider that the use of the corporate entity as an instrument to 
escape contractual obligations is a justification to set aside the corporate personality. 
However, the concept of sham derived from Gilford Motors v Horne can be regarded 
as an incomplete approach because there is not a systematic procedure or set of 
factors that help to determine whether or not to pierce the corporate veil. Indeed, from 
the cases Gilford Motors v Horne and Jones v Lipman the judiciary did not create a 
method to properly apply this approach, a fact that can be attributed to the concern 
regarding the principle established in the case of Salomon.  
     However, despite the lack of a systematic method, case law has made the English 
judiciary consider the concurrence of facts such as the motive for creating a company.  
The motive can be determined on there being a criminal component or an intention to 
defraud. Moreover, the exact moment as to when a company is brought into being is 
also considered as it helps to define the intention of the incorporator(s); for example, 
if a person creates a company and then transfers its assets, which are part of legal 
proceedings, the legitimacy of this legal entity may be regarded as doubtful and thus 
be considered a sham.  
     In more contemporary English corporate personality cases, parties seeking to 
pierce the corporate veil have continued to make use of the concept of sham. An 
example is the the case, Trustor AB v Smallbone & others.110 In the case Trustor AB v 
Smallbone & others, Mr. Smallbone is a director accused of syphoning funds. He had 
authority to administrate Trustors AB monies and using its power transferred the 
monies to a company called Introcom. Introcom was a company controlled by 
Liechtenstein Trust, whose beneficiary was Mr. Smallbone. In this case, the claimant 
argued that the company was a sham used for improper purposes. Certainly the 
English court considered setting aside the corporate personality and holding Mr. 
Smallbone liable. In this case the court held “… the court is entitled to pierce the 
corporate veil and recognise the receipt of the company as that of the individual in 
control of it if the company was used as a device or façade to conceal the true facts, 
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thereby avoiding or concealing any liability of those individual(s).”111 However, 
although the improper use of the corporate entity was recognised, it was not 
considered to be sufficient justification to pierce the corporate veil.      
 
    The concept of sham can be considered as an appropriate basis from which to 
develop an argument to deal with the corporate personality when used for improper 
purposes. Nonetheless, since its early days this approach has been covered by the 
shadow of the precedent established in the case of Salomon. The three cited cases 
present three different periods of time and it can be appreciated that although there is 
an evident improper use of the corporate personality, the English courts have opted 
for keeping the integrity of the corporate personality and deal with the issue through 
alternative means.   
2.1.2.2 Agency 
 
     The traditional concept of agency addresses a relationship in which a party (named 
the principal) will draw up a contract with another party (named the agent) to act on 
its behalf (or can be a relationship implied from circumstances).112 Consequently, the 
acts and contracts made by the agent will make liable and obligate the principal.113  
 
     Piercing the corporate veil on grounds of agency is not simple because it clashes 
with the structure of the corporation. The corporation is a person with rights and 
liabilities but it is an incorporeal being. Thus, this entity acts in society through its 
administrative organs which are formed by directors and staff authorised to act on its 
behalf. The corporation performs through an agency relationship. Moreover, the 
corporation is an instrument created to carry out commercial enterprises. This entity 
does that by having complete independence from its shareholders. Hence, to consider 
a company as an agent of the members would, indeed, defeat the concept of Joint 
Stock Corporation. The House of Lords, in the decision over the case of Salomon, 
emphasised this fact by stating that a corporation generally is not an agent of its 
members.114   
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    In the case Smith, Stone and Knight Ltd v Birmingham Corporation, Judge 
Atkinson in his decision relied on the concept of agency.115 In this case, a company 
ran a subsidiary on land that was acquired by the local council. The parent company 
did not receive any compensation from the disturbance of the subsidiary’s activities 
made by the council. The council denied compensation based on the fact that both 
companies were separate legal entities. The Judge considered piercing the corporate 
veil in order to allow the parent company to claim compensation for disturbance. 
Thus, in order to justify his decision, Judge Atkinson accepted an argument supported 
by agency. However, rather than traditional agency, he adapted the concept in 
accordance with the corporate structure and established a test in order to determine 
whether there was or was not an agency relationship between the parent company and 
the subsidiary. This test consisted of answering a set of questions regarding aspects of 
the parent company and subsidiary relationship, such as ownership, control and 
benefits.116 Commentators have addressed this variation of traditional agency as 
implied agency. The concept of agency in this context is aimed at groups of 
companies and it has been based mainly on the degree of control that the parent 
company has over the subsidiary.117 However, an exception based on control does not 
necessarily provide a strong case.  
 
     Throughout the years, corporate groups have gained more relevance and the 
elements regarding their structure have been the subject of study by commentators 
and judiciary. As a result, the dominance of the parent company over the subsidiary(s) 
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has been considered as a normal aspect of a corporate group.118  This form of business 
organisation is based on a group of entities that agree to act under a common 
administration to achieve a common purpose. Consequently, a degree of control by 
the parent company over the subsidiary is necessary and it will vary in accordance 
with the type of enterprise.119 In order to make a strong case in proving dominance 
over a subsidiary, the argument must therefore be accompanied by facts regarding the 
finances and governance of the subsidiary. 
 
     Currently, implied agency does not have the same reception as the sham 
exception.120 A factor that may have influenced the current perception of implied 
agency in the corporate veil context is the origins of this exception. Indeed, this is an 
exception that derived from a case that did not involve a misuse of the corporate 
entity. Instead, the veil was pierced in favour of the incorporators, something that has 
not been well perceived by the judiciary in any jurisdiction.121 Moreover, the test 
developed by Judge Atkinson was based mainly on the degree of control of a parent 
company over a subsidiary; as has been mentioned, the control of a parent company is 
an aspect that has been gradually accepted with the evolution of corporate groups. 
Therefore, whether a company is controlled to a higher or lesser degree is an 
argument that has weakened in deciding whether or not to pierce the corporate veil.  
 
    The sham exception as a means to deal with corporate personality issues has 
provided a more solid ground than the implied agency. This can be attributed to the 
fact that the sham exception focuses on the concurrence of fraud rather than control.  
2.1.2.3 Single Economic Unit  
 
     In principle, a corporate group is not recognised as a new entity but rather each 
corporate member remains a separate entity with its own rights and liabilities.122  The 
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concept of a “single economic unit”, however, appears as an exception to this 
principle. Indeed, it is likely that courts show a degree of willingness to regard the 
corporate group as one economic unit based on the wording of a particular statute or 
contract (particularly for tax purposes).123 An example is Sepia Logistics Ltd 
(formerly known as Double Quick Supplyline Ltd) and another v Office of Fair 
Trading,124 where the Office of Fair Trading regards a group of companies as a single 
economic unit for purposes of an investigation for anti-competitive practices. 
However, the concept of a single economic unit as a doctrinal approach to deal with 
corporate veil issues has not been widely accepted.  
 
    A doctrinal approach to deal with corporate veil issues single economic unit made 
its debut in the case DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough 
Council.125 DHN Food Distributors Ltd (DHN) was a holding company which ran its 
business through two wholly owned subsidiaries. One of the subsidiaries held the title 
of the land where the warehouse that DHN used to carry out its business was located. 
The Borough Council compulsorily acquired the land and refused to pay 
compensation for disturbance because DHN did not own the land and the subsidiary 
did not have an interest in the business. In other words, the veil of incorporation 
created a troublesome situation for the parent company. However, the Court of 
Appeal agreed to disregard the legal entity and consider the group of companies as a 
single economic unit in order for the parent company to receive the proper 
compensation for the disturbance of the business. The decision regarding this case 
was heavily influenced by the comments of Lord Denning, an English Judge who has 
been known for his tendency in favour of disregarding the legal entity.126  Lord 
Denning on the DHN case argued that the subsidiaries were strongly influenced and 
subject to the will of the parent company. In the DHN group, there was only one 
business and two of the three companies forming part of the group did nothing but 
own the businesses’ fixed assets. Therefore, based on this fact, Lord Denning 
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compared the relationship between the parent and the subsidiaries to that of a 
partnership in which all the partners participate in a business with a common view of 
profit.  These grounds supported the argument that the group of companies was, in 
reality, a single economic entity and should be treated as one. 
 
     The Court of Appeal’s decision in the DHN case was exceptional for that time.127 
Two years later, the case Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council presented similar 
circumstances to those in the DHN case.128 A company carried out its business on a 
property owned by another company and Mr. Woolfson held the majority of shares in 
both companies. The council compulsorily acquired the land but there was no 
compensation. Thus, Mr. Woolfson claimed for compensation through an argument 
supported by the precedent established in the DHN case. However, the court did not 
accept the single economic unit argument. The basis of this precedent was considered 
weak.129 Consequently, the approach proposed in the DHN precedent lost relvance 
because of the arguments presented in the decision of woolfson.130  
 
     As a doctrinal approach to hold shareholders liable (natural and legal persons), the 
single economic unit has not been widely applied. This was not properly elaborated 
on the DHN judgment and the argument to address the companies as a sole unit was 
not consistent. Moreover, the fact that this was a compensation case, I consider, 
affected the development of this approach. As above mentioned, the English judiciary 
may allow an exception to the corporate personality if this has been used as a sham 
for fraudulent purposes; for instance, the circumstances of the DHN case did not fall 
within the established ground on which to apply this remedy.  
 
     The English single economic unit shares the same origins as implied agency as 
both are based on cases in which the party seeking to pierce the corporate veil is the 
shareholder who created the veil and benefitted from it. I personally regard this fact as 
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one of the main causes for the single economic unit’s lack of success as a doctrine to 
address corporate entity issues. However, in spite of this, the single economic unit is 
still an available remedy to address the disregard of the legal entity in English 
company law.131  
2.1.3 The case Adam v Cape Industries 
 
    The modern corporate personality has experienced changes since the decision in the 
case of Salomon. The specific facts of the Salomon case concerned a small private 
company established and run by an individual human trader. However, this 
circumstance gradually changed with the advent of corporate groups and 
multinational companies. Indeed, a network of subsidiaries created extra-layers of 
limited liability and encouraged ambitious enterprises. Moreover, subsidiaries 
established in different countries extended company law issues on an International 
scenario. The principle established in the case of Salomon, however, can be 
considered as one of the few aspects of English company law that has not changed 
throughout the years: “the corporate personality will not be disregarded unless this 
has been used for an unlawful purpose”. 
 
    The case Adam v Cape Industries is a contemporary case that has been the subject 
of interest among the common law judiciary and academia, due to the fact that this 
case involved different legal issues (conflict of law, tort and corporate personality 
issues in the context of corporate groups). However, for the purposes of this thesis I 
will focus on the corporate personality issue presented in the case of Adam v Cape 
Industries because in this case the different English approaches to deal with the 
corporate personality are reviewed. 
 
     In order to explain the influence of this case on the current English position with 
regard to the corporate personality, the facts of the case will be briefly addressed. It 
will then be explained how the English court regarded each of the arguments based on 
the existing methods to deal with the corporate veil.      
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2.1.3.1 The Facts 
  
     Cape Industries (Cape) was a company created in England. It was the parent 
company of a group of companies and together they were dedicated to the extraction 
and marketing of asbestos. 132 During the Twentieth Century, Cape developed a 
profitable business. By 1953, Cape decided to expand its business to America. Thus, a 
subsidiary called “North American Asbestos Corporation” (NAAC) was created. It 
reported high profits during the late 1950s. Meanwhile, early reports of diseases 
produced by asbestos came to light.   
 
    By the 1970’s, NAAC and its parent company Cape Industries were sued by the 
victims of asbestos diseases. NAAC arranged a settlement with the victims and paid 
compensation. However, NAAC exhausted its insurance and to re-insure would have 
cost more than the business was worth. Therefore, Cape decided to liquidate NAAC 
as part of a process of reorganisation in order to continue the selling of asbestos on 
the American market. However, new cases against Cape soon materialised yet Cape 
Industries refused to appear in American courts. Cape’s defence was based on the 
corporate veil.   
 
     The responsibilities of operations previously executed by NAAC were transferred 
to a company called “Continental Products Corporation” (CPC).  CPC was not a 
subsidiary of Cape. CPC had a relationship with Cape through a company created in 
Liechtenstein, “Associated Mineral Corporations” (AMC), whose stock was held by a 
Liechtenstein lawyer who was instructed by Cape. In other words, AMC was the 
“middle-man” in the relationship between Cape and CPC.   
 
    The plaintiff established proceedings against Cape and obtained a successful 
judgement in the U.S. courts. Therefore, this judgement was presented in English 
Courts to be enforced against Cape. The plaintiff argued that Cape had continued the 
asbestos business in the U.S. via CPC. Arguments to make Cape liable were 
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developed on grounds of agency and single economic unit. Furthermore, it was 
argued that CPC and AMC were part of a sham for Cape to avoid liabilities. However, 
the English Court did not hold Cape liable because the court regarded that Cape had 
made a legitimate use of the corporate structure. 
 2.1.3.2 The Corporate Veil Point (Sham Argument) 
  
     The arrangements made by Cape in regard of NAAC, AMC and CPC restructured 
the whole operation of Cape Industries in the U.S.. Cape industries decided to close 
its subsidiary (NAAC) in the U.S. to reduce its involvement in the marketing and sale 
of asbestos. However, it did not cease trading in the U.S.; rather Cape made an 
agency agreement with another company (CPC), which was a company incorporated 
in Liechtenstain that AMC managed. During the proceedings the Plaintiff sought to 
prove that this arrangement was made with the intention to constitute a façade for 
Cape to avoid liabilities towards asbestos victims. Through the sham argument the 
plaintiff wanted to trigger the piercing of the corporate veil in order to regard the 
CPC's presence in the United States as the presence of Cape.  
 
     The Court of Appeal concluded that AMC was not more than a corporate name, an 
entity controlled by Cape. Cape held the majority of shares and controlled its 
management. However, AMC was a company incorporated in Liechtenstain and did 
not practice any operation in the U.S.. Therefore, although it fell under the scope of 
sham, it did not help to determine the presence of Cape Industries in the U.S..  On the 
other hand, CPC was considered an independent legal entity that practiced its 
operations legally. Indeed, there was a connection between CPC and Cape through 
AMC. However, the Court of Appeal considered that the way Cape restructured its 
operations was legal.133 The motives behind the modifications of the group structure 
were made in order to reduce (future) liability.134  
 
     The Court of Appeal starts its analysis about the corporate veil point citing the 
wording of the case Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council, in which it is said that 
“it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only where special circumstances exist 
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indicating that it is a mere façade concealing the true facts”.135 Throughout the 
analysis of the facts, the court found no special circumstance that could justify this 
remedy. The Court of Appeal held that “whether or not this is desirable, the right to 
use a corporate structure in this manner is inherent in our corporate law”.136  
2.1.3.3 Single Economic Unit  
 
     Cape, NAAC and CPC were separate legal entities. Certainly, Cape and NAAC 
had a relationship Parent-Subsidiary and for legal effects Cape was present in the U.S. 
through NAAC. The restructuring of Cape’s operations eliminates its subsidiary 
NAAC and to trade asbestos CPC was created.  The claimant argued that although the 
companies are separate legal entities, there are special circumstances in which the 
distinction between companies is ignored and are regarded as one entity. He cited 
different precedents such as DHN Food Distributor Ltd v London Borough of Tower 
Hamlets and Revlon Inc v Cripps & Lee Ltd,137 in order to support his argument. 
However the Court of Appeal rejected the argument based on single economic unit 
upon the basis of the fact that CPC was not a subsidiary of Cape; CPC had an agency 
contract with AMC, both different legal entities from Cape.138  
 
     On the one hand, NAAC was one of Cape’s subsidiaries and as such it was subject 
to Cape’s influence over finance and management. The plaintiff argued that Cape was 
involved in the day-to-day running of NAAC, a factor that undermines the 
independent existence of a subsidiary. However, the Court of Appeal considered that 
formalities regarding NAAC existence were respected, thus the distinction between 
Parent and Subsidiary cannot be bridged. On the other hand, regarding CPC, the 
single economic unit argument was rejected because CPC was not one of Cape’s 
Subsidiaries; it was a legal entity independent from Cape.139  
 
 
                                                        
135
  Idem. At page 516 
136
  Idem. At page 826 
137
 This case involved an issue regarding the ownership of a trademark. For the purpose of determining 
Revlon Inc as beneficiary of the product,  Suisse subsidiary and the parent were regarded as a unit. See, 
Revlon Inc v Cripps & Lee Ltd [1980]  FSR 85 
138
 Supra note 131. At page 823 
139
 Idem. At page 515 
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2.1.3.4 The Agency Argument   
 
     In this case, agency was one of the plaintiff’s arguments to support an action to 
hold Cape Industries liable and pay compensation to victims affected by asbestos 
diseases. The plaintiff developed this argument against NAAC and CPC.  As is 
previously mentioned, the former was Cape’s subsidiary that was liquidated, whilst 
the latter was an independent company, which continued the operations of the 
liquidated company.  
 
     NAAC as a subsidiary of Cape had its own legal personality, assets and 
management.140 The court found that, indeed, NAAC acted in some circumstances as 
an agent of Cape. NAAC assisted in the marketing of asbestos in the U.S., it arranged 
the performance of contracts between U.S. customers and the Cape group, and it had a 
co-ordinating role, (particularly in arranging delivery). However, NAAC did not have 
any authority to represent Cape and make it liable for any contract.141 Thus, the court 
did not find enough justification to deal with Cape and NAAC as a single entity on 
grounds of agency.  
 
     Regarding CPC, the court considered CPC as a separate and independent entity. 
Certainly there was a connection created between Cape and CPC through AMC. 
However, Cape did not hold any shares nor had it any type of direct influence as it 
had over NAAC. CPC was an independent legal entity with its own business.  
2.1.4 Reception of Adams v Cape Decision  
     
     The decision over the case of Cape has produced different academic opinions. 
Some of them have been negative, mainly based on the fact that “it constituted an 
unconscionable denial of human liability for harm caused to other people and 
therefore the veil should have been lifted on an equitable basis”.142 The decision over 
Cape is also regarded as a precedent that accentuates the conservative position of 
English Courts in regard to the corporate entity.143  Moreover, it has generated a 
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142See, Hudson, A. Understanding Company Law. Oxon: Routledge; 2012.  At page 38 
143See, Farrar, J. Supra note 123. At page 74  
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restrictive approach to corporate personality issues.144  Indeed, it has considerably 
narrowed the possible rationale for piercing the corporate veil in England.145  
 
    Certainly, Adams v Cape is a precedent that evidences a degree of unfairness. 
However, opinions sharing the observations made by the court have also arisen. It has 
been appreciated that Cape took the necessary steps to “quarantine” the impact of 
such liability of its business activity.146 In the case of Cape there was not any fraud or 
intention to harm the claimants. There was only a coherent use of the corporate 
personality advantages. Moreover, it has to be considered that the corporate 
personality has evolved and is not as simple as it was in the days of Salomon. Today, 
the reality is more complex as most large businesses are carried on through the 
medium of corporate groups of business.147  
 
    As a personal observation, I cannot deny the concurrence of unfairness. However, I 
agree with the Court’s position and the fact that Cape acted legally. I summarise my 
opinion on the case of Cape with fact that the corporate personality is a tool that when 
used, involves a degree of “collateral damage”. 
2.1.5 The Piercing of the Corporate Veil after Cape 
 
     The case of Cape definitely refreshed the conservative positions of the English 
Courts with regard to the corporate veil. Prior to the case of Cape, the English courts 
did not pierce the corporate veil, which is a fact that has not changed in the “post-
Cape” era. English courts have not omitted the option of piercing the corporate veil 
and have even gone as far as to accept that the veil can be pierced in exceptional 
circumstances. However, concrete grounds on which to pierce the corporate veil have 
not yet been developed.  
 
    The previously cited precedents of Guilford Motors v Horne and Jones v Lipman 
are popular English corporate veil cases in which the corporate personality was not 
                                                        
144See, Digman, A. & Lowry, J. Supra note 44. At page 41 
145See, Higgs & Goo’s. Cases & Materials on Company Law. 7th Edition. Oxford: Oxford 
University press; 2011. At page 121 
146See, Davis, P. &  Worthington, S. Gower & Davis Principles of Modern Company Law. 9th 
Edition. London: Sweet & Maxwell; 2008. At page 208, Paragraph 2-13 
147See, Lowry, J. & Reisberg, A. Pettet’s Company Law and Corporate Finance. Essex: Pearson 
Education Limited; 2012. At page 47 
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ignored; rather liability was extended. It can certainly be considered that to avoid 
conflicts with the principle established in the case of Salomon, English courts have 
opted for a less direct approach. An example of this tendency in the period “post-
Cape” can be found in the case, Creasy v Breachwood Motors Ltd.148 In this case Mr. 
Creasy worked for Welwyn Motors Ltd (Welwyn) as the company’s manager. 
Welwyn conducted its business at premises owned by a company called Breachwood 
Motors Ltd. (Breachwood). Two individuals owned the shares and were the directors 
of both companies. It is important to add that both companies were not part of a 
group; therefore there was not a parent subsidiary relationship. Mr. Creasy was 
dismissed and he decided to start proceedings for wrongful dismissal. However, 
before proceedings could be brought to Welwyn, the company ceased trading. 
Breachwood took over all of Welwyn assets and paid off Welwyn’s creditors, with 
the exception of Mr. Creasy’s claim. Mr. Creasy applied to have Welwyn substituted 
by Breachwood as the defendant. Breachwood appealed based on the fact that both 
companies were separate legal entities. Consequently it could not be responsible for 
the compensation payable to Mr. Creasy, which was an obligation of Welwyn. 
However, the appeal was dismissed. In this case, Richard Southwell Q.C. opined that 
the power of the court to lift the corporate veil exists and should be exercised to 
achieve justice when necessary.149 However rather than piercing the corporate veil 
and holding Welwyn shareholders liable, Breachwood became a defendant. 
  
    In the decision in Creasy v Breachwood Motors Ltd, the court considered the 
piercing of the corporate veil. However, this case did not involve a real disregard of 
the legal entity. In fact, the integrity of the corporate personality was respected. 
Certainly, the reasoning in this case pointed to piercing the corporate veil yet the 
influence of the Salomon’s precedent and the reaffirmation of this in the case of Cape 
made the court opt for a less direct approach, extending the proceedings to the other 
company. It is important to add that even though English courts tend to opt for a less 
direct approach to avoid conflicts with the corporate personality, the affected party 
does not always succeed. An example is the decision made in the case Ord v Belhaven 
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 “The power of the court to lift the corporate veil exists. The problem for a judge of first instance is 
to decide whether the particular case before the court is one in which that power should be exercised 
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Pubs Ltd, in which the plaintiff requested to substitute the defendant company for its 
parent on grounds of the case Creasy v Breachwood Motors Ltd, but the Court of 
Appeal refused.150  
 
     A more recent example of the English court’s manner in which they deal with 
corporate personality issues is the indirect means they used in the 2012 case Chandler 
v Cape.151 In this case, the plaintiff worked for a subsidiary of Cape PLC during the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. The subsidiary was shut down and fifty years later the 
Plaintiff was diagnosed with asbestosis. The Plaintiff started proceedings against the 
parent company (Cape PLC) of the nonexistent subsidiary and the court had to deal 
with the dilemma regarding the liability of the parent company. The court omitted the 
piercing of the corporate veil because in principle parent companies are not liable for 
the negligence of the subsidiary. However, liability of Cape PLC was established on 
other grounds. The court regarded the knowledge that Cape PLC had over the harsh 
effects of asbestos as a determining factor. Moreover, the court stressed that Cape 
PLC was liable not because it assumed the liability of the subsidiary but because it 
owed a duty of care to Mr. Chandler.  
 
    In the “post-Cape” era, certainly, no inclination for an approach to pierce the 
corporate veil has been developed in English company law. However, the piercing of 
the corporate veil is still constantly debated and opinions about the application of this 
remedy are never-ending in English Courts. The recent decision in the 2013 case 
Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited & others,152 presents a revision of the English 
cases on this subject. Although this case finished (as have previous cases) without the 
corporate veil having been pierced and with concurrence to the statement, “the veil 
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 In the case Ord v Belhaven Pubs Ltd, the plaintiff took a 20 years lease of a public house from the 
defendant. The defendant was a subsidiary within a group of companies controlled by Ascot Holding 
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can only be pierced in limited circumstances”, this case is regarded a breakthrough 
since it presented a point which is discussed in the first chapter: the relevance of 
public policy.153  
 
     Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited & others was a divorce case in which the wife 
sought to enforce her rights over properties owned by a group of companies of which 
her ex-husband was the beneficial owner. The issue was whether the court had the 
power to transfer the properties of the companies to the wife. The question was solved 
under the Matrimonial Clauses Act 1973. It was emphasised that the act conferred 
wide powers to the judge to enforce ancillary relief; to ignore the corporate 
personality was considered as a faculty of the judge, based on the public interest 
contained in this Act.154 However, in this case the veil was not directly pierced. 
Rather the companies were considered as merely trustees of the husband and 
consequently the companies were ordered to transfer the assets to the wife. The 
decision of the Family Court was supported on grounds of the beneficiary ownership 
of the husband over the companies. Certainly, the companies were properly 
incorporated and no irregularity existed but the objective of the court was to tackle the 
concealment tactic.155 The relevance of this case lies in the fact that concealment 
tactics that involve the corporate personality have lost relevance in the context of 
family law.  
 
    Since the decision regarding Cape, the English Courts have continued the tendency 
to use alternative methods to deal with corporate personality issues. It can be 
considered that grounds on which an argument to pierce the corporate veil are likely 
to succeed are limited to cases involving circumstances that affect the interest of the 
state such as a corporate entity owned by citizens of an enemy state.156  
                                                        
153 See, Chapter One. At page 30-32 
154 See, Supra note 152. At page 6 
155 Idem at page 22-29 
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 The case Daimler v Continental Tyre & Rubber Co [1916] 2 AC 307 involved a company owned by 
an enemy state. In the case, Continental Tyre Co. sought to enforce a debt owed to them by Daimler. 
However, the membership of Continental Tyre Co. was comprised of German citizens, a country that at 
that moment was at war against England.  Although Continental Tyre Co. was a UK registered 
company, the House of Lords refused to sanction the enforcement of the debt and refused to recognise 
that this company was an independent entity from its membership. This case is an example of a 
circumstance where the interest of the State is over the corporate personality and principles that support 
its existence.  
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2.1.6  The Disregard of the Legal Entity in the Context of English Statutory Law 
  
     The statutory provisions aimed at deterring certain misuses of the corporate entity 
do not represent a desire of the English judiciary to override the rule established in the 
precedent of Salomon. Instead, the statutory bodies in this context are aimed at 
extending the company’s liability to those responsible for the misuse of the corporate 
personality in determined circumstances.157 In other words, the corporation’s separate 
personality is not ignored but instead it overrides the principle of limited liability. 
Certainly, the legal personality may be disregarded if the formalities for 
incorporation, established in the Company’s Act, are not followed. However, when a 
company is incorporated, all the requirements tend to be followed in order to avoid 
any future inconvenience.158   
 
     The current statutory regulation for companies is the Company’s Act 2006 which, 
when dealing with abuses of the corporate personality, is supplemented by the 
Insolvency Act 1986.  Statutory law in this context has been developed as a protection 
for creditors against losses resulting from negligent and fraudulent management of 
companies. Indeed, statutory provisions in this context have been developed mainly in 
the area of Insolvency proceedings. Provisions regarding fraudulent and wrongful 
trading and abuse of the company’s name will extend liability to managers when an 
anomaly is found during the winding up of the company.  
 
     These provisions are mainly aimed at directors, who are the ones dealing with the 
company’s management on a daily basis.159  Shareholders become subject to these 
rules when they participate or have a strong influence over the board of directors 
(shadow directors).160 It is important to add that hired directors do not enjoy the 
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 Revenue law, Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, Trading with the Enemy Act 1939 and the Insolvency 
Act 1986, are some of the statutory bodies in which the misuse of the corporate entity has been 
addressed. See, Sealy, L. Sealy’s Cases and Materials in Company law. 9th Edition. Oxford: Oxford 
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benefits of limited liability, as do shareholders.161 However, directors cannot be 
directly sued for the faults of the company. Actions against the company must be 
addressed against the company; directors will become part of the proceedings when 
their fraudulent or negligent participation in the company’s default has been 
proven.162  
2.1.6.1 Fraudulent and Wrongful Trading  
 
    The concepts of fraudulent and wrongful trading are aimed at controlling directors’ 
behavior and its effects are triggered if an anomaly is found during the liquidation 
process.163  Both concepts share a similar objective but have different grounds for 
their application.  
 
     The concept of fraudulent trading was first introduced in Section 275 of The 
Companies Act 1929.164 The objective of this provision has been to enable the 
liquidator to seek a contribution to the company’s insolvent state from directors 
whose actions prior to the insolvency proceedings had been fraudulent. The concept 
of fraudulent trading was expected to provide a basis which would make liable any 
person who engaged in conduct that would satisfy the definition of fraudulent 
trading.165 However, during the 1980’s the Cork Committee, which was responsible 
for reviewing the U.K. insolvency law, considered that the concept of fraudulent 
trading was inadequate to provide compensation in situations where the person 
involved was not dishonest but merely reckless or negligent.166 Thus, in the reforms 
made to insolvency law, a new provision was introduced whereby civil liability would 
arise in a much broader context. This has been addressed as wrongful trading. 
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Fraudulent Trading  
 
     The provisions concerning fraudulent trading can be regarded as a protection for 
creditors against fraudulent practices. The directors are, indeed, entrusted with the 
management and running of the company. Consequently, they are exposed to 
situations that may motivate opportunistic behavior.  Fraudulent trading is currently 
addressed as a criminal and civil offence.  
 
     The Companies’ Act 2006, Section 993 addresses fraudulent trading as a criminal 
offence that, if the company has been used to achieve a fraudulent purpose, is 
punished with imprisonment. An example is the case Regina v Terrence Freeman.167 
In this case, the defendant was director of an English company and chief executive 
officer of a Swiss company, both of which were used to carry out a fraudulent 
scheme. This consisted of requesting money from investors and for this to be traded 
using trading platforms and also was promoted as a hedge fund. However, the 
defendant did not have access to the trading platforms he used to convince investors 
and the hedge fund was non-existent. The defendant gave false financial statements 
and did not disclose his criminal record to the investors. By undertaking fraudulent 
trading and other statutory offences, he was sentenced to seven years of 
imprisonment.  
 
      Fraudulent trading is addressed as a civil liability when, during the course of the 
company’s winding up, it is found out that the business was conducted with an 
intention to defraud other parties. Different to the criminal offence, the civil offence 
arises in the context of insolvency proceedings. This issue is currently addressed in 
Section 213 of The Insolvency Act 1986, which also establishes the penalty for this 
fault. However, because it is a civil offence, there is no imprisonment; rather, liable 
parties are to make contributions to the company’s assets if the company does not 
have sufficient assets to meet its liabilities. 168 An example is the case Kevin Ashley 
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Goldfarb (liquidator of Overnight Limited) v Arthur James Higgins, Andreas 
Charalambous Andreou and Lofti Chareb.169 In this case, the liquidator is the 
company which purchased computer parts from Germany. The computer parts were 
sold at a low price and the only profit that could have been made was from the 
retention of the Value Added Tax. The company never operated a bank account as all 
the payments were received and made through an account operated by Mr. Higgins. 
The revenue authorities obtained a default judgment against the company in respect of 
the V.A.T due. However, the company’s assets were not enough to recover the debt 
owed. Therefore, the liquidator applied to make the defendants contribute to the 
company’s assets on grounds of the fraudulent trading provision in Section 213 of 
The Insolvency Act 1986. 
 
     In order to hold a director liable on grounds of Sections 993 or 213, fraudulent 
intention and behavior must be proved. However, the claimant must be aware that 
there are other regulations addressing fraud, which in turn may be more suitable to 
support his claim. In the case Morphitis v Bernasconi & others,170 two former 
directors of a company in liquidation were accused on grounds of Section 213, of 
carrying on the business of the company with intent to defraud creditors and for other 
fraudulent purposes and that they were liable to make contribution to the assets of the 
company. However, although the business was found to be intending to defraud, only 
one creditor was shown to have been defrauded. Consequently, the court considered 
that one defrauded party does not fall under the scope of Section 213. The court held 
that a single defrauded person has to develop his/her argument based on the general 
law of fraud; if one person is defrauded in the course of the company’s business, this 
does not mean the whole business was executed with intent to defraud.  
 
Wrongful Trading 
  
     Wrongful trading has been addressed in Section 214 of The Insolvency Act 1986. 
Based on this concept, a director or a shadow director will be liable and will have to 
make a contribution to the company’s assets (if the court thinks proper) if the 
negligent management of the company leads to insolvency. Negligent management 
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has been addressed as wrongful trading because there are cases in which managers 
keep the company’s business afloat even after the accounts or other management 
information have clearly revealed that the company is in a chronic, loss-making 
position,171 consequently causing losses to creditors. An example is the case 
(liquidator of Idessa (UK) limited) Idessa UK Limited v John Morrison & 
Christopher Povey.172 The liquidator, among the other claims, considered that the 
directors should be liable because they had knowledge of the company being on the 
border of insolvency and they did not take the necessary measures. The court 
observed facts such as the lack of regular meetings of the board to discuss the 
financial position of the company, the loss of income from external investors and the 
expense of financial resources. Based on the lack of measures to prevent the 
insolvency of the company, the court imposed liability on the directors on grounds of 
wrongful trading.173 
     In order to support an argument under Section 214 concerning wrongful trading, 
two elements must be proved: 
  Knowledge, actual or constructive, that insolvent liquidation was unavoidable   Failure to take every step to minimise potential loss to creditors 
 
      The first point is not aimed at creating pressure on managers. In the case Earp & 
another v Stevenson & another , the Court did say, “directors are not required to be 
clairvoyant.” 174  However, it is considered that a competent director must be aware of 
the company’s finances.175 Moreover, in a situation of financial difficulties a certain 
standard of thinking and behavior are expected in order to save the company or at 
least minimise the loss.176 Indeed, as long as directors are proven to take measures 
such as spending cuts and consultations with professional advisors in order to handle 
the company’s financial difficulties, they may be free from liability.177 
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    A logical course of action would be to recognise the difficulties of the company 
and go into voluntary insolvency proceedings. However, although this may mitigate 
losses to creditors, it is not a guarantee that directors will be free from liability. 
Certainly, during the winding up of the company some evidence of reckless or 
negligent management that would put a director within the scope of Section 214 may 
be found. Such an example is the case Re Farmizer Products Ltd.178 In this case, a 
company went into administration but it was unsuccessful and consequently it was 
placed in voluntary insolvency proceedings. Liquidators claimed that the directors 
should be liable and contribute to the payment of the company’s debts on grounds of 
Section 214. They claimed that the directors were aware of the situation of the 
company before it went into administration but they continued trading. However, the 
court did not hold the defendants liable.   
2.1.6.2 Abuse of Company Name (Phoenix Companies) 
 
     The abuse of the company’s name, known also as “Phoenix Company”, is a 
situation that results from “the continuance of a failed company by those responsible 
for that failure, using the vehicle of a new company.”179 This new company trades 
under the same or similar name, has the same assets as before (acquired for a low 
price) and exploits its goodwill and business opportunities.180 Meanwhile, the 
creditors of the previous insolvent company are left to prove their debts against a 
valueless shell and the management conceal their earlier failure from the public.”181 
     The action of creating a new company that bears the same name and carries the 
same business may not, in principle, be improper. The lack of success of a company 
may be for reasons beyond the control of its directors. Moreover, the use of the same 
assets and trading style of the original company may be the only possibility for the 
employees to earn their livelihood. An example of this is the case Lightning Electrical 
Contractors Ltd, Re, in which the use of a previous company’s name in order to 
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maximise the value of the first company’s assets is allowed.182  
    However, the issue arises when the intention of setting a phoenix company is to 
defraud creditors. The English legislature has addressed this phenomenon through 
The Insolvency Act 1986. In Section 216, the use of the name (or a similar name) by 
which a company in process of liquidation was known (at least 12 months before the 
liquidation), is prohibited. Moreover, the directors of the company to whom this 
restriction applies cannot, for a period of five years thereafter, be director or manager 
of a company that bears a prohibited name, unless the court so allows. The Insolvency 
Act sanctions this misconduct in Section 217 through the extension of liability to the 
directors or shadow directors involved in the abuse of the company’s name.   
    The case of Ricketts V Ad Valorem Factors Ltd, is an example in which the English 
judiciary addresses the issue of the prohibited name and director’s liability.183 Mr. 
Rickett was the director of the company, Air Component Limited, which went into 
liquidation. At the time of the company’s liquidation, Mr. Rickett was also director of 
another company called Air Equipment Limited, which went into liquidation months 
later. The creditors of the latter claimed that Mr. Rickett should be personally liable 
for the company’s debts on grounds of the prohibited name provision. In the first 
instance, the court held Mr. Rickett liable together with the company for its debts. 
Therefore, Mr. Rickett decided to appeal. The Court of Appeal engaged in studying 
whether Mr. Rickett should be considered as liable on grounds of the prohibited name 
provision. The names of both companies, as well as the assets that formed the assets 
of each one, were evaluated in order to determine the association between them and 
Mr. Rickett. The outcome was that Mr. Rickett’s appeal was dismissed on grounds of 
section 216 (2-(b)), which established that similarities of names between the company 
in liquidation and another company suggested the existence of a relationship between 
the companies and the manager.184  
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     The prohibition in Sections 216 and 217 is not absolute. Certainly, this has its 
exception under the Insolvency Rules 1986. As mentioned in the first paragraph, there 
are some circumstances in which to trade under the prohibited name may be 
beneficial. However, the legislature has established some requirements in order to 
allow the use of a prohibited name. In the Insolvency Rules 1986 r. 4.230 it has been 
established that the use of the forbidden name will be allowed if the new company has 
been using the name for at least twelve months and the company has not been 
dormant. 185 An example of this is the case ESS Production Ltd v Sully.186 In that case, 
Mr. Sully was the principal shareholder of an informal group of companies that used 
the acronym ESS in their name or trading name. One of the companies went into 
liquidation. Thus, a solvent company, which was part of the group, bought the assets. 
The solvent company traded under a name similar to the prohibited name, but 
creditors knew about it; in fact, the name of the group was well known. Furthermore, 
it was also a known fact that Mr. Sully played an influential role in both companies’. 
The Court in the first instance held Mr. Sully liable on grounds of Section 217(1). 
However, the defendant appealed, arguing that it complied with the exception to the 
restrictions over the name established in the Insolvency Rules r. 4.230. The Court of 
Appeal allowed the appeal of Mr. Sully based on the grounds of the Insolvency Rules 
1986,  
 
    Indeed, the exception to the prohibited name rule exists. However, it is not always 
possible to be subject to this exception. In the case First Independent Factors and 
Finance Ltd v Churchill and another;187 two brothers were directors of a company 
that went into liquidation. They created a new company with a similar name, which 
bought the old company’s goodwill. The defendants claimed that they knew it was a 
forbidden name. Therefore, they realised the sale of the business to the new business 
based on the Insolvency Rules 1986, r 4.228.188 Subject to this, providing they gave 
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notice to the previous creditors, they are not personally liable for the company’s 
debts. However, the claimant denies receiving any such notice. Furthermore, the 
Court of Appeal considered that even if notice were given as claimed, such notice 
would not have been effective in relieving the Appellants from liability under Section 
217(1). This is because it was a liability which had already arisen by reason of their 
having acted as directors of the new company prior to the giving of the alleged notice. 
 
     The provisions against phoenix companies are a product of the need for protection 
of good faith creditors. However, these rules do not involve piercing of the corporate 
veil. Instead, these provisions deal with directors and shadow directors who 
manipulate the corporate entity’s assets.  
2.1.6.3 Tax Law and the English Corporate Entity 
 
     If there is a conflict between tax law and the corporate entity, it is likely that tax 
law will prevail.189 Indeed, my perception of public law as a force stronger than the 
corporate fiction is evidenced in this area of English law. Certainly, I cannot say that 
English Courts act without considering the circumstances of the case. In England 
there is a tendency to protect the corporate entity. Consequently a conflict, which is 
more evident in cases involving corporate groups, exists.190 I consider that the 
corporate entity has the opportunity to battle against the tax law enforcement in view 
of the fact that tax provisions are not aimed specifically at the corporate entity; rather 
these provisions seek to prevent and punish tax evasion. Nonetheless, in this conflict 
tax law tends to prevail.    
    An early case that exemplifies the controversy between revenue authorities and 
corporate groups is Bartholomay Brewing Company v. Wyatt (surveyor of taxes).191 In 
this case, an English corporation had been formed for the purpose of amalgamating 
three American breweries and carrying on the business under one management. The 
English company, however, faced a local restriction for foreign ownership of real 
property. Therefore, an American company was created in order to manage the 
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breweries. The English company held the majority of shares in the American 
subsidiary, but all the commercial operations where carried out in America and 
managed by the subsidiary. The issue in this case was in determining whether or not 
the English corporation was carrying on business wholly or partly in England.192 If so, 
it would have been taxable for the whole of the profits made (whether remitted to 
England or not).  If not, only the remitted profits would have been taxable. In this 
case, the court determined that in principle, shareholders do not manage the company. 
As an entity independent from its shareholders, a company carries out its own 
business through its directors and agents. However, although the English company 
was a shareholder and all the operations and management where carried out in 
America, the English company was considered to have had a high degree of control 
over the business decisions. Therefore, on this ground the profits became the subject 
of taxation.   
      The cited case took place in the early days of the modern joint stock corporation. 
Consequently, issues such as place of incorporation and place of business were the 
subject of analysis in the early days of corporate taxation. However, although 
corporate taxation has improved and concepts such as a company’s residence have 
been clarified, 193 it has not completely resolved the problem because the use of the 
corporate group for tax evasion is still a current issue. 
     Modern tax provisions are aimed at the company’s management rather than the 
corporate entity. As the concept of corporate personality has developed, it has also 
developed the concept of corporate taxation. Certainly, the structure of the corporate 
group is complex in that it allows the development of schemes to evade taxes. 
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However, instead of engaging in the “herculean task” of dealing with a group 
structure, authorities have focused on the management. Managers are the means by 
which the corporation acts in the real world. Consequently, most of the actions of the 
company can be attributed to the managers. A recent example is the case Re Instant 
Access Properties Ltd; Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills v Gifford 
and others.194 In this case, amongst the charges against the directors was the issue of 
tax evasion. It was alleged that the defendants, by creating a sham arrangement, 
which consisted of diverting income to a company incorporated in British Virgin 
Islands, had caused or allowed the company to structure its affairs in such a way that 
the UK tax authority, HMRC, received less money than was properly due.  
     Certainly, managers tend to be the objective of tax regulation rather than the 
corporate entity. However, for purposes of the judicial proceedings involving tax 
evasion, disregard of the legal entity is likely. An example is the case Re H and others 
(Restraint Order: Realisable Property).195 In this case, the defendants were the 
shareholder owners of two family companies used to evade tax duties on a large scale. 
They were placed under arrest and the corporate personality was disregarded. As a 
result, the stock in the companies' warehouses and the companies' motor vehicles 
were treated as available property held by the defendants.  
     Certainly, in a tax evasion scheme, managers may not be the brains behind the 
conduct. However, by establishing measures against managers they become aware of 
the effects of their (direct and indirect) involvement in a tax evasion scheme. Thus, 
this can, to some degree, deter the use of the corporate entity for tax evasion.  
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Summary   
 
     The case of Salomon established the basis for the current position of English courts 
with regard to the corporate personality: the corporate personality will be preserved as 
long as it has not been used for fraudulent purposes. However, no clear concept of 
fraud in this context was established. Years after the precedent in the case of Salomon 
the judiciary attempted to introduce exceptions based on the concepts of sham, agency 
or single economic unit. However, the cases in which these concepts were used did 
not involve the piercing of the corporate veil. Rather, alternatives means were used to 
deal with the corporate personality. Consequently, the English authorities can be 
considered to have dealt with corporate veil issues in a way in which the integrity of 
the corporate personality is not affected. Moreover, in the case Adam v Cape 
Industries the English authorities reaffirmed the tendency to preserve the integrity of 
the corporate personality.  
 
    Currently, the piercing of the corporate veil is not a common practice in this 
jurisdiction. There is no systematic approach to apply this remedy. The grounds on 
which an argument to pierce the corporate veil is likely to succeed are limited to cases 
or circumstances that affect the interest of the state. In the context of positive law, 
rules contained in The Company’s Act 2006 and The Insolvency Act 1986 are not 
aimed at affecting the integrity of the corporate personality. Rather, these rules are 
aimed at companies’ directors and shareholders who have an active role in the 
management of the company. These statutes are a means to deter and punish the 
negligent and fraudulent management of the corporate personality. In the context of 
tax law, there is no direct exception to the corporate personality, but this is likely to 
be disregarded in this context due to the strong public interest that exists in favour of 
tax law.  
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2.2 The Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the U.S.  
 
    The United States is the jurisdiction that can be considered as precursor of the 
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Certainly, the fact that the joint stock 
corporation has been in common use since the early days of the U.S. has also made 
corporate entity issues common in this jurisdiction. The American author, Maurize 
Wormzer, can be considered a pioneer in the study of this subject. Indeed, he analysed 
various situations in which the corporate entity should be ignored. Wormzer 
generalised that “when the conception of corporate entity is employed to defraud 
creditors, to evade an existing obligation, to circumvent a statute, to achieve or 
perpetuate monopoly, or to protect knavery or crime, the courts will draw aside the 
web of entity, will regard the corporate company as an association of live, up-and-
doing, men and women shareholders, and will do justice between real persons”.196  
 
     The analysis made by Wormzer provides the rationale on which the piercing of the 
corporate veil has been applied in the U.S. Courts, which is to prevent and punish the 
improper use of the corporate entity. However, the formulation of a standardised 
approach to deal with corporate veil issues has not been an easy task. Company law in 
the U.S. is a matter left for each state to regulate; therefore, each state has its own 
notion about piercing the corporate veil, which tends to vary from state to state.197 
The uncontrolled piercing of the corporate veil may affect the economic benefits 
produced by the corporate entity and obstruct the development policies of each state. 
Consequently, each state has had a strong interest in applying its own laws in the area 
of piercing the corporate veil.  
 
     Nonetheless, in spite of the circumstances the U.S. authorities have managed to 
create an approach to deal with corporate personality issues. This approach consists of 
evaluating aspects regarding the degree of control of the shareholders over the 
                                                        
196
 See, Wormser, M. The Disregard of the Corporate Fiction and Allied Corporation Problems. 
At page 40; Cited by Rudorfer, M. Piercing the Corporate Veil, A sound Concept. New York: New 
York University. 2006. At page 3 
197
 See, Hartman, P. Piercing the Corporate Veil in Federeal Courts: Is Circunvention of an 
Statute Enough. Pacific Law Journal. (Volume 13) 1982. At page 1246  
Page 76 of 239 
 
company, the concurrence of fraudulent behavior and the existence of a link between 
the misuse of the corporate entity and the plaintiff’s loss or harm. These factors have 
been arranged under the heading of the doctrine of instrumentality and alter ego. 
However, before addressing instrumentality and alter ego, the effects of state and 
federal law over piercing the corporate veil will be explained.  
2.2.1 State and Federal Law  
 
     Each state has evaluated the factors that trigger the piercing of the corporate veil in 
accord to their own internal policy. Consequently, a situation exists where some states 
tend to be more willing than others to apply the piercing of the corporate veil. The 
different tendencies among the states are demonstrated by Professor Robert 
Thompson in an empirical study he made about piercing the corporate veil in the 
U.S.198 Examples of the different tendencies are the States of Delaware and New York 
and, by the time Thompson made his study, the State of New York had produced 
more piercing cases than the State of Delaware.199 On the one hand, the State of 
Delaware is known as a corporate-friendly jurisdiction and consequently reluctant to 
pierce the corporate veil. The position of Delaware authorities regarding the 
application of this remedy can be attributed to a policy aimed at protecting Delaware 
Corporations. On the other hand, the State of New York has been more open to 
consider piercing the corporate veil. New York is an important centre of commerce 
and, as in the State of Delaware, the corporate personality plays an important role. 
However, New York authorities have been critical of the concept of corporate 
personality. This can be attributed to a factor such as the influence of Judge Benjamin 
Cardozo, who questions the metaphor of the corporate personality in the case Berkey 
v Third Ave. Ry. Co.200 Although, the veil was not pierced in this case, the comments 
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of Judge Cardozo is one of the facts that has shaped New York judges’ opinion about 
whether or not to pierce the corporate veil.  
  
     In a corporate veil case involving law from different states’, the tendency is to 
apply the law from the state where the company is incorporated or the law chosen by 
the parties.201 However, circumstances tend to differ when piercing the corporate veil 
involves a federal policy. Federal policies are products of a need for special regulation 
regarding the protection of a public interest, which may not be introduced in state 
company law because it would drive companies out of the state to more hospitable 
jurisdictions. States in the U.S. compete to provide a friendly environment for 
incorporation.202  Consequently, aspects such as protection of investors, creditors, 
customers, employees and any circumstance involving a public interest have come 
from federal legislation.203  
 
      Federal courts have developed their own approach to deal with corporate veil 
issues, which has been based on the similar elements considered by the state courts; 
control over the company and the concurrence of fraudulent conduct.204 However, 
federal courts have also included a third point that differentiates the federal approach 
from the state approach. This third point, regarded by federal courts, is based on the 
use of the corporation to circumvent a statute or frustrate legislative purpose.205  
 
     The First Chapter of this thesis addressed one of the premises followed in this 
work, which is based on the non-existence of a real piercing of the corporate veil in 
the cases where a public interest is in jeopardy.206 This statement is supported by the 
prevalence of the public interest over the corporate personality. The fact that the U.S. 
federal courts have developed an approach to deal with corporate veil issues at federal 
level does not challenge the statement previously mentioned. The existence of a 
method to address corporate veil issues at federal level can be considered as a means 
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to emphasise the fact that, in order to pierce the corporate veil, this must have been 
used in a way which affects a public policy.  
 
     It is important to point out that the existence of state and federal jurisdictions may 
produce a conflict of law. This may arise when federal courts have to decide whether 
to apply federal law or state law. Federal courts have to determine whether federal 
law is more suitable than state law to deal with a corporate veil issue.  The dilemma 
between both federal and state law in this context derives from the question; which 
may better serve the interest of public policies?207  
 
    Indeed, the U.S. courts and academia have questioned the extent to which a state 
policy regarding the preservation of the corporate veil may frustrate federal regulatory 
policy. An example of this controversy arises in the case United States v Bestfoods.208 
In this case, proceedings were taken against a company due to the pollution caused by 
its activities. This company was part of a group of companies and the claimants 
wanted to hold the parent company liable for the damages caused by the subsidiary. 
However, the Sixth Circuit Court absolved the parent company based on the fact that 
the parent company could only be held liable if the parent had sole or joint venture 
operation of the polluting facility. The Sixth Circuit Court applied law from the State 
of Michigan.209 Thus, its decision followed notions of separate corporate personality 
contained in state law. However, the Supreme Court overturned this decision and held 
the parent company liable by considering the influence of the parent company over 
the subsidiary on grounds of the concept of operator contained in the “Comprehensive 
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Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act” (CERCLA).210  The 
rationale behind the CERCLA Act has been based on the protection and preservation 
of public health and the environment, which can be considered as a public policy that 
overrides the concept of corporate personality.  (The role of CERCLA in the context 
of corporate personality issues will be discussed in more detail later in this section) 
  
      The plurality of state corporate law, the tendency of each state to create a friendly 
environment for business and the use of federal law to deal with aspects regarding 
public interest, have definitely influenced, American doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil.  
2.2.2 The Doctrines of Instrumentality and Alter-Ego 
 
     The concepts of instrumentality and alter ego are names given to the set of factors 
that must concur to consider whether or not to ignore the corporate veil. These 
concepts have developed as different doctrines; the instrumentality doctrine was 
created to deal with corporate groups and the alter ego doctrine is principally applied 
in cases where the corporate entity is made up of one or two shareholders.211 
However, although both doctrinal approaches aim at a different objective, these are in 
essence the same. Both require the concurrence of the same factors in order to 
evaluate whether or not to ignore the corporate personality: control, fraud and 
causation. 
 
(1) Excessive control/lack of separate existence: This factor consists of the 
excessive dominance that a shareholder(s) has over the corporate entity, to the 
point that the separate personality of the corporation and the individual no 
longer exists.  Excessive control will be determined through the assessment of 
the relationship between the corporation and the shareholder. In this 
assessment aspects will be observed, aspects such as the influence of the 
shareholder over the company by the time the plaintiff dealt with the 
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corporation and whether corporate formalities have been followed.212 The 
influence of the shareholder is determined in the company’s independent 
decision-making authority.213  If the corporation has no power to take its 
decisions, it is likely to be regarded as controlled. With regard to corporate 
formalities, it has been considered that if a shareholder has not followed the 
minimum requirements established by law, they should not enjoy the benefits 
of legal personality and limited liability.  
 
(2) Fraud and inequitable conduct: This factor consists in the concurrence of 
fraudulent or illegal behavior on the part of the shareholder controllers of the 
corporation. The concurrence of actual fraud or the intention to defraud or the 
existence of bad faith makes piercing the corporate veil likely. The rationale 
on this point is based on the fact that if the acts are treated as those of the 
corporation alone, an inequitable result will follow.214   
 
(3) Causation: This factor consists in proving that the misuse of the corporate 
entity actually caused the claimant’s loss.215 In this thesis, a connection 
between the uses of the corporate veil for a fraudulent purpose and the loss 
suffered by the plaintiff as an essential requirement to determine whether or 
not to pierce the corporate veil is considered. If the piercing of the corporate 
veil is applied to cases where the corporate entity is not the cause of the loss or 
harm, this will produce the uncontrolled application of this remedy. As a 
result, the corporate entity will be undermined.  
 
     The courts normally require the concurrence of excessive control over the 
company and fraud derived thereby, in order to pierce the corporate veil. Causation, 
on the other hand, is not a requirement in some state courts.216 In fact, there are some 
cases in which the veil has been pierced based on a circumstance that has no relation 
to the harm or loss of the plaintiff.  An example is the case Sea-Land Services v 
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Pepper Source.217 In this case Sea-Land Services (plaintiff) shipped sweet peppers on 
behalf of “Pepper Source” (defendant). Pepper Source defaulted on the bill. Sea-Land 
filed a claim against Pepper Source but it was unable to collect because Pepper 
Source had no assets. Therefore, the plaintiff sought to pierce the corporate veil in 
order to hold the sole shareholder, Gerald Marchese, and other corporations he 
controlled personally liable. The court regarded the facts in the light of the precedent 
Van Dorn Co. v Future Chem. & Oil Corp;218 which can be considered a case in 
which emphasis was laid on the alter ego approach (explained later). First, with regard 
to excessive control/lack of separate existence, Marchese was the sole shareholder of 
the corporation and failed to maintain adequate records of the corporate formalities. 
Marchese and Pepper Source had the same office and the same expense accounts. 
Moreover, Pepper Source was not adequately financed for the risks of its business. 
However, the claimant could not prove the second required circumstance of the alter 
ego approach which consisted in proving that the allowance of limited liability would 
sanction a fraud or promote injustice. Despite the lack of consistent proof to support 
the second requirement, the Court decided in favour of the plaintiff in the first 
instance and held the defendant liable. However, the sentence was remanded because 
of lack of evidence to support the second requirement. Therefore, an argument 
supporting the fact that the company was also used to commit tax fraud was presented 
and the authorities, based on this argument, allowed the disregard of the legal entity.   
    The decision on Sea-Land Services v Pepper Source can be regarded as against the 
integrity of the corporate entity. Certainly, Pepper Source did not comply with its 
obligation and evidently was heavily controlled by Marchese. However, the 
fraudulent conduct of the defendant must be proved in circumstances related to the 
case. Tax fraud was far away from affecting the claimant and the fact that the court 
supported its decision on this factor is one of the reasons for the American doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil to be the subject of criticism. Following, I will address the 
doctrines of instrumentality and alter ego in order to explain its differences and 
current role in U.S. corporate law.  
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2.2.2.1 The Alter-Ego Doctrine  
 
    The piercing of the corporate veil on grounds of alter ego is usually employed in 
circumstances where the claimant wants to prove that the shareholder(s) have failed to 
separate his/their affairs from those of the corporation. This approach is likely to be 
applied when the corporation is made up of one or two shareholders.219 If the court, 
based on the proof and circumstances of the case, consider that the separateness of the 
corporation has ceased, the corporation will be considered as an alter ego of the 
shareholders.  The rationale on which the alter ego doctrine has been founded can be 
considered as of a punitive nature; if the shareholders themselves ignore the corporate 
fiction, the court will do so as well in order to protect creditors and society.220 The 
circumstances that must concur to trigger the piercing of the corporate veil on grounds 
of alter ego are: 
  There must be such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exists;  And secondly, if the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone, an 
inequitable result will follow. 
 
     This test, on which is founded the alter ego, was applied in the case of Van Dorn 
Co. v Future Chem. & Oil Corp. In this case, the claimant seeks to recover money 
owed to him by the defendant company. The claim was based on an allegation of 
breach of contract and fraud. The majority of shares of the defendant company called 
“Future Chemical” and the other company involved (called Sovereign Oil Company) 
were owned by one individual who was also the president of both companies. Among 
the issues analysed by the court was whether the evidence provided was sufficient to 
justify piercing the corporate veil. In this case, the court regarded that corporate 
formalities such as shareholders’ and directors’ meetings, were not complied with. 
Moreover, assets of both companies were intermingled. The court considered that 
both companies were dominated to the point that their separate existences could not 
be recognised. In this case the court made reference to the fact that “A corporate 
entity will be disregarded and the veil of limited liability pierced when two 
                                                        
219
 See, Rudorfer, M. Supra note 196. At page 4 
220
 Ballantine, H. Ballantine on Corporations (re.ed.1946). Cited by Idem. At page 5  
Page 83 of 239 
 
requirements are met: First, there must be such unity of interest and ownership that 
the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual [or other 
corporations]  no longer exist, and second, circumstances must be such that 
adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or 
promote injustice.”221  The precedent established in the Van Dorn Co. case pointed to 
the fact that unity of interest and fraud are adequate justification to ignore the 
corporate personality. Moreover, in this precedent the court laid emphasis on the fact 
that both factors must concur in order to ignore the corporate personality.  
 
     The alter ego approach has been applied in more recent cases such as 
Semmaterials, L.P. v Alliance Asphalt, Inc.222 In this case, the claimant sought to 
enforce a judgment against the company Alliance Asphalt Inc. However, the 
defendant company could not pay the sum requested in the judgment. Therefore, 
actions were taken against the shareholder controllers. Based on the evidence, the 
shareholder controllers did not comply with corporate formalities; no shares were 
issued and shareholders’ assets were commingled with corporate funds. Moreover, 
there was an intention to dissolve the corporation and "rename" the corporation as a 
new company, engaging in the same type of business as previously (now with a new 
name). The court decided to consider the defendant company as the alter ego of its 
controller shareholders and allowed the claimant to enforce its judgment against the 
shareholders’ assets. The court, in this case, considered that preserving the corporate 
veil would have produced an inequitable result.  
 
      The factors that are observed in order to confirm the concurrence of the 
circumstances required by the test are usually under-capitalisation, failure to observe 
records of corporate formalities, non-payment or overpayment of dividends or large 
withdrawals of corporate assets.223 Some of the courts that have applied this approach 
are in California and New Jersey.224  
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2.2.2.2 Instrumentality Doctrine  
 
     The instrumentality doctrine is an approach created to deal with corporate veil 
issues mainly within the context of corporate groups. Frederick Powell firstly 
proposed this doctrine in 1931; his objective was to formulate a clear rule for piercing 
the corporate veil.225 In the case Lowendahl v Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, the 
approach proposed by Powell was applied and the precedent established in this case 
became reference for its later application.226 In this case, two insolvent individuals 
transferred all their assets to a newly created corporation in exchange for forty-nine 
per cent of the shares. The company, Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, owned the 
remaining fifty-one per cent of the shares. After the claimant, Lowendahl, could not 
recover his credit from the individuals and the transferee corporation, he sued 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. The claimant argued that the transferee corporation was 
controlled by Baltimore & Ohio Railroad and requested to pierce the corporate veil to 
recover from Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. In this case, the court refused to pierce the 
corporate veil. Firstly, the court considered that the defendant company had no direct 
relation to the scheme designed by the individuals. Secondly, the court also found that 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad did not control the company at the time of the fraudulent 
transfer. Citing Powell, the Court established that the party seeking to disregard the 
corporate entity must prove: 
  The parent controls and dominates the subsidiary to such a degree that the 
subsidiary is a mere “instrumentality” of its parent.   Through the domination and control of the subsidiary, the parent is 
perpetrating a fraud or working an injustice.  These elements result in an unjust loss or injury to the complainant.   
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     Under the instrumentality doctrine, the complete domination over the corporate 
entity by its shareholders has to be observed. However, it is important to point out that 
the ownership of majority or complete stock is not strong enough proof of dominance. 
In order to determine whether a company is an instrument of dominant shareholder(s), 
factors such as gross under-capitalisation or limited decision-making ability of the 
corporation must concur. In a relationship between a parent company and a 
subsidiary, dominance is likely to be determined by factors such as same directors and 
officers working in the parent and the subsidiary, lack of the subsidiary’s proper 
business and complete financing of the subsidiary through parental enterprise.227 
 
     Following the dominance over the corporate entity, it also must be proven that 
influence over the company is used to achieve a wrongful or inequitable result.228 
There is not a clear definition of fraud or wrongful conduct in this context. 
Consequently, American courts have been liberal in defining the type of behavior that 
can be considered as wrong in this context, for example: wilful breach of contract, 
asset stripping and even wrongful discharge of an employee.229  
 
    The third point required by the instrumentality doctrine requires a connection 
between the dominance and fraud with the injury or loss sustained by the party 
seeking to pierce the corporate veil. Differing from the alter ego approach, causation 
is an element that tends to be regarded by the courts that apply the instrumentality 
doctrine. A recent case in which are the wrongs required by the instrumentality 
doctrine are considered is Fantazia International Corp v CPL Furs New York Inc.230 
In this case, Fantazia  entered into a contract with CPL for the distribution and sale of 
CPL products in exchange for sales commission. However, a dispute arose regarding 
the sales commission. Thereafter, Fantazia started proceedings to recover unpaid 
commissions and also alleged that CPL was dominated by its parent company to the 
point that both entities should be regarded as a single economic unit.   However, 
Fantazia  failed to prove domination of the parent over the subsidiary and whether the 
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relationship between parent and subsidiary was the cause for its loss. In this case, the 
claimant could not comply with the wrongs established in the instrumentality 
doctrine: control, fraud and causation. Although, this case did not present a successful 
claim to pierce the corporate veil, it presents an example of the use of the 
instrumentality approach to determine whether or not to pierce the corporate veil.  
 
     The instrumentality doctrine is an approach applied mainly in the context of 
corporate groups and has been applied by courts in New York and Florida.231 
2.2.3 Reality of the American Doctrine  
 
    The American standard to pierce the corporate veil seems simple and easy to apply. 
Indeed, if the shareholder has complete domination over the corporation used to 
commit fraud, which proximately caused a plaintiff’s injury, the veil will be pierced. 
However, in practice it is not that simple. In fact, to prove each of these elements is 
complicated in some circumstances. An example is the case Walkovsky v Carlton.232  
In this case, Mr. Walkovszky was injured in a taxi accident. The taxi which injured 
Mr. Walkovszky was owned by a company called Seon Cab Corporation. Seon Cab 
Corporation was part of a group of ten corporation owned solely by Mr. Carlton. Each 
corporation owned only two taxis and carried a lawful minimum insurance of $10,000 
per taxi. All the companies operated as a unit and the working capital of the 
companies was kept to a minimum. Mr. Walkovsky received insufficient 
compensation from Seon Cab Corporation. Therefore, Mr. Walkovszky sought to 
recover the full amount of medical costs as well as compensation for damages. 
However, even if all the assets of the ten companies were joint, it would not be 
enough to satisfy the claim. Therefore, he claimed for Mr. Carlton to be liable as well. 
However, the court considered that there was no fraudulent intention from Mr. 
Carlton since he had incorporated and followed that established by the law; i.e. the 
companies had the minimum insurance and capital which, according to law, is 
necessary for a company to operate in the State of New York. Unquestionably, Mr. 
Carlton had a high degree of control over the company’s part of the group, a factor 
that makes the piercing of the corporate veil more probable, yet there was no proof of 
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fraudulent intention on the part of Mr. Carlton. The fact that he complied with capital 
requirements established by law was evidence that he operated his companies in a 
legitimate manner.  
 
      As a personal observation, the standard was designed and aimed to deal with the 
corporate veil in the context of fraud rather than a situation such as the one presented 
in the Walkovsky v Carlton case. Certainly, it may be difficult to prove the 
concurrence of fraud as in the previously cited case of Sea-Land Services v Pepper 
Source. However, the piercing of the corporate veil in a case involving fraud is more 
likely than in one that involves tort.  
2.2.3.1 Contract and Tort Cases 
 
    The piercing of the corporate veil in the U.S. has been classified in contract and tort 
cases. This classification derives from the different circumstances presented in both 
contexts.  On the one hand, in a contractual relationship both parties agreed to deal 
with each other. Therefore, the plaintiff is a voluntary creditor that has chosen to deal 
with the corporation. The creditor has the opportunity to investigate the company and 
to choose whether or not to contract. Moreover, the creditor can establish measures to 
secure its credit, such as higher interest rates or to ask for a personal guarantee from 
the shareholder. On the other hand, a tort victim is a person who has been harmed by 
the activities of the company and had no previous relationship with the company. 
Contrary to a voluntary creditor, a tort victim did not have the opportunity to 
negotiate and take guarantees to secure proper compensation; rather, a tort victim 
becomes involve by casualty and there is a probability that the company may not have 
enough assets to compensate. 
 
    Logically, the piercing of the corporate veil should be applied straight away in a 
case where a person or group of people has been harmed by the activities of a 
company that do not have enough assets to compensate the victims. However, the 
reality is that American courts do not frequently pierce the corporate veil in tort cases; 
rather, the piercing of the corporate veil is likely in a contract case.233  This has been 
the subject of criticism by American academia. Some academics have even argued 
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that the corporate veil should be invalid in the context of tort.234  However, in spite of 
the criticism, American courts are currently more likely to disregard the corporate 
personality in contracts than in tort cases.  
 
     Contract cases can be considered to provide a stronger basis to pierce the corporate 
veil than do tort cases. Firstly, courts in the U.S. require the concurrence of fraud or 
inequitable conduct, which is more probable to find in a contract case than in a tort 
case. An example is in the case Roofing Ctr. V On Top Roofing, Inc.; the claimant 
purchased materials that were used for work with customers but the profits were spent 
on high salaries and extravagant rents. Consequently creditors were not paid and the 
court allowed the piercing of the corporate veil.235  Indeed, a voluntary creditor is 
more likely to be affected by fraud or reckless behavior, thus demonstrating the use of 
the corporate form to undermine the bargaining that has gone on between the 
company and its creditors. Secondly, due to the different nature of the relationship 
between the corporate entity and the tort victim, the piercing of the corporate veil 
tends to be decided on whether or not the corporate formalities were followed by the 
members of the company.236 However, corporate formalities are normally followed, 
therefore complicating the development of an argument to support the application of 
this remedy. The previously cited case of Walkovszky v Carlton is an example. Mr. 
Cartlon undoubtedly created the companies to benefit from the corporate personality 
and limited liability. However, he complied with the requirements established by the 
law. Although, the compensation paid by the insurance was small, Mr. Carlton 
complied with the minimum established by the law. To look at corporate formalities 
to determine whether or not to pierce the corporate veil in the context of tort has been 
the subject of criticism due to the fact that the veil may be pierced under 
circumstances that have no relation to the cause that produced the harm or injury.237  
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    The existence of the corporate veil cannot be abolished in the context of tort 
because this will undermine the concept of corporate personality. I support this 
statement on the fact that corporate personality was created to diminish the exposure 
to the risk involving a commercial adventure. Financial risks are not only in a 
contractual context but also in the context of tort. Certainly, it may be unjust for the 
tort victims in cases such as Union Carbide’s Bhopal disaster.238 However, the 
corporate personality and the attribute of limited liability were created to protect 
investors and their assets, as is presented on the case Cotton v Gaylord Container 
Corp.239 In this case a parent company called “Gaylord Container Corporation” and 
its subsidiary “Gaylord Chemical Corporation” operated next to each other and shared 
facilities. Nonetheless, each had its own manufacture and sales business independent 
from each other.  Gaylord Container had decided to form Gaylord Chemical as a 
separate corporation in order to isolate the risk of the separate chemical operation in a 
separate entity and to protect the rest of its considerable investment in Gaylord 
Container from any potential creditors of Gaylord Chemical. A chemical disaster 
happened and the victims sued the Gaylord Chemical. Moreover, the claimants sought 
to include the parent company in the proceedings by requesting to regard both 
companies as a single business enterprise. The single business enterprise, or single 
economic unit, is an approach aimed at disregarding the corporate personality and 
limited liability protection in the context of corporate groups. However, in order to 
regard a group as a unit it must be proved that the parent company has somehow  
abused the corporate form. In the argument made by the claimants, there was no 
allegation that Gaylord Chemical would not be able to pay the damages nor was there 
an attempt to prove that there was an abuse of the privilege of incorporation. The 
claimants instead emphasised the business and physical connections between the two 
plants, their common ownership and the various means by which the two were 
operated in a co-ordinated manner.  The court decided to maintain the separate 
existence between the parent and subsidiary based on the fact that there was not a 
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concurrence of fraud or wrongdoing or abuse of the corporate form by part of the 
parent company.   
 
    The fact that the piercing of the corporate veil is likely to happen in cases involving 
an issue derived from a contract, evidences that this doctrine has been developed to 
prevent and punish the unjust enrichment of the shareholders at the expense of the 
corporation’s creditors. In some circumstances, tort victims may not receive proper 
compensation and shareholders may not be held liable for the harm produced by the 
activities or products made by the corporation. This is unarguably unfair yet the 
piercing of the corporate veil was a remedy created without an altruistic purpose.  
2.2.4 Agency and Enterprise Liability  
 
    The concepts of agency and enterprise liability are other alternatives that have been 
considered by the U.S. Courts for dealing with corporate veil issues, mainly in the 
context of corporate groups. The author Kurt Strasser considers these alternatives to 
the piercing of the corporate veil as “more episodic than systematic”.240 This 
statement by Strasser is justification for the fact that agency and enterprise liability 
are used to validate ignoring the corporate entity in a setting where the piercing of the 
corporate veil was either not available or not requested by the parties. Moreover, the 
context in which these approaches are applied does not involve the concurrence of a 
fraudulent or wrongful action as they are based on the excessive control of one 
company over another.  
 
2.2.4.1 Agency  
 
    In the U.S., the concept of agency has been considered as an alternative route to the 
imposition of liability upon a parent corporation for the acts of its subsidiary. 241 
However, it has been complicated to adapt the concept of agency in this context due 
to the fact that in the parent-subsidiary relationship, agency relationship does not 
exist. All agency relationships consist of an expressed agreement in which a party 
called the principal gives authority to another party to act as its agent. All the acts 
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made by the agent under the name of the principal will render the former liable. 
However, this is not the case for corporate groups. As explained in the first chapter of 
this thesis, corporate groups are based on a group of companies that act under the 
direction of one company in order to achieve a common purpose.242 Each of the 
companies forming the group is considered an independent entity with its own 
businesses and liabilities. If a parent company contracts its subsidiary to act as its 
agent, the former will be held liable for the acts of the latter on grounds of agency. 
Otherwise, “agency” would not be considered an appropriate means for holding the 
parent company liable.  
 
      In cases where a subsidiary is not solely owned by the parent but also has the 
same directors and is used only to benefit the parent company, it may be argued that 
the subsidiary is merely an agent of the parent. Moreover, the subsidiary’s attachment 
to the parent gives ground to argue the existence of implied agency. However, 
American courts have dealt with parent company’s liability using the doctrines of 
instrumentality and alter ego rather than using implied agency.243 Implied agency in 
this context is based on control and unfairness, which are the grounds on which 
instrumentality and alter ego are based.244   
 
     The U.S. courts do not rely on the concept of agency to deal with corporate veil 
issues. Notably, an approach based on agency has not been widely accepted in the 
U.S..245 
2.2.4.2 Single economic unit or Enterprise liability 
 
    The “Single Business Enterprise” is a concept aimed at dealing with corporate 
personality issues in the context of corporate groups. The approach based on this 
concept does not focus on discussing and questioning separate liability rules for the 
individual corporate entity and its corporate parent shareholder. However, this 
approach focuses on the business as a whole and aims to determine whether the 
corporate group should be regarded as a unit. In order to decide whether the group 
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should be considered as a unit, the internal organisation and management structure of 
the enterprise would be taken into consideration rather than the culpability and 
wrongful conduct involved in the case. Indeed, the approach aimed at regarding a 
group of companies as a unit can be considered as an alternative to piercing of the 
corporate veil in the context of tort. The case In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz is an 
example.246 The issue in this case derives from a mechanical malfunction of a Super 
Tanker called Amoco Cadiz, which caused the ship to drift and crash into rocks on the 
coast of Breton, France. The accident produced an oil spill on the coast of France, 
causing environmental damage and losses for communities in the coast. Therefore, in 
the U.S Courts the Republic of France and the affected parties started legal action 
against the companies forming the group to which the Amoco Cadiz belonged. The 
basis of the claim was the negligent operation and faulty design of the Super Tanker.  
The defendant companies claimed exoneration of liability based on the concept of 
separate corporate personality. The court evaluated facts such as the duty of the 
subsidiaries to provide proper maintenance in order to maintain the ship seaworthy 
and the degree of influence the parent company (Standard Oil Company) had over the 
subsidiaries involved in the case. In this case, the court found the parent company to 
be liable together with its subsidiaries;  
 
“As an integrated multinational corporation which is engaged through a system of 
subsidiaries in the exploitation, production, refining transportation and sale of 
petroleum products throughout the world, Standard is responsible for the tortuous acts 
of its wholly owned subsidiaries and instrumentalities… Standard exercised such 
control over its subsidiaries AIOC and Transport that those entities would be 
considered mere instrumentalities of Standard Oil Company… Standard is therefore 
liable for its own negligence and the negligence of AIOC and Transport with respect 
to the design, operation, maintenance, and crew training of the Amoco Cadiz” 247  
 
     In the Amoco Cadiz case the concept of enterprise liability was presented as a 
means to address the liability of the group. However, this concept is not normally 
applied alone. Enterprise liability is applied together with labour and environmental 
regulations. Labour and environmental regulations contain policies which are aimed 
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at protecting interests that are over the concept of corporate personality. By ignoring 
the legal personality of the companies part of the group and addressing a corporate 
group as a unit the liability that exist in cases involving a public interest that has been 
affected is reinforced. 
 
2.2.5 The Current Position of American Courts in Regard of Piercing the Corporate 
Veil   
     Throughout this section I have pointed out that some U.S. Courts give different 
weight to a factor that may not be of interest to another State Court. In this section, 
the multiple-jurisdiction factor has been evidenced, which is the reason for the 
piercing of the corporate veil to be a complex subject in the U.S.. However, in spite of 
differences among State Courts, the American Courts share the contention that a 
strong justification is required in order to ignore the corporate personality.  
     The American courts tend to preserve the corporate personality if there is no strong 
justification to ignore it. An example is the recent decision over the case Complete 
Transportation, LLC v. CPM Colchester, et all LLC.248 In this case, the claimant 
seeks to recover his credit from the defendant company, which is an LLC. One core 
argument used by the claimant is the excessive control the defendant has over the 
company. In its analysis, the Court cited the Connecticut General Statute, in particular 
a section corresponding “Relations of Members and Managers to Persons Dealing 
with a Limited Liability Company,” and pointed out the liability of members and 
managers to third parties. In Sections 34-133 (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 34-133), it is 
established that the liability is limited. The court regarded previous case law and cited 
passages involving the instrumentality doctrine and the requirements for its 
application. Case law in this area indicates the fact that “… disregard the fiction of a 
separate legal entity, to pierce the shield of immunity afforded by the corporate 
structure in a situation in which the corporate entity has been so controlled and 
dominated that justice requires liability to be imposed on the real actor."249 Based on 
statements such as this, the Court structured its decision and considered that on 
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grounds of instrumentality, the plaintiff could not prove the concurrence of wrong 
other than the defendant company´s inability to pay. Thus, the piercing of the 
corporate veil was denied.  
 
   Another example is the case Joseph Friend, v. Remac America, Inc.250 In this case 
the claimant, while working for the defendant, suffered injuries and claimed 
compensation. However, the defendant company did not pay proper compensation to 
the claimant. Thus, the claimant requested the piercing of the corporate veil on the 
two-prong test (control and fraud) and moreover reinforced his claim on the argument 
of undercapitalisation and lack of compliance of corporate formalities. The claimant 
emphasised the lack of a proper insurance coverage to protect employees.  However, 
the Court pointed out that the test with which the claimant wanted to justify the 
piercing of the corporate veil is applicable to contract cases, not to tort cases such as 
the then present claim. The court in this case said that the shareholders and managers 
were not liable for the torts of the company. Moreover, the claimant could not prove 
undercapitalisation or lack of compliance with corporate formalities. The claimant 
alleged undercapitalisation based on the fact that the company had not bought enough 
insurance cover. The Court considered the claimant´s claim inadequate and decided 
not to pierce the corporate veil.  
 
     In the case Jaclinn Pulman v Alpha Media Publishing INC the exceptional nature 
of piercing the corporate veil is also present. In this case the claimant presented her 
claim in New Jersey Courts.251 The claimant invested in a bungalows project and was 
told that a company called Maxim owned the bungalows. The Claimant trusted the 
company and felt secure because she had the impression she was investing with a 
solid company. However, the claimant researched the project and discovered that 
Maxim was not the owner of the project. Moreover, she lost her money when it was 
revealed that the bungalows project was a Ponzi scam.  The claimant sued a group of 
companies involved based on the fact that she was fraudulently misrepresented and 
also requested the piercing of the corporate veil. The New Jersey court required the 
concurrence of control and the use of the influence over the company to achieve 
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fraud. The claimant alleged that the defendant created a cluster of companies in order 
to carry out the scam. However, the claimant pleaded the piercing of the corporate 
veil as a separate cause of action. Consequently, it was denied. The piercing of the 
corporate veil is not considered as a cause of action in New Jersey courts. 
  
    The three cited examples present three different circumstances in which the 
piercing of the corporate veil is denied. In these three cases, the claimants presented 
poor justification for piercing the corporate veil. American Courts are willing to 
ignore the corporate personality if it is improperly used. In these cases, the courts 
evaluated and considered the application of this remedy. However, to pierce the 
corporate veil the American Courts require strong justification.  
2.2.6 The Piercing of the Corporate Veil in the Context of American Statutory Law  
 
    In the U.S the piercing of the corporate veil has been developed as a doctrine but 
not as a statutory rule. As previously mentioned, company law in the U.S is a matter 
regulated by each state. Consequently, since the early days of American Company 
Law, states have competed to develop an environment favourable for the 
incorporation of companies.  Notably, the incorporation of companies represents a 
profitable business for the State and its inhabitants. Therefore, in order to attract 
investors, states’ corporate laws have been drafted focusing on aspects such as the 
preservation of the corporate veil.  
 
     Currently, there is not a direct exception to the corporate personality in U.S 
Company Laws. However, this does not mean that a measure to enforce public policy 
has not been taken. The author Harry G. Henn comments: “The corporate entity will 
be recognized, but will not be permitted to be a device to defeat public policy.”252 The 
statement made by Henn is shared in this thesis. Indeed, in the first chapter it is stated 
that a public interest protected by a public policy will prevail over the corporate 
personality.253 The State has a duty to protect public interests and a statutory rule is a 
means used by the State to fulfill its duty to protect the public interest. The U.S tax 
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law, labour law and environmental law are areas in which the corporate personality is 
likely to be ignored by the U.S. authorities in order to enforce a public policy.   
2.2.6.1 Tax Law 
 
     In the context of tax law, for state and federal tax purposes, the corporate entity is 
usually recognised, although disregarded when used as a tax-evasion device.254 
Originally, tax law was silent in respect of this matter. However, the decision of the 
U.S Supreme Court on the case Higgings v. Smith shed light on this subject. 255 In this 
decision it was established that the government might disregard sham corporations 
whenever that would best serve the purpose of a tax statute and that a taxpayer who 
has chosen to do business as a corporation must accept any tax disadvantage of that 
form.256 In other words, the taxpayer will not be permitted to renounce the corporate 
entity for their benefit.   
2.2.6.2 Labour Law  
 
      Corporate personality may produce different questions in the context of labour 
law cases; for example, to what extent should a parent company accept responsibility 
for their subsidiaries’ unfair labour practices? Alternatively, to what extent should a 
collective bargaining agreement covering the employees of one corporation be 
extended to cover another nominally separate yet still commonly owned entity? 
However, although there have been questions and reflections on this subject, the 
public interest which exists regarding the protection and enforcement of workers’ 
rights tends to prevail over the corporate personality dilemma. The U.S Federal 
Courts have assumed the task of formulating a federal common law of labour 
relations, a fact that has left many aspects of the employment relationship subject to 
exclusive federal control and furthermore to be entirely immune from state 
regulation.257 The National Labour Relations Act (NLRA) is a regulation that deals 
with collective bargaining agreements, working hours, employment discrimination 
and wages. The NLRA is one of the most notorious regulations that has been 
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developed and applied in labour cases involving the corporate personality. From the 
application of the NLRA in corporate personality cases, the concepts of “single 
economic employer” and “alter ego” have been introduced to American labour law. 
The former is based on determining whether nominally independent enterprises are 
sufficiently intertwined and whether they should be considered a single employer for 
NLRA purposes. The latter seeks to determine whether the existence of a corporate 
entity is an attempt by the employer to avoid obligations. Both approaches focus on 
review aspects concerning management and corporate formalities. Moreover, it can be 
considered that the single economic employer is founded on the approach developed 
from the concept of a single economic unit previously mentioned. Indeed, the single 
economic employer transfers liability to the companies forming the group as if they 
were a whole.  
 
     As a personal observation, the application of the NLRA can be considered as an 
attempt to make the piercing of the corporate veil in labour law cases coherent. The 
corporate personality cannot be disregarded in every labour controversy because 
doing so would affect its integrity. Certainly, workers’ rights take priority due to the 
public interest that exists regarding the enforcement of these rights. However, there 
must also be a rational justification for the use of this remedy. Therefore, through the 
application of the rules contained in the NLRA, the U.S judiciary has introduced the 
single economic employer and alter ego approach to systematically apply this remedy 
in this context.   
 
     It is worth adding that approaches formulated from the application of the NLRA 
have been applied together with other labour statutes such as the WARN Act (workers 
Adjustment and Retraining Notification)258 and ERISA (Employment Retirement 
Income Security Act). 
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2.2.6.3 Environmental Law   
 
    In the U.S. the piercing of the corporate veil in statutory interpretation is best 
illustrated in the field of environmental law; indeed, during the 1970s concern for the 
environment started to arise in the mind of the American public.259 The 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, the Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), was a product of the concern regarding the need for a rule to deal with 
the release of hazardous substances. The rationale of CERCLA was based on a public 
policy aimed at the protection of the environment. However, Federal Courts in this 
context do not disregard the legal entity straight away. In CERCLA liability is 
imposed depending upon four circumstances but for the purposes of this section, only 
the first one will be addressed. It has been established that the owner and operator of a 
polluting vessel or facility will be liable for environmental contamination.260  
 
     The U.S is known for its strong industry, which has been developed through the 
use of corporate groups. Many industrial activities involve hazardous practices and in 
cases of environmental disasters, parent companies and other subsidiaries part of the 
group are free of liability thanks to the group’s structure. In some circumstances, the 
affected parties seek to make the parent company liable; thus the concept of operator 
established in CERCLA has been used to support an action against a parent company. 
The use of the concept of operator derives from the fact that subsidiaries operate 
under the instructions of the parent. However, to address the parent corporation under 
the concept of operator contained in the Act is complicated because a subsidiary, in 
principle, operates as an independent entity from its parent and the influence of the 
parent over the subsidiary is the product of an agreement between both in order to 
achieve a common purpose. Moreover, in the Act there is not a clear definition of 
what can be considered as an operator in this context. Therefore, the alter-ego 
doctrine has been employed to supplement the concept of operator in order to enforce 
the policies contained in CERCLA.261 The use of the test contained in the alter-ego 
approach can be considered as a better means to determine parent liability for the 
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subsidiary’s actions.  By evaluating aspects such as compliance with corporate 
formalities and financial independence, the degree of control of the parent over the 
subsidiary can be determined thus establishing whether the parent company can be 
viewed as operator or not.  
 
     The previously cited case of The United States v Bestfoods262 is a relevant case in 
this area. In this case the court dealt with the dilemma about whether the parent 
company could be considered as an operator for the purposes of CERCLA. Moreover, 
the court tried to provide a definition of operator in this context. To deal with the 
concept of corporate groups is complicated but the precedent in United States v 
Bestfoods has provided a reference for contemporary cases; an example being AMW 
Materials Testing, Inc v. Town Babylon.263 In this case a fire produced the release of a 
hazardous substance kept in a building owned by the defendant. Thus, the claimant 
sought to hold the defendant liable on grounds of the concept of operator contained in 
CERCLA and the precedent set by United States v Bestfoods. 
2.2.7 The Role of the Concepts of Fraud and Negligence the Context of Corporate 
Veil issues  
 
     Among the imperfections of the U.S. doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, one 
aspect that should be analysed is the use of the remedy to deal with corporate veil 
issues derived from damages produced by negligence. In this thesis it is considered 
that corporate personality issues involving fraud must be handled separately from 
cases involving negligence. To include the concept of negligence together with fraud 
is not appropriate because negligence involves an issue where producing loss or harm 
is unintentional. The issue on mixing the concepts of fraud and negligence lies in the 
fact that it complicates the application of a remedy such as piercing the corporate veil, 
which was originally created to deal with the fraudulent use of the corporate entity.  
 
    If the corporate personality is used to achieve a fraudulent purpose this will be 
ignored; this is the premise on which the piercing the corporate veil has been built. 
The application of this remedy in cases in which a fraudulent intention does not exist 
has contributed to the uncertainty that surrounds this subject. The omission of the 
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original trigger (fraudulent behaviour) makes the piercing of the corporate veil void of 
its original purpose (punishment and prevention of fraud) and renders this remedy 
unpredictable. Some American academics consider the unpredictability of the 
doctrine as convenient because it encourages wrongdoers to abstain.264 However, in 
this thesis unpredictability is considered a factor that undermines the concept of 
corporate personality because it gives room for the application of piercing the 
corporate veil in circumstances that do not necessarily require this remedy.  
 
     Currently, the piercing of the corporate veil has been considered as a last resort, 
due to its unpredictability.265 As mentioned, the exceptional circumstances are based 
mainly on the concept of fraud. If this trigger is omitted, it gives room for an 
uncontrolled and unjustified application of this remedy.  
 
     As stated, corporate entity issues derived from fraud and those derived from 
negligence should not be confused. However, what is negligence in this context? In 
this thesis the concept of negligence refers to the harm produced by reckless 
management and tort damages produced by the practice of dangerous activities. 
Reckless management produces harm to different parties that have a direct relation 
with the corporate entity, for example, workers may not get their wages and creditors 
may not recover their credit because the company ran out of assets due to 
irresponsible management. The inadequate practice of dangerous activities, on the 
other hand, generally consists of damages to parties that do not have any relationship 
with the corporate entity; for example, a chemical disaster that affects a town and 
pollutes the environment. However, there are also cases in which dangerous activities 
may affect parties that have a direct relationship with the entity such as the 
employees, who may be affected if the company does not comply with security 
requirements.  
 
     The objective of the corporate entity is to protect shareholders from these 
situations. However, to preserve the corporate personality presents a dilemma based 
on the unfair result that may be produced in some circumstances if the corporate 
personality is preserved. This “fairness dilemma” can be considered as the reason for 
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the concept of negligence to be considered when dealing with corporate personality 
issues. Currently, in the U.S. the piercing of the corporate veil has been requested by 
affected parties in cases were no fraudulent behaviour was seen to have existed; a 
factor that can be attributed to the mix of the concepts of fraud and negligence when 
talking about corporate personality issues. However, it is likely that the U.S. courts 
will deny the piercing of the corporate veil if there is no fraud or an evident 
inequitable result. Evidence of this can be found in an example such as the case 
McCloud v Bettcher Industries Inc.266 The claimant in this case worked for a 
subsidiary and sustained injury while operating a bread machine. Therefore, the 
claimant sought to pierce the corporate veil to hold the parent company liable together 
with his employer. However, the Court considered that the parent as a shareholder 
could not be held liable for the torts of its subsidiary. The court maintained that a 
party seeking to pierce the corporate veil must establish that the owners, through their 
domination, abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form, thereby 
perpetrating a wrong that resulted in injury to the affected party. In this case there was 
not an abuse of the corporate form. Another example can be found in the case Smith v 
Delta , decided by the New York Court.267 In this case the claimant was injured while 
working for a company managed by the defendant. The claimant claimed for 
compensation not only against the employing company but also the defendant 
company and individual parts of this entity. However the claimant failed to justify on 
what grounds the corporate veil should be pierced in this case. He did not prove that 
the defendant failed to adhere to corporate formalities, inadequate capitalization or 
commingled assets. The court considered that a party seeking to pierce the corporate 
veil must establish that the owners, through their domination, abused the privilege of 
doing business in the corporate form by perpetrating a wrong or injustice against the 
affected party. 
     In these two examples the piercing of the corporate veil was denied based on a 
lack of consistent argument to justify the application of this remedy. The purpose of 
citing these cases is to show the concurrence of pleas based on a cause that does not 
involve fraud. To allow and reflect over the piercing of the corporate veil in cases 
where no fraudulent behaviour exists creates uncertainty. Indeed, the fact that a court 
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considers this action without the concurrence of the original trigger creates a 
perception that this doctrine may be applied whenever it is summoned.  
 
      Although the concept of negligence has been considered by the U.S doctrine, the 
corporate personality issues in this context have been handled in a more practical way 
in certain areas of law; for example, damages derived from reckless management in 
the context of public companies. In this context, hired directors rather than 
shareholders manage modern U.S companies. These hired directors do not receive the 
benefits of the corporate personality and limited liability, as do the shareholders. 
Consequently, authorities do not need to deal with the corporate veil in this situation. 
For this task, accountability and management regulations have been developed in 
order to deter and penalise reckless management. An Example is the American 
“Sarbanes Oxley Act”, a regulation that strengthens accountability controls, increases 
the oversight role of boards of directors and renders the penalties for fraudulent and 
negligent activities more severe.268  
 
     The existence of statutes aimed at dealing with reckless management in the context 
of public companies evidences the existence of a more practical method to deal with 
corporate personality cases where no fraudulent behaviour exists. In other words, a 
statutory approach in this context can be considered as more practical. If statutory 
exceptions were developed in critical areas such as reckless management and 
environmental law, the piercing of the corporate veil would be a less uncertain 
subject.  
 
     Some civil law jurisdictions have been practical and have handled issues derived 
from negligence in statutory rules. An example is Brazilian environmental law in 
which it is established that the corporate entity will be ignored in cases involving 
damages to the environment.269  As it has been mentioned throughout this thesis, civil 
law jurisdictions adhere to positive law. Definitely, this is an influential factor for the 
development of a statutory exception to the corporate personality. However, the 
existence of an exception to the corporate veil in Brazilian environmental law can be 
attributed to the need of a rule aimed at helping to enforce public policies in this area 
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of law. The concurrence of negligence is common in environmental disasters. To use 
this as a remedy for piercing of the corporate veil is not suitable for this sort of 
circumstance. Consequently, it is appropriate to apply a direct statutory exception in 
this context. 
 
     It is important to add that the development of a rule to deal with the corporate 
personality in a case that does not involve fraud must be based on the legal framework 
and legal needs of each jurisdiction. As I emphasise throughout this thesis, economic 
development has strong influence over the corporate personality and all the aspects 
that surrounds this concept.  
 
    My case study, Panama, is a jurisdiction in which the piercing of the corporate veil 
has been recent. Panama has developed as a financial service provider. Industrial 
activity does exist in this country but on a small scale in comparison to industrialised 
countries. Moreover, companies tend to be private rather than public. The existence of 
more private companies can be attributed to the fact that funding can be gathered 
from local banks.270 The existence of a small capital markets with few public 
companies and little industrial activity makes the concurrence of reckless 
management and tort damages infrequent issues. As I have mentioned, an approach to 
piercing the corporate veil must be based on the legal framework and the usage that is 
given to the corporate entity. In Panama, the joint stock corporation has been 
developed in an environment that allows the corporate entity to be used in a way that 
makes the concurrence of fraudulent intention likely. Certainly, it cannot be denied 
that cases involving loss or harm produced by negligence may arise. For example, 
reckless management may leave workers without payment. However, Panamanian 
labour law has already included a mechanism to deal with this issue and does not 
necessarily involve engaging the corporate veil dilemma. The rule contained in the 
Article 92 of the Panamanian Labour Code not only allows the setting aside of the 
corporate personality on grounds of fraud but also on grounds of negligent 
management causing the company’s impossibility to pay its employees.271   
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    The piercing of the corporate veil as a remedy based on the prevention and 
punishment of fraud should have the scope for its application limited to this context. 
To attempt to pierce the corporate veil in situations that do not involve fraud, creates 
uncertainty because there will be no specific ground for the application of this 
remedy. Moreover, it contradicts the exceptional nature of this remedy by allowing 
parties requesting its application whenever they want, a fact that definitely would 
undermine the concept of corporate personality.  
 
Summary 
 
     The U.S. is a jurisdiction that presents a complex legal system. Unquestionably, 
the plurality of state jurisdictions and a federal jurisdiction have generated different 
opinions and perspectives about the piercing of the corporate veil. However, despite 
the doctrines of instrumentality and alter-ego being considered as the only systematic 
approach to deal with corporate veil issues, they present a set of circumstances that 
have to concur in order to ignore the corporate personality; namely, the main trigger, 
which is the concurrence of wrongful and fraudulent behavior. Nonetheless, there 
have been cases involving corporate personality issues that have not necessarily 
involved the concurrence of a fraudulent behavior. Consequently, the American 
judiciary has also relied on other approaches to deal with corporate entity issues such 
as agency and the single economic unit. In the context of statutory law there is no 
direct exception to the corporate personality. However, this can be ignored based on 
public policies aimed at protecting a public interest. 
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2.3 Why does the U.S appears more willing than England to pierce 
the corporate veil?  
  
     The U.S. and England are common law tradition countries, have strong markets 
and prosperous economies. The corporate personality has been key in the 
development of these countries.272 Consequently, both tend to respect the integrity of 
the corporate personality. However, when it comes to situations that involve an 
improper use of the corporate personality, the U.S. has evidenced more willingness to 
ignore the existence of the corporate personality than England. In fact, the piercing of 
the corporate veil has been a common issue in U.S. company law. This chapter has 
addressed the American doctrines of instrumentality and alter ego. Both doctrines are 
the result of rich case law on piercing the corporate veil. 
 
    However, the fact that the U.S. has developed to a greater extent the doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil does not mean that the U.S. authorities will pierce the 
corporate veil whenever this action is requested.  The U.S. authorities tend to preserve 
the integrity of the corporate personality. Nonetheless, it has been perceived that the 
U.S. is a jurisdiction willing to pierce the corporate veil because a series of factors 
that make this subject gain more relevance in the U.S..  
 
     The U.S. has a federal government a fact that in turn makes the U.S. a complex 
jurisdiction. Company law and all the aspects related to it have been left as a matter 
for each state to regulate. Consequently, each state has a different opinion about the 
piercing of the corporate veil. Certainly, the doctrines of instrumentality and alter ego 
are structured on the same concepts: control, fraud and causation. However, each state 
has its own perception of each of these concepts. Moreover, when corporate 
personality issues go beyond state borders, conflicts of laws arise not only between 
state laws but also between state law and federal law. As a result, the diversity of 
opinions and constant debates about piercing the corporate veil stimulate the 
development of this subject. In contrast, England has a more centralised type of 
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government. As a consequence, court decisions tend to have a more uniform effect 
than in the U.S. Evidence of this is the English case of Salomon v Salomon Co. In 
England, the precedent established in the Salomon case is the foundation of the 
current position regarding the piercing of the corporate veil, the preservation of the 
corporate personality. It cannot be denied that among the English judiciary and 
academia there have been different opinions on this subject. However, the general 
tendency is to follow the precedent established in the case of Salomon.  
 
    In addition, another factor that has to be considered is the perception of the concept 
of fairness in this context. It can be considered that English authorities tend to be 
stricter than the U.S. An example is the previously cited case of Adams v Cape. In this 
case, the U.S. authorities decided to hold Cape Industries liable. However, when 
English authorities where requested to recognise and enforce this judgment, they 
refused to do so. Their refusal was based on the lack of a strong justification to ignore 
the corporate personality. The U.S. authorities tend to consider the piercing of the 
corporate veil in cases that do not necessarily involve a fraudulent or wrongful 
conduct. In contrast, English authorities emphasised in the case of Cape that the 
corporate veil should not be pierced merely because it is just to do so.273  
 
     The U.S. and England share the same legal tradition and the corporate personality 
has been relevant to their economies. However, the geographical dimension, 
organisation of government and judiciary and the role of the concept of fairness are 
factors that in this thesis are considered to have had an effect over the piercing of the 
corporate veil in the U.S. and England. These factors are of special attention because 
they are precisely what make each of these jurisdictions unique. 
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2.3.1 The Dilemma between the “Sledge Hammer Approach” and the “Back Door 
Approach”  
 
     The piercing of the corporate veil is a subject that has been regarded differently in 
the U.S. and England. As stated in Chapter One, the piercing of the corporate veil is a 
remedy that each jurisdiction adapts in accord to its legal needs. The “sledge hammer 
approach” and the “back door approach” are names used in this section to address the 
different paths that the U.S. and England have taken to pierce the corporate veil. I 
address both approaches under these headings for the purpose of this section, which is 
to determine what can be the most suitable position for my case study, Panama. I am 
not arguing that Panama should copy the American or English approaches; rather my 
intention is to present my opinion about whether Panama should be active or passive 
with regard to corporate veil issues (the Panamanian corporate personality and the 
piercing of the corporate veil is a subject that will be properly addressed in Chapter 
Four).  
 
    On the one hand, the U.S. deals in a straightforward manner with the corporate 
personality. The doctrines of instrumentality and alter ego are a means to piercing the 
corporate veil. Hence, it can be considered as a jurisdiction that has used a “Sledge 
Hammer approach” because it directly strikes the concept of corporate personality. 
England, on the other hand, has opted for not attacking the corporate personality but 
instead looking for alternative ways in which to deal with corporate veil issues. In this 
chapter, it was noted that English cases dealing with corporate personality issues did 
not finish with piercing of the corporate veil. The fact that the integrity of the 
corporate personality has not been affected makes this a “back door approach” 
because it looks for an alternative, less direct, means to establish liability for the 
corporation’s acts.   
 
     These different approaches trigger the following question: which approach 
provides a more suitable basis for the Panamanian approach? Some may argue that a 
“back door approach” is more convenient for Panama in view of the fact it is a 
financial service provider and relies on the incorporation of companies. A “back door 
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approach” will not worry investors nor undermine the corporate personality; at the 
same will help to deal with the misuse of the corporate personality. However, in this 
thesis it has been opted for a “Sledgehammer approach”.  
 
    A “back door approach” requires a high degree of judicial creativity in order to find 
a concept that suits the case and which can be justified. This degree of judicial 
creativity exists in common law tradition countries such as England but not in civil 
law tradition countries such as Panama. The “back door approach” is less combative 
yet it can be considered as being surrounded by uncertainty.  
 
    As a personal observation, a statutory rule is more compatible with the Panamanian 
legal framework. Panama is a civil law tradition country and as such it relies on 
statutory law. The motive behind the inclination for a “sledge hammer approach” is 
based on its practicality. A statute that directly deals with the corporate personality 
tends to be based on circumstances that may concur in any case and in any area of 
law. A statutory approach, however, has a drawback. A statute cannot cover every 
matter and legal loopholes will come to light with the application of the statutory rule. 
 
     Undeniably, a statute that directly allows the piercing of the corporate veil will be 
subject to criticism because it may be seen as something that will undermine the 
Panamanian corporate personality. This is a disadvantage that faces the “sledge 
hammer approach”. Nevertheless, in this thesis it is considered the more appropriate 
approach. 
Page 109 of 239 
 
 
Chapter Conclusion  
 
 
    The U.S. and England are the jurisdictions where corporate personality has been 
used to greater extent. England is the jurisdiction that pioneered the use of corporate 
personality as a device for commerce and the U.S. has used this instrument even more 
extensively. In fact, it can be considered that the modern corporate entity is originally 
Anglo-American.  The piercing of the corporate veil is a phenomenon that derived 
from the existence and common use of the corporate personality by Anglo-American 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, whilst being the jurisdictions that pioneered the use of this 
entity, they were thus the first to experience the dilemma of whether or not to pierce 
the corporate veil. However, although the U.S. and England share a similar main 
rationale for piercing the corporate veil (the punishment and prevention of fraud), this 
subject has been addressed differently by both jurisdictions.  
 
    On the one hand, the English authorities have been reluctant to apply a remedy 
such as piercing the corporate veil. This position was defined in the case of Salomon. 
Since the decision over the case of Salomon, approaches based on concepts such as 
sham, agency and single economic unit have been proposed. However, no systematic 
approach to apply this remedy has derived from these concepts. The concept of sham 
has had more acceptance as a means to deal with corporate veil issues. However, in 
cases where it has been used to support an argument against the corporate personality, 
the decision has not been the piercing of the corporate veil but rather liability has been 
extended to the companies or defendants. The precedent of Salomon is solid and thus 
authorities have opted for alternatives that do not affect the integrity of the corporate 
personality in order to avoid conflict.  
 
     In this chapter, it has been pointed out that English authorities have adopted a 
different approach to deal with corporate personality issues. Notably, the fact that a 
specific approach has not been developed does not necessarily mean that the misuse 
of the corporate personality is allowed. In contemporary cases involving corporate 
personality issues, the Courts have tended to protect the integrity of the corporate 
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personality and justify liability on other grounds. In the cited case of Chandler v Cape 
PLC, the court established liability not by disregarding the existence of the corporate 
veil but by considering the existence of a duty of care towards an affected employee 
of a subsidiary.  
 
     In addition, English authorities have also relied on statutory rules to deal with 
corporate personality issues. However, statutory rules are not aimed at the corporate 
personality but instead at the parties responsible for its misuse. In this jurisdiction, the 
grounds on which an argument to pierce the corporate veil is likely to succeed are 
limited to cases involving circumstances that affect the interest of the state.  
 
    On the other hand, since the early days of the corporate personality, the U.S. has 
been more open to applying the piercing of the corporate veil; a factor that can be 
attributed to the plurality of internal jurisdictions that, along with other opinions, 
feeds the debate over topics such as the piercing of the corporate veil. The doctrines 
of instrumentality and alter ego, which are in essence the same, have been developed 
from the corporate veil debate. Both doctrines are aimed at making shareholders liable 
when it is proven that their excessive control over the corporate entity rendered it a 
mere instrument for fraudulent purposes.  
 
    The U.S doctrine to pierce the corporate veil has been the subject for criticism 
because there is not a concrete definition as to what can be considered as control and 
fraud. Moreover, the application of this doctrine is unpredictable and jurisprudence is 
full of vagueness. However, despite heavy criticism, the doctrines of instrumentality 
and alter ego are considered as the only systematic approach to deal with corporate 
veil issues. These doctrines present a set of circumstances that have to concur in order 
to ignore the corporate personality. The main trigger is the concurrence of wrongful 
and fraudulent behavior.   
 
     In the context of U.S. statutory law, there is no direct exception to the corporate 
personality. Undoubtedly, U.S. policy makers have gradually introduced exceptions to 
the corporate entity in areas of law in which public policies have been set in order to 
protect a public interest but these statutory exceptions are limited to a specific 
circumstance. 
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    This chapter closes with a brief comparison that gave rise to the metaphors of 
“sledgehammer” and “backdoor”. The purpose of the former was to describe the 
active American position and of the latter the passive English position, in this context. 
I decided to briefly analyse which position would be the more appropriate for Panama 
to adopt because this will gradually introduce the reader to the core of this thesis. In 
addition, this chapter contributes to confirm one of the premises of this research; “the 
piercing of the corporate veil is a remedy that each jurisdiction adapts in accord to its 
internal needs.” Indeed, although the piercing of the corporate veil can be considered 
as an Anglo-American occurrence, the development of this subject has taken different 
paths in both jurisdictions.  
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CHAPTER III: The Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil 
in Hispano-American Civil Law Jurisdictions; a comparison 
of the methods used by Spain and Latin American countries 
to deal with corporate veil issues 
 
 
     The German academic Rudolf Serick suggested, in his work “Rechtsform und 
Realitit Juristischer Personen” (Legal Form and Reality of Corporate Persons), to use 
the American doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in continental jurisidictions.274 
The work of Serick influenced certain aspects regarding the disregard of the legal 
entity in the civil law world. However, civil law jurisdictions have not copied 
wholesale American doctrine; rather, each civil law country has dealt with the abuses 
of the corporate veil in accordance with its own legal framework and needs, whilst 
following a similar objective to that of the American doctrine, i.e. the prevention and 
punishment of fraud.  
 
    This chapter discusses the piercing of the corporate veil in Spain and Latin 
America. Spain is a continental jurisdiction that follows the civil law tradition and 
moreover introduced this legal tradition to Latin America during the colonial period. 
Although Latin American countries are currently independent republics, the influence 
of Spanish civil law is still present and legal developments in Spain are to this day 
sometimes considered by Latin American jurisdictions. In regard piercing the 
corporate veil, Spain has developed an approach to deal with corporate veil issues, 
which consist in the use of domestic doctrines and concepts. Certainly, Latin 
American jurisdictions consider Spanish legal developments, but in the context of 
piercing the corporate veil Latin American countries have developed their own 
methods.  
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    The objective of this chapter is to support my premise regarding prosperity and 
legal tradition as key factors when it comes to the development of an approach to deal 
with corporate veil issues. My objective is to demonstrate how traditional legal 
concepts have been used in this context by Latin American jurisdictions and the 
individuality each jurisdiction has when dealing with the corporate veil.  
 
    Before explaining the approach used by Spain, Argentina, Colombia, Chile and 
Brazil in dealing with corporate veil issues, I will briefly address two aspects that are 
imperative in the understanding of how corporate veil issues have been handled in the 
jurisdictions subject of study. These aspects are types of business associations and 
traditional legal concepts. As in the previous chapter, I will highlight differences 
among jurisdictions, which share the same legal tradition and have a historical 
connection, when it comes to piercing the corporate veil.   
3.1  Types of Business Association  
 
    The Anglo-American joint stock corporation was the first type of business 
association to have the attributes of legal personality and shareholders’ limited 
liability. Therefore, the American doctrine of piercing the corporate veil was 
originally aimed at dealing with the misuse of the corporation. However, the 
advantages of legal personality and limited liability have been gradually extended to 
other types of business associations such as the “Limited Liability Company”. 
Therefore, among American academics whether the doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil could be applied to limited liability companies has been a subject of interest.275 In 
civil law jurisdictions, however, the action of disregarding the legal personality has 
not been aimed at one type of business association.  
 
     The forms of business associations that exist in the civil law jurisdictions under 
discussion in this thesis are classified under the Spanish heading Sociedades 
Mercantiles (in Portuguese “Empresa Commerciais”). This heading includes the 
                                                        
275
  Limited Liability company is form of business association, which introduction in the U.S has been 
relatively recent. See, Huss, R. Revamping Veil Piercing for all Limited Liability Entities: Forcing 
the Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age. University of Cincinnati Law Review. (Volume 
70) 2007. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1014432 [last visit may 30, 
2013] at page 96-97. See also, Bainbridge, S. Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing. SSRN eLibrary. 
Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=551724 [last visit may 30, 2013]  
Page 114 of 239 
 
Sociedad Anónima  (in Portuguese “Da sociedade anônima”), which can be regarded 
as the equivalent to the Anglo-American joint stock corporation. Certainly, early 
cases involving corporate veil issues were based on the misuse of the sociedad 
anónima. However, the judiciary and academia did not limit the action of ignoring the 
corporate veil only to this type of business association.  
 
     Throughout the Twentieth Century, new types of business associations with the 
attributes of legal personality and shareholders’ limited liability have been introduced 
in Spain, Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Brazil. These forms of business associations 
are:  
  Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada  (SRL): a type of business association 
that requires less formality for its creation than does the sociedad anónima. 
The SRL has low capital requirements and its management is more flexible. 
The capital is not divided into shares but in participaciones sociales. 
  Sociedad Unipersonal: a company that complies with all the legal 
requirements in order to exist but only one individual or legal entity owns a 
majority or all of the shares. Therefore it cannot be regarded as a company 
with a plurality of owners.  
  Empresa Unipersonal: a type of commercial entity. The empresa unipersonal 
has a different legal personality to the owner, who has limited liability in 
regard to the acts made under the name of the business.  
  Sociedad por acciones simplificadas (SAS): a derivation of the sociedad 
anónima, but it is more flexible regarding corporate governance aspects. One 
individual can create a SAS and be its sole shareholder and its legal 
representative. The SAS was created as an alternative to the sociedad 
anónima, which in some jurisdictions is subject to strict regulations. In some 
circumstances it is difficult for small entrepreneurs to comply with the 
requirements given in order to obtain the benefits of trading under the 
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corporate form. Therefore, the SAS was created to allow small entrepreneurs 
access to the benefits of legal personality and limited liability. 
 
     The rationale for the creation of these other types of business associations has been 
to satisfy the needs of small entrepreneurs and thus encourage investment. However, 
not all the jurisdictions addressed in this chapter have included all these types of 
business associations in their legal framework. These forms of business associations 
have been adopted by a jurisdiction in accord to its commercial needs.  
 
    The policy makers in the jurisdictions that have included some or all of these types 
of business associations have been aware of these associations´ potential to be a 
device to practice fraudulent acts. Therefore, the application of an action to disregard 
the corporate veil has been extended to cases that may involve the misuse of the 
mentioned types of business association; a subject addressed more extensively 
throughout this chapter.  
3.2 Traditional Legal Concepts  
 
     The use of traditional legal concepts has been one of the most common reactions 
against the misuse of the corporate veil in civil law jurisdictions. A civil law judge 
does not always have the faculty to use judicial creativity, as has the common law 
judge.276 Therefore, in deciding early cases which involved a misuse of the corporate 
veil, civil law judges sought principles and legal concepts contained in positive law in 
order to support a decision to pierce the corporate veil. It is important to add that 
although Spain, Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Brazil are different legal systems, 
they have been built on similar legal principles and concepts. Consequently, the legal 
concepts cited to deal with corporate veil issues are the same. The most used 
traditional legal concepts in corporate entity issues are:  
  Fraude a la ley: (Fraud of the Law): the use of alternative legal means to 
achieve a result intended by another law or laws to be prohibited.277 For 
                                                        
276
 See, Perdomo, R. & Marryman, j. Supra note 17. At page  48-49 
277
 Becerra, F. Diccionario de Terminología Jurídica Mexicana (español- Inglés). Mexico: Escuela 
Libre de Derecho; 1999. 
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example, an individual who is restricted from contracting with the state due to 
administrative faults avoids this restriction by using a legally incorporated 
company to contract with the state. 
  Simulación: this is a concept based on the use of legal means to avoid 
obligations.  In civil law there are two types of simulated acts, simulación 
absoluta and simulación relativa . Simulación absoluta  makes reference to an 
act, which assumes an appearance not corresponding to reality, and is usually 
the result of two or more persons who attempt to accomplish an unlawful 
purpose. For example X transfers his property to Y. In reality X continues to 
own the property but by simulating the transfer X avoid the enforcement of 
Z’s credit over X’s property.  Simulación relativa refers to an act that is made 
to conceal the true character of the purpose sought by the parties and therefore 
once discovered the true act or transaction is made retroactively effective for 
all purposes.278 For example, X sells his property to Y for £100,000, but in the 
contract it is stated that the price is £50,000. The purpose in concealing the 
original price is to avoid taxation. 
  Abuso del derecho: (Abuse of rights):  intentional exercise of rights by a 
person that causes harm to another with no benefit to the person, and which 
entails an indemnity obligation, provided it is proven that such right was 
exercised for the sole purpose of causing damage or harming the other 
person.279 For example, individuals have the right to associate and use the 
benefits of the corporate personality. However, if the right to use and benefit 
from the use of the corporate form is used to defraud third parties, there is an 
abuse.   
 
    Besides fraude a la ley, simulación and abuso del derecho there are also legal 
devices such as the Acción Pauliana , which has been used to deal with corporate veil 
issues. The acción pauliana is a legal remedy to enforce contractual obligations. This 
remedy is applied when one of the contracting parties performs other legal acts in 
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 Idem  
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 Idem  
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order to avoid his obligations to the other party. The affected party may request this 
remedy in order to nullify the acts made by the other party. Thus, enforce the contract.  
 
     These concepts and principles have been present in civil law tradition and have 
been an auxiliary means to deal with corporate veil issues. Moreover, some of these 
concepts have become the basis of current exceptions to the corporate personality in 
some civil law jurisdictions. Based on this fact it cannot be asserted that the American 
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has been adopted or copied by Hispano-
American jurisdictions. Indeed, it can be argued that the Hispano-American approach 
to deal with corporate veil issues has a degree of originality. 
 
     The ways in which legal concepts and legal devices have been used vary among 
civil law jurisdictions. As has been stated in the previous chapters, the piercing of the 
corporate veil is a subject developed individually by each jurisdiction. Spanish civil 
law has certainly influenced Latin American countries subject of study in this thesis 
(except Brazil). However, Latin American countries that have dealt with corporate 
veil issues have done so in a way different to that of Spain.  
3.3 The Spanish Method to Deal with the Misuse of the Corporate 
Veil   
 
     The Spanish approach to deal with corporate veil issues has been developed in two 
stages; the first stage started with the doctrina de terceros, which functioned in a 
different way to the American piercing of the corporate veil yet achieved the same 
result; the second stage started in the 1980s with the introduction of the Spanish 
doctrine of levantamiento del velo.280 The levantamiento el velo is Spanish for lifting 
the corporate veil. In this section, I will address this concept by its Spanish name.  
 
     The reason to include Spain in this thesis is not only its historical connection with 
my case study Panama and other Latin American jurisdictions, but also the peculiar 
development of piercing the corporate veil in this jurisdiction. In order to explain the 
Spanish approach to deal with the misuse of the corporate veil, I shall first address the 
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 See, Perez, R. Una Vision Dual de la Doctrina del Levantamiento del Velo de la Persona 
Juridica. Revista del Instituto de la Judicatura Federal (No 25) 2008. At page 170  
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doctrina de terceros. I will address the concept and how this doctrine developed into 
the levantamiento del velo. Following this, the current situation of the Spanish 
levantamiento del velo will be explained.  
3.3.1 Doctrina de Terceros 
 
     The doctrina de terceros is an early approach used by the Spanish judiciary to deal 
with the misuse of the corporation’s legal personality.281 This doctrine is based on the 
fact that the corporation and the shareholders are third parties in regard to each other’s 
acts; for example, the corporation is a legal person with capacity to contract. 
Contracts signed under the name of the corporation only make the corporation, and 
not the shareholders, liable. In the same way, the corporation is a third party in regard 
to the acts and obligations of an individual or group of shareholders. Under this 
doctrine, issues regarding the misuse of the corporation’s attributes are not solved by 
disregarding the corporation’s legal personality but instead liability is extended to the 
shareholders (or the corporation). By losing the status of third party in regard to the 
acts of the other, liability is extended. Based on the fact that the integrity of the 
corporation’s legal personality is respected, I consider the Spanish doctrina de tercero 
differs from the piercing of the corporate veil.  
 
    An early case involving the application of the doctrina de terceros is the precedent 
established in the Sentencia de 7 de junio de 1927.282 In this case the defendant was 
obligated to pay a compensation derived from an arbitral judgment. However, after 
the arbitral judgment was issued, the defendant created a company and transferred his 
assets. The Spanish Tribunal Supremo283 considered the time on which the transfer of 
assets was made as a factor to determine the intention of the defendant. The fact the 
defendant constituted the company and the assets were transferred after the issue of 
the award made the Tribunal Supremo consider the conduct of the defendant as 
elusive. However, the Tribunal Supremo decided not to ignore the company’s legal 
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 See, Boldo, C. Levantamiento del Velo Corporativo y Persona Juridica en el Derecho Privado 
Español. 4th Edition. Navarra: Editorial Arazandi; 2006. At page 175 
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 This precendent was cited by the author Carmen Boldo. Idem. At page 177 
283 The Spanish Tribunal Supremo is the highest court in Spain for all matters not pertaining to the 
Spanish Constitution. The Tribunal Supremo meets in the Palacio and Convento de las Salesas Reales 
in Madrid. The Tribunal Supremo consists of a president and an indeterminate number of magistrates 
appointed to the five chambers of the court. See, 
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personality; instead, the effects of the arbitral judgment were extended to the 
corporation’s assets.284 Another example regarding the application of the doctrina de 
terceros is the Sentencia de 26 de enero de 1952.285 In this case the defendant was the 
owner of properties that were for let. In the contract signed between the landlord and 
the tenants, there was a clause in which the tenants had the right to re-occupuy the 
flats after construction work. At some point the defendent embarked upon a project to 
refurbish the flats, but did not wanted the tenants back. Thus, the defendant decided to 
create a company and transfer the properties to the company. The court considered 
that the properties were transferred to a corporate entity used by the defendants as a 
means to avoid the contractual obligation.  In this case, the company lost its status of 
third party due to bad faith in the transaction between the landlord and the company. 
Thus, the tenants were allowed to return to the flats.  
    
    The doctrina de tercero did not only look to the actions but also to the fact that the 
corporation complied with the conditions established in the law. In the Sentencia de 8 
de octubre de 1929,286 the Tribunal Supremo denied the condition of third party to a 
corporation whose Memorandum of Association fell under the scope of the concept of 
simulación. The lack of legal ground with which to support the corporate personality 
made the tribunal consider this as invalid. 
 
    This doctrine became the primary tool for dealing with issues involving the 
corporate veil. However, with the use of the doctrina de terceros becoming more 
common, the need for a more complete approach to deal with corporate personality 
issues was becoming evident.   
 
      In the Sentencia de 8 de enero de 1980,287 the Tribunal Supremo did not disregard 
the corporation’s legal personality, but nevertheless established the foundation for its 
later application. In this case, the company “PROTUCASA” was constituted to carry 
out the development of a residential project. Some of the shareholders of 
                                                        
284
 The decision of the Spanish court on this case, I consider, is similar to the English approach in the 
cases Gilford Motors v Horne and Jones v Lipman (previously cited in the second chapter). In both 
cases the liability of the shareholders was extended to the company, losing the latter its “status of third 
party in regard of the shareholder’s obligations”.  
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 STS de 26 de enero de 1952 (RJ 1952, 478) 
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287
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PROTUCASA bought properties in the project. However, irregularities arose and a 
group of tenants, who claimed the compliance of contract clauses, sued 
PROTUCASA. Nonetheless, PROTUCASA argued that the contract was not valid 
because some of the complaining tenants were shareholders of PROTUCASA. By 
contracting with themselves they undermined the corporation’s status of legal 
personality.  In this case the Tribunal Supremo decided to consider not just the form 
but also the substance of the relationship in order to determine the role of the 
claimants who were members of the defendant company. In the end the court held that 
the claimants’ relationship with PROTUCASA did not affect the integrity of the 
corporation’s legal personality. Shareholders and the company have different legal 
personality, thus, the contract was valid. In this case the court did not regard the 
corporate entity as a third party, but regarded the parties behind the veil of 
incorporation and analysed the intention of the parties. 
 
       The doctrina de terceros, it could be considered, respects the integrity of the 
corporate personality. However, there are circumstances such as the case 
PROTUCASA in which is not possible to deal with the issue by the extension of 
liability. In the cited case the court has to evaluate whether the corporate personality 
fulfill the requirements to be considered a legal person. Certainly, it was not a case 
about piercing of the corporate veil, but involved a debate about the existence of the 
corporate personality. The doctrina de terceros is effective to deal with liability 
derived from contractual obligations. However, there are circumstances that require a 
deper reasoning about whether or not to preserve the existence of the corporate 
personality, as the case decided by the sentencia de 28 de mayo de 1984. 
3.3.2 El Levantamiento del Velo y Persona Juridica  
 
    The Sentencia de 28 de mayo de 1984288 is the first Spanish precedent in which the 
levantamiento del velo is directly used as a remedy to deal with corporate personality 
issues.289 This case was based on a compensation claim. The company Uto Ibérica 
S.A owned a number of apartments in “la Palma Mallorca” that were damaged by 
water from a broken pipe in the water supply network. Due to the damage caused by 
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the water, the apartments were not available for rent during the summer. 
Consequently, Uto Ibérica S.A suffered a financial loss.  
 
    In order to be compensated for financial loss, Uto Ibérica S.A started proceedings 
against the Bureau de la Palma  in April 1978. Legal actions were taken against the 
Bureau since water supply was one of the services provided by the Bureau. However, 
previous to the events of the case, the Bureau created a company called “Empresa 
Municipal de Aguas y Alcantarillado” (EMAYA) for administering and maintaining 
the water supply network. The objective was to make the Bureau’s administration 
more efficient.  
 
   With regard Uto Ibérica S.A’s claim the Bureau denied any liability on grounds that 
EMAYA was in charge of the water supply network. Therefore, EMAYA was held 
liable. The argument made by the Bureau did not make Uto Ibérica S.A desist from its 
actions against the the Bureau. Instead, besides maintaining its claim against the 
Bureau, it also started proceedings against EMAYA in 1979.  
 
    The First Instance Court dismissed both claims. However, the Audiencia  
Territorial290(Provincial Tribunal) partly supported one claim. The Bureau was 
absolved but the claim against EMAYA was maintained. However, EMAYA 
presented a “recurso de casación”291 in which it was argued that legal action against 
it was not valid because it was subject to an expiration date. The actions against 
EMAYA started almost one year after the actions against the Bureau. This type of 
proceedings is subject to an expiration date in order to avoid saturation of the Courts. 
EMAYA argued that the actions against the Bureau did not interrupt the expiration 
date because the Bureau and EMAYA are separate legal entities. In other words, if a 
legal action was admitted against EMAYA, it would be a whole new proceeding 
regarding the same case. 
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 Audiencia Territorial is a second instance court. It has competence mainly over apelations in civil 
and administratives matters. See, 
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     In order to make a decision, the Tribunal Supremo decided to apply el 
levantamiento del velo corporativo. By lifting the corporate veil the Tribunal 
Supremo found a unity of interest and a similar administration (The Mayor was the 
administrator and member of the board in the company). The existence of a common 
administration and a unity of interest made the Tribunal Supremo consider the Bureau 
and EMAYA as one similar entity. Furthermore, due to its consideration, the 
expiration was interrupted. Therefore, recurso de casación was dismissed and 
EMAYA and the Bureau were regarded as the same entity in relation to proceedings. 
The Court decided that EMAYA was liable and had to pay compensation. It is 
important to add that the veil was lifted in order to determine the link between the 
bureau and EMAYA for procedural purposes, not to make the Bureau liable together 
with EMAYA. In the judgment, only EMAYA had to pay compensation to the 
plaintiff.  
 
     Notably, this was the first time the legal personality was directly ignored in 
Spain.292 The existence of a unity of interest and a common administration were the 
basis of the court’s analysis, but the court analysis was also reinforced through 
existent legal concepts applied to the case. Definitely, due to a lack of guiding 
principles or rules, the Tribunal Supremo justified ignoring the corporate personality 
on values contained in the Spanish Constitution293 and legal concepts contained in the 
Spanish Codigo Civil294. These are:   
  Conflict between legal certainty and justice (article 1º.1 and 9º.3, constitucion)  Equity (article 3º.2, Codigo Civil)  
                                                        
292
 The following is an abstract containing the argument which the Spanish Tribunal Supremo based the 
application of the levantamiento del velo:  
 “…desde el punto de vista civil y mercantil, la más autorizada doctrina, en el conflicto entre 
seguridad juridical y justicia  (legal certainty and justice), valores hoy consagrados en la 
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antisocial de su derecho (abuse and misuse of rights)….” 
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 Fraud ( article 6.4, Codigo Civil) and perjuicio de intereses  Buena fe y Abuso del Derecho (article 7.2, Codigo Civil)   
 
    Before explaining how the current levantamiento del velo has been developed since 
the commented case, I will briefly explain each of the concepts on which the Spanish 
authorities justified the decision over the commented case.  
3.3.2.1 Conflict between legal certainty and justice 
 
     Legal certainty is a fundamental pillar of any legal system. Legal certainty can be 
defined as a value that requires authorities to make decisions in accord with legal 
rules in order to prevent arbitrary use of power. The prevention of arbitrariness and 
the adherence to law generates certainty because authorities’ behavior becomes 
predictable. However, legal certainty is just one value that needs to be complemented 
with other concepts such as justice. Justice can be defined as a force that preserves 
freedom and equality. Moreover, it can be considered the rationale of the law’s 
existence. In Spain, the concepts of legal certainty and justice are contained in the 
constitution and the State has the duty to preserve these values. However, there are 
circumstances in which both values conflict, such as the previous commented case.  
     
     In Sentencia de 28 de mayo de 1984 the Tribunal Supremo justified the prevalence 
of justice over legal certainty and proceeded to set aside the corporation’s legal 
personality. In the wording of the sentence by the Tribunal Supremo, an appraisal of 
the conflict between legal certainty and justice is made and it is decided that justice 
prevails over legal certainty: “in this conflict between legal certainty and justice, 
values protected by the constitution, it has been decided to set aside the corporate 
personality…”295 As a rule, the corporate personality contained in company law 
which has no exception generates a tendency to preserve it; indeed, a predictable 
outcome. However, the fact that the court decided to ignore the corporate personality 
shows a clear inclination to achieve justice over certainty.  
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3.3.2.2 Equity  
     
   The concept of equity makes reference to two situations. Firstly, equity makes 
reference to a set of ethical principles that guide application of equity. Secondly, 
equity is the method used by judges to solve cases based on its reasoning when the 
strict application of legislation may produce an evident injustice.  
 
   The concept of “equity” was introduced in Spain with reforms to the Spanish 
Código Civil in 1974.296 However, equity in Spanish legislation has not been based on 
philosophy and ethics; rather, the Spanish legislator made an attempt at developing a 
coherent and compatible concept of equity with Spanish legal framework. In the 
article 3.2º of the Titulo Preliminar of the Spanish Código Civil it is stated, “equity 
must be taken into account in applying rules, but the resolutions of the Courts may 
only be based exclusively on equity when the law expressly allows this.” The 
sentences that compose the cited article present two situations in which the concept of 
equity is present.  
  Equity must be taken into account in applying rules.  This sentence refers 
to the use of equity as a tool to interpret the law. In this context equity is used 
to provide an appropriate solution when a rule creates doubts regarding its 
interpretation; in other words, a rule that is supposed to regulate a determined 
circumstance seems to be inadequate. This mode of equity has not been widely 
accepted by the Spanish Tribunals, which have a preference for the second 
method.  
  A judgment can be based on equity as long as the law expressly allows it. 
This notion of equity has been more accepted by the Spanish judiciary. I 
believe that this is so as it better adapts to the nature of the Spanish civil law 
system. Some situations in which the Spanish legislation allows judges to 
exercise equitable discretion are: “prudente arbitrio” to take measures to 
protect assets (articulo 181 Codigo Civil), “lo que corresponda” for the 
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administration of common property (articulo 398 del Código Civil), to 
moderate the effects of liability derived from negligence (articulo 1103 del 
Código Civil).  
 
    The two sentences that compose part of the wording of the Article 3.2º are 
classified by the Spanish author Carmen Boldo as equidad como medio interpretativo 
(equity as a tool to interpret law) and equidad como fundamento de las resoluciones 
de los Tribunales (equity as ground of judgment).297  
 
     The Sentencia de 28 de mayo de 1984 was not based on equity.298 There is no 
statute in Spanish law that allows the judge to disregard the corporation’s legal 
personality based on equity. However, the Tribunal Supremo did use equity as a tool 
to interpret the law. Although this mode of equity has not been widely accepted, it did 
provide a solution for the case at hand. In the Sentencia de 28 de mayo de 1984, the 
preservation of the corporate veil would have allowed the prescription of proceedings 
and the plaintiff would therefore not have recovered any compensation. I regard that 
the Tribunal Supremo summoned equity in this case in order to solve the conflict 
between legal certainty and justice.   
3.3.2.3 Fraud and Perjuicio de Intereses  
 
    In Anglo-American jurisdictions as well as in civil law jurisdictions, the concept of 
fraud is the rationale on which the approach to deal with corporate veil issues has 
been built. In the Sentencia de 28 de mayo de 1984 the Spanish Tribunal Supremo 
summoned the concept of fraude a la ley contained in the article 6.4 in the Titulo 
Preliminar of the Código Civil which provides that “Acts performed pursuant to the 
text of a legal rule, which pursue a result forbidden by the legal system or contrary 
thereto shall be considered to be in fraud of the law and shall not prevent the due 
application of the rule which they purported to avoid”.299 
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     From the study of the facts of the case decided by the cited Sentencia , there was no 
direct allegation of fraud. Certainly, this has been the subject of debate among the 
Spanish academia.300 However, although there was no fraud, in this precedent the 
court considered that the purpose of emphasising the concept of fraud is to 
demonstrate that the use of the corporate personality can be seen to contradict its 
original purpose.301  In later Spanish cases dealing with the levantamiento del velo, 
the concept of fraud is more extensively developed.  
3.3.2.4 Good Faith and Abuso del Derecho 
 
    The principle of good faith makes reference to the duty each individual has to act in 
a manner that is in accordance with morality, honesty and other social values. In a 
legal context, good faith can be considered as a concept that supplements the law by 
establishing a limit in the use of rights. In other words, a person can enjoy their rights 
as long as they are not used in bad faith. The use of right(s) in bad faith may produce 
the invalidity of the right(s), the void of acts made under the use of this right(s) and 
the payment of compensation if any harm has been produced.  
 
     In the Titulo Preliminar of the Spanish Código Civil is provided in the article 7.1: 
“rights must be exercised in accordance with the requirements of good faith”. Good 
faith is a general concept and it may be too vague if it is applied by itself to deal with 
corporate veil issues. Therefore, the Spanish judiciary opted to summon the concept 
of good faith together with the concept of abuso del derecho, which makes reference 
to the use of rights in an irregular manner to the point it produces harm or loss to third 
parties.302  
 
     How rights are to be used is addressed in the article 7.2 of Titulo Preliminar in the 
Spanish Código Civil: “the law does not support abuse of rights or illicit exercise 
thereof. Any act or omission which, as a result of the author’s intention, its purpose or 
the circumstances in which it is performed manifestly exceeds the normal limits to 
exercise a right, with damage to a third party, shall give rise to the corresponding 
compensation and the adoption of judicial or administrative measures preventing 
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persistence in such abuse.” Based on this rule, three aspects are considered in 
determining whether there has been abuso del derecho. These are as follows: 
intention of the person, objective and the circumstances in which the right is used. 
Certainly, the parameters established to determine abuso del derecho strengthen an 
argument to pierce the corporate veil based on good faith.  
 
     In the case resolved by the Sentencia de 28 de mayo de 1984, however, the 
elements required for an abuso del derecho were not present. It can be said that abuso 
del derecho was used in a vague manner. The author Carmen Boldo in her study 
about el levantamiento del velo, argues that in this context the Spanish courts have 
used the concept of abuso del derecho without any reasoning or deep justification for 
its use.303  
3.3.3 The Current Doctrine of Levantamiento del Velo Corporativo 
 
    Since the precedent established in the Sentencia de 28 de mayo de 1984, the 
Spanish approach to deal with corporate veil issues has been developed through 
legislation and doctrine. The development of legislation is the result of the criticism 
made by a sector of the Spanish academia against the standard established in the 
Sentencia de 28 de mayo de 1984.304 It is considered that fraude a la ley, buena fe, 
abuso del derecho and equidad are vague concepts, whose application may hinder 
legal certainty and produce arbitrary judgments.305 However, despite this criticism, 
the jurisprudence following the Sentencia de 28 de mayo de 1984 have contributed to 
the development of legislation that deals with corporate personality issues in Spain.  
Currently, legislations and doctrines can be considered complementary to each other 
when dealing with corporate personality issues in Spain.  
 
     The areas where the Spanish levantamiento del velo can be considered to have 
been more active are: unipersonalidad sobrevenida , corporate groups, 
infracapitalisacion nominal and avoidance of legal rules and contractual obligations. 
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3.3.3.1 Unipersonalidad Sobrevenida  
 
    The commingling of assets, siphoning of assets, and excessive control by one 
individual or a legal entity over a company, have been issues that Spanish 
jurisprudence has addressed in ample extent in the context of Sociedades 
Unipersonales.306  
 
     The previous regulation for sociedad de responsabilidad limitada and sociedad 
anónima did not establish nor regulate the possibility of creating a sociedad 
unipersonal. Therefore, due to the lack of restriction, individuals and legal entities 
could own a majority of shares in a company to the point it could not be regarded as a 
company with plurality of owners. This phenomenon was addressed as 
unipersonalidad sobrevenida .  
  
     The levantamiento del velo has been a method for dealing with the confusion of 
assets derived from unipersonalidad sobrevenida . An example is the Sentencia del 
Tribunal Supremo de 3 de junio de 1991.307  In that case a company called “Las 
Llantas S.A” owned the shares of another company called “Arboleda S.A”. An 
individual representing “Las Llantas, S.A” sold a part of a property owned by 
“Arboleda S.A” to the claimant in order to engage in the development of a residential 
project.  However, there was an issue that led the claimant to sue both companies. 
Arboleda S.A claimed that it was not part of the contract. Therefore it was not subject 
to proceedings. Moreover, it requested the rescission of the contract because the 
properties sold to the claimant by Llantas S.A did not belong to this company. 
However, the Tribunal Supremo considered that the preservation of the legal 
personality and separation assets would produce a loss for the claimant. Therefore, 
based on the fact that Las Llantas S.A had used the assets of Arboleda S.A as if they 
were their own, in addition to the fact that the former owned the shares of the latter 
and there was an intention to avoid obligation, the Tribunal considered both 
companies to be liable for the obligation towards the claimant.  
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     The regulation of the phenomenon of unipersonalidad sobrevenida was the 
initiative taken to diminish fraudulent practices in this context. The Ley 2/1995 de 23 
de marzo reformed the regulation for Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada , and 
introduced the Sociedad Unipersonal in Spain. In this regulation, the sociedad 
unipersonal is defined as the company created by an individual or legal person or a 
company whose shares were bought by one member from the other members.308 The 
formal regulation of the sociedad unipersonal and measures to prevent its abuse 
created an environment of certainty that did not previously exist.   
3.3.3.2 Corporate Groups   
 
    The phenomenon of corporate groups is quite recent in Spanish positive law. The 
Ley del Mercado de Valores (Ley 24/1988, de 28 de julio) is the first body of law that 
defines the concept of corporate groups in Spanish legislation as a conglomerate of 
companies that act under the same direction and unity of interest.309  Regulations 
regarding consumers’ protection, banks, accountability standards and the code of 
commerce address certain aspects of corporate groups. However, only certain statutes 
present a rule that establishes excessive control as a trigger for the disregard of the 
legal personality in the context of corporate groups. An example is the Spanish 
competition law (Ley 16/1989, de 17 de julio), which in its Article 8 ignores the legal 
personality of the companies’ part of a group, in order to extend the liabilities of the 
controlled company to the controller company.  
 
    Spanish courts have used the doctrine of levantamiento del velo as an alternative to 
positive law when dealing with the fraudulent use of the group structure.  In this 
context, the application of this doctrine has been based on the concept of group. The 
functions of a corporate group are based on a unity of interest and command. In this 
unit, each company is a different legal person with its own rights and liabilities. 
However, when the legal entity has been used to evade obligations the veil must be 
lifted for the group to answer as a whole.   In the sentencia de Tribunal Supremo de 
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27 octubre de 2004,310 the Tribunal emphasised that the use of a device such as the 
corporate personality must not be used as a means to achieve fraud; in this case, the 
company Sisbarna had the majority of shares of Siscomp. Both companies shared the 
same domicile and Sibarna established the policies followed by Siscomp. However, 
the accountability of both companies was not clear and created confusion. Siscomp 
could not comply with its obligation. Therefore, the Tribunal ignored the separate 
corporate personality and regarded the companies as one unit since Sisbarna  created 
Siscomp as a company to avoid liabilities and the payment of debts.  
 
    The doctrine of levantamiento del velo has definitely been useful to deal with the 
concept of corporate groups in Spain.  Nonetheless, this has not been widely applied 
in private law cases involving corporate groups. Rather, this doctrine has been applied 
to a greater extent in cases dealing with corporate groups in the context of labour 
law.311 
    3.3.3.2.1 The levantamiento del velo and corporate groups in Spanish Labour law 
 
    The early labour law cases involving a group of companies were based on the issue 
of identifying the employer. The group structure allows the creation of a network of 
companies that in some cases is used to evade obligations the employer has to the 
employee(s). The Spanish judiciary in the period previous to the introduction of the 
levantamiento del velo addressed this issue initially through the Principio de Unidad 
de Empresa (single economic unit). An example is the Sentencia del Tribunal Central 
de Trabajo de 15 de octubre de 1982,312 in which the Labour Court recognised the 
separate existence of two companies.  However, it also held that the concept of legal 
personality could not be used to avoid obligations towards the employees. Both 
companies act under a common direction and aim to achieve a similar goal. Thus, if 
both companies act as a unit, both should answer for their debts as a unit.  
 
     The doctrine of levantamiento del velo was applied later in this context but 
constructed on a similar objective to that of a single economic unit, to regard the 
group as a unit. Spanish labour case law has gradually built grounds on which the 
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joint liability of a group of companies can be justified. In the Sentencia de la Sala 
Sexta del Tribunal Supremo de 30 de Junio de 1993,313 the court mentioned the 
following: 
 
a- Joint liability is imputed to a corporate group that presents vertical 
domination, unified governance and a personal and economic relationship.  
(Sentencia de 24 de Julio de 1989 (RJ 1989, 5908) 
 
b- To consider joint liability in regard of employer obligations, it is necessary for 
the members of the group to have not only an economic relationship but also 
share the payroll. (Sentencia de 22 de enero de 1990 (RJ 1990, 180))  
 
c- Besides unified governance, joint liability requires the concurrence of 
commingling of assets, no determination for which company the employees 
work, improper use and abuse of the corporation’s legal personality to the 
point it has a negative effect on the employees. (Sentencia de 30 de enero de 
1990 (RJ 1990, 233)) 
 
d- In a group, the concurrence of a nexus or connection must be based on special 
characteristics. Firstly, the unified functioning of the group must be as it is 
described in the SS de 6 de mayo de 1981 (RJ 1981, 2103) and SS de 8 de 
octubre de 1987 (RJ 1987, 6973). Secondly, employee performance in the 
different companies in the group, without defining who is the employer, must 
be based as described in SS de 11 de diciembre de 1985 (RJ 1985, 6094), SS 
de 3 de marzo de 1987 (RJ 1987, 1321), SS 8 de junio de 1988 (RJ 1988, 
5256), SS 12 de Julio de 1988 (RJ 1988, 5802) and Sentecia de 3 de mayo de 
1990 (RJ 1990, 3946). 
 
e- To declare joint liability the concurrence of factors such as confusion of 
payroll, confusion of assets and the use of a company as a façade are required. 
(Sentencia de 19 de noviembre de 1990)  
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f- Employees’ performance in different companies in the group is not an illicit 
act aimed at hiding the real employer. It is a practice based on the organization 
of the enterprise. This practice will be licit as long as the employee’s rights are 
not affected. (Sentencia de 26 de noviembre de 1990 (RJ 1990, 8605)) 
 
    The levantamiento del velo has been relevant in labour law cases involving 
corporate groups. The fact that guidance for the application of this remedy has been 
established in case law evidences a tendency of the Spanish judiciary to prevent the 
abuses against employees through the use of the group structure.  
3.3.3.3 Infracapitalisacion Nominal  
 
     The concept of undercapitalisation is divided into two: infracapitalisacion 
material and infracapitalisacion nominal.314 Infracapitalisacion material makes 
reference to a company with no capital or assets to perform due to shareholders not 
paying their share or due to a lack of financing.315 Infracapitalisacion nominal, on the 
other hand, makes reference to a company that has enough capital to perform; 
however, the capital does not derive from shareholders’ contributions and instead is 
rendered from loans made by the shareholders to the company. 316   
 
     Infracapitalisacion material, on the one hand, I personally consider does not create 
corporate veil issues. Spanish company law establishes a minimum capital for 
sociedades anónimas and sociedades de responsabilidad limitada .317  The payment of 
capital is a formality that has to be fulfilled in order for the company to come into 
existence.  If the capital is not paid up the company is invalid. In the case of 
individual shareholders, if he/she/it do not pay the value of the share, rights cannot be 
enforced. Infracapitalisacion material is an issue that affects companies’ existence 
and shareholders’ rights. If a company is invalid due to the non-payment of the 
required capital this cannot be used to engage in wrongful practices.  
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     Infracapitalisacion nominal, on the other hand, is used for fraudulent purposes in 
some cases. By lending capital to the company, shareholders gain the status of 
creditors. Moreover, shareholders’ credit may have preference over other creditors; a 
situation that may leave the company with not enough assets to pay its debts after 
shareholders recover their credit.  
 
     In Spain the issue involving infracapitalisacion nominal has been solved through 
the enactment of the Ley Concursal de 2003 (insolvency law).318 In Articles 92 and 93 
of this law, it is established that the debts of the company in regard to shareholders 
loans will be paid after all the creditors have been paid. The law in these articles 
established that a creditor who has a relationship with the debtor in the form of five 
percent of the company’s shares, would lose his preference over the company’s 
assets.  
 
    The Ley concursal de 2003, however, partially solves the issue of 
infracapitalisacion nominal. The ley concursal has a gap in cases in which the 
shareholder has property rights over the assets that form the debtor’s assets. Thus, 
Spanish courts have opted to deal with this issue by using the doctrine of 
levantamiento del velo.  In the Sentencia de 24 de diciembre de 1988,319 a bank seized 
the assets of an insolvent company called Evapol S.A. The company Curipa S.A 
started proceedings against the bank. Curipa S.A claimed that it has rights of property 
over the assets of Evapol S.A. However, the Tribunal Supremo decided to lift the 
corporate veil on grounds of fraud. Both companies were created and administered by 
the same individual, which used the entities as a dummy to evade obligations. Both 
companies had no real objective or commercial activity. 
3.3.3.4 The Use of the Corporate Veil to Avoid the Law and Contractual Obligations 
 
     Regarding the avoidance of the law, the levantamiento del velo is a remedy that is 
applied when a corporate entity obstructs the application of the law. The Principio de 
Responsabilidad Patrimonial Universal is contained in the article 1911 of the Spanish 
Código Civil, which provides “The debtor is liable for the performance of his 
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obligations with all present and future property”. This principle has been enacted and 
is enforced by Spanish Courts. However, there are circumstances in which the 
corporate veil (in the form of a sociedad anónima, sociedad unipersonal or by using a 
group structure) is used to avoid this legal obligation. In fact, this is one of the most 
common corporate veil issues in Spanish case law; some examples being the 
Sentencia de 11 de noviembre de 1995,320 and the Sentencia de 30 de mayo de 
2005.321 
 
     In the Sentencia de 11 de noviembre de 1995, a natural person created a corporate 
entity in order to transfer assets that were about to be seized by the Court. The 
company was created and owned by the individual and his family. The Court 
disregarded the veil based on the fact the defendant was using the corporate entity to 
avoid his obligations. In the Sentencia de 30 de mayo de 2005, a corporate entity 
claimed ownership over the assets of a company subject to proceedings. However, the 
companies had the same owner. The court lifted the corporate veil in order to prevent 
the fraud. 
 
   As regards contractual obligations, the levantamiento del velo has been applied to 
deal with the corporate veil if used (in the form of a sociedad anónima, sociedad 
unipersonal or by using a group structure) to defraud a contracting party. One of the 
most common contractual relationships in which the corporate veil has been used to 
defraud is the contratos de compraventa  (sales contract). An example regarding the 
levantamiento del velo enforcing the payment of monies owed from a sales contract is 
the Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 30 de mayo de 1998.322 In this case, the 
company Promocion y Explotacion Hidráulica S.A sold industrial equipment to 
Construcciones Metalicas Fam S.A. However, the former did not make the payment 
agreed in the contract. Therefore, Promocion y Explotacion Hidráulica S.A started 
proceedings not only against Construcciones Metalicas Fam S.A. but also against its 
major shareholder and sole administrator, “Don Felix”.  The claimant decided to sue 
“Don Felix” because the entity Construcciones Metalicas Fam S.A. had no assets to 
pay for its debts. The Tribunal evaluated whether to ignore the corporate veil on the 
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following grounds: 1) the fact that the company was composed of “Don Felix’s” 
family, 2) the fact that “Don Felix” owned the majority of shares, and 3) the company 
did not comply with basic formalities such as accounting registers. Based on these 
facts the Court decided to ignore the corporate personality and make “Don Felix” pay 
the monies owed to the claimant.  
 
    It is worth mentioning that the evasion of contractual obligations derived from sales 
contracts are not the only circumstances in which the levantamiento del velo has been 
applied. This doctrine has been applied to enforce laws such as the articulo 76 de la 
ley de seguros (insurance law)323, normas de concurso de acredores (insolvency 
law)324; solve conflicts in contratos de arrendamiento (leasing contracts)325, contratos 
de presamo (loans)326, incumplimiento de clausula de no competencia (covenant to no 
compete)327.  However, for the purpose of this work I emphasise responsabilidad 
patrimonial and obligations derived from sales contracts because this doctrine has 
been applied to a greater extent in these areas.  
3.3.4  Requirement for applying the levantamiento del velo  
 
    The levantamiento del velo is a remedy whose application has not been made 
randomly. The Spanish judiciary through jurisprudence has gradually developed a 
criterion for the application of this remedy. In the precedent established in 1984 the 
court based the levantamiento del velo on concepts such as abuso de derecho, fraude 
a la ley, buena fe and equidad. Certainly, these concepts have been the subject of 
criticism, but have been gradually complemented statutory law.  
 
     Although fraud was not the core element to justify ignoring the corporate 
personality in the 1984 precedent, the Spanish court has established the concurrence 
of fraud in order to apply the levantamiento del velo to be imperative; for example, in 
the Sentencia de 12 de junio de 1995,328 the company Curtidos Codina S.A requested 
the disregard of the veil of the company Tomás y Nelco S.A, in order to hold 
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shareholders of Tomás y Nelco S.A, liable for the debts of the company. However, the 
Tribunal dismissed the request to pierce the corporate veil based on the lack of 
intention to defraud on the part of the shareholders. The claimant was aware of the 
financial condition of the defendant and continued trading with the company. 
Moreover, the claimant had a contrato de seguro de crédito por incumplimiento 
(guarantee), from which it had already recovered part of the claimed debt. The 
concurrence of fraudulent intention must be proved in order to apply the 
levantamiento del velo.  
3.3.5 Critical Observation  
 
     If the Spanish approach to corporate veil issues is compared with the English and 
American approach presented in Chapter Two, it can be argued that the Spanish 
approach has been developed in a more “organised manner”. While the Anglo-
American approach has been structured over metaphors and inconsistent case law, the 
Spanish approach has been developed from what could be argued as more consistent 
concepts and principles.   
 
     I do not consider the Spanish approach superior to the Anglo-American one. 
However, I do consider the Spanish approach as more consistent when it comes to 
deal with corporate personality issues. The consistency of the Spanish method can be 
appreciated in the doctrina de terceros, an early practice founded on the extension of 
liability and developed in case law. The case law about the doctrina de terceros has 
not been based on a case-by-case basis. I attribute this to the fact that Spanish 
authorities focused on the aspects that make the corporate entity to lose its status of 
third party, rather than focusing on metaphor debates.  
 
     The doctrina de terceros, certainly, was a clever means to deal with corporate 
personality issues. However, the different circumstances presented in each corporate 
personality case demanded a more complete method. Therefore, the doctrina de 
terceros gradually changed into the current Spanish levantamiento del velo. 
 
    The current Spanish Levantamiento del Velo is the subject of criticism because of 
the concepts on which it has been structured: fraud, equity and abuso del derecho
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These concepts are regarded as vague and inconsistent. However, despite such 
shortcomings, these concepts are not merely plucked out of thin air; rather they are 
recognised and contained in Spanish legislation, a factor greatly contributing to 
certainty. The fact that the law provides a basic definition of fraud and abuse creates 
the basis to further argue these concepts.  
 
     I attribute the systematic development of the Spanish approach to the influence of 
civil law tradition. This legal tradition is based on formalism and adherence to written 
law. The Spanish approach has been developed systematically to make it compatible 
with the Spanish civil law framework. The statutory exceptions to the corporate 
personality are also evidence of this formalism. 
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Summary 
 
    The Spanish doctrina de terceros was the original method to deal with corporate 
veil issues in Spain and its gradual development created the basis of the current 
Spanish doctrine of levantamiento del velo. The Sentencia de 28 de mayo de 1984 was 
the precedent in which the Spanish judiciary introduced the levantamiento del velo 
and the grounds for its applications. However, the basis on which the levantamiento 
del velo was justified has been subject to criticism by the Spanish academia. The main 
argument against this precedent is the fact that the concepts of abuso del derecho, 
fraude a la ley, equidad y buena fe were employed loosely and vaguely. Nonetheless, 
during the 1990s this precedent gave room for Spanish courts to reflect over the 
levantamiento del velo.  
 
      The current Spanish doctrine of levantamiento del velo has been developed mainly 
on judgments of the Spanish Tribunal Supremo. This doctrine has been applied in 
different circumstances yet the most common judgments regarding the levantamiento 
del velo are in cases involving the following areas: unipersonalidad sobrevenida , 
corporate groups, infracapitalisacion nominal and avoidance of Legal Rules and 
Contractual Obligations (mainly in sales and leasing contracts). In some of these 
areas, statutory rules that prevent the misuse of the corporate veil are currently being 
developed. However, the levantamiento del velo has not lost relevance; rather, 
legislation and doctrine complement each other.  
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3.4 Piercing the Corporate Veil in Latin America  
 
     In Latin America corporate veil cases were rare because the joint stock corporation 
did not play a particularly relevant role. In other words, if the corporate entity was not 
in common use, the abuse of the corporate veil was in turn not common. During the 
end of the Nineteenth Century Latin American countries became newly formed 
Republics and throughout most of the Twentieth Century suffered civil wars and 
authoritarian regimes that obstructed economic development. It was not until the late 
1970’s that Latin American countries have gradually gained political stability and 
have become more dynamic economies.329 Consequently, the sociedad anónima, and 
sociedad de responsabilidad limitada, among other entities with the attribution of 
legal personality and limited liability, have been more actively employed. Therefore, 
corporate veil issues have gradually become more common.  
 
    The development of Latin American countries has, nonetheless, not been uniform. 
Consequently, not all Latin American countries have developed an approach to deal 
with corporate veil issues. In fact, a majority of Latin American countries do not have 
an approach to deal with this subject. The few countries that have built an approach to 
address corporate veil issues and the countries that are in the process of doing so are 
the ones with considerable economic growth. 
 
     In this section, the piercing of the corporate veil in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and 
Brazil shall be addressed. These are Latin American jurisdictions that, I consider, 
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have developed the subject of piercing the corporate veil more extensively. As a 
personal observation, each of these jurisdictions has had a vacuum in their framework 
for companies. This is thus the reason why each of them has developed its own 
exceptions to the corporate personality.  
3.4.1 Argentina 
 
     Argentina is the Latin American jurisdiction that can be considered to have 
pioneered the piercing of the corporate veil (within Latin America) with the 
implementation of a statutory rule that directly addresses the disregard of the legal 
entity.330 This rule was introduced in 1983 by the Law 22.903. This law modified the 
“Ley de Sociedades Comerciales de 1972-Ley No 19,550”,331 by adding the Article 
54. That Article provides that: 
 
 “The liabilities of a corporation used to seek a purpose beyond the corporate goals, 
as a mere instrument to defraud the law, the public policy or the good faith, or to 
frustrate rights of third persons, will be imputed directly to its shareholders or to the 
controlling persons who facilitated such activities”.332  
 
    From reading this Article it can be considered that Argentinean policy makers used 
the concept of ultra vires as a basis for this exception to the corporate personality.333 
Certainly, there is no direct mention of the ultra vires doctrine but “an act beyond the 
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    La actuación de la sociedad que encubra la consecución de fines extrasocietarios, constituya un 
mero recurso para violar la ley, el orden publico o la buena fe o para frustrar derecho de terceros, se 
imputará  directamente a los socios o a los controlantes que la hicieron possible, quienes responderan 
solidaria e  ilimitadamente por los perjucios causados.   
333
 An act carried out by a public authority, a company or a fiduciary person is ultra vires when it is not 
within the scope of the powers entrusted to such authority, company or person. See, Greenberg, D.  
Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (8th edition). London: Sweet & Maxwell; 2012. 
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corporate goals” can be interpreted as an act that is made against the objective of the 
corporate entity presented in the Memorandum of Association. 334 Through the 
registration of the Memorandum of Association, the corporate entity comes into 
existence and to state the objective of the company is one of the conditions for the law 
to recognise the existence of the corporate entity. If a company acts against this 
objective, it should be considered as having acted beyond that which was authorised 
by the law. Certainly, in practice companies may be allowed to act beyond their 
original objective. However, an act beyond the corporate goals in this context is 
interpreted as the use of the company as a tool for achieving fraud.  
 
     Argentinean academia and judiciary have addressed the rule contained in the 
article 54 as “Inoponibilidad de la Persona Juridica”;335 and the trigger for this 
remedy is based on acts beyond the corporate goals combined with a fraudulent 
intention. The inoponibilidad de la persona juridica , besides creating a formal 
parameter to address the misuse of the corporate entity, expands the scope of the 
doctrine developed in precedents prior to the rule of inoponibilidad de la persona 
juridica. 
 
     The existence of a statutory rule does not make the disregard of the legal entity a 
frequent practice in this jurisdiction. The Argentinean judiciary emphasises the 
exceptional application of the rule contained in the Article 54 based on the premise 
that the uncontrolled application of this remedy may affect legal certainty and 
undermine the benefits of the entity doctrine. In the case Pardini v Fredel, SRL y 
otros,336 the Argentinean judiciary refreshed and emphasised the fact that a remedy 
such as Inoponibilidad de la Persona Juridica  “must be applied when it is proved that 
there has been a fraudulent use of the corporate entity and there is no other remedy 
available.”  
 
                                                        
334
 The academia has addressed this circumstance under the concept of “fines- extrasocietarios”; a 
concept that refers to the use of the corporate entity for a purpose different to that established in the 
articles of incorporation. See, Hurtado, J. Supra note 304. At page 76 
335
 The concept of Inoponibilidad refers to the infectiveness of an act. In this context, the corporation’s 
legal personality is used as a shield against creditors and third parties. The rule contained in the 
Argentinean LSC is aimed at neutralising the shield created by the legal personality.  
336
 Sentencia de la Camara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, Sala C, de fecha 15 de agosto de 
2006, caso Pardini v. Fredel, SRL y otros  
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     The inoponibilidad de la persona juridical is a breakthrough. However, it is also a 
rule with loopholes. Among much criticism of this rule is the fact that it is not certain 
whether minority shareholders may use it against dominant shareholders. The text in 
the article provides this remedy in cases where “the rights of third parties are 
affected”.337 The rule does not expressly exclude minority shareholders yet in some 
cases the Argentinean judiciary has maintained that this rule is, nonetheless, not 
aimed at protecting minority shareholders.338 
3.4.1.1 The Piercing of the Corporate Veil in Argentina before the Rule of 
Inoponibilidad de la Persona Juridical  
 
     Prior to the reform that introduced the rule of inoponibilidad de la persona 
juridica, the Argentinean judiciary had already ignored the corporation’s legal 
personality. However, areas of Argentinean law where the corporate veil was ignored 
(bankruptcy law, labour law, family law and tax law) were areas in which there was 
an interest that had to be protected by the state. Consequently, the corporate 
personality may have lost relevance when there was a higher interest at risk. One of 
the most relevant precedents in this context is the case Swift-Deltec.339 Cia Swift de la 
Plata S.A was a subsidiary of “Deltec International”, which was a holding company 
incorporated in the U.S. In this case, the Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación 
(Supreme Court of Justice)340 decided to disregard the legal personality of Cia Swift 
de la Plata  in order to extend bankruptcy proceedings to other companies in the group 
and to the parent. The judiciary justified the decision to disregard the corporate entity 
on the basis that the holding company controlled the personality of Cia Swift de la 
Plata  and used its influence over the company against the interest of society and third 
                                                        
337
 See, Grispo, J. Inoponibilidad de la Persona Societaria. Revista de las Sociedade y Concursos, 
available at http://www.iprofesional.com/adjuntos/documentos/09/0000929.pdf [last visit may 30, 
2013] At page 15  
338
 Simancas, Maria Angelica C/ Crosby, Ronald S/ Sum. - Ref. Norm.: L.  
19550: 54 - 22/12/1997. Cited by Crispo J. Idem. At page 15 
339
 Sentencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion, de fecha 4 de septiembre de 1973. case Cia. 
Swift de la Plata Sa S/ Quiebra C/ Deltec Arg. Y Deltec Internacional 
340
 The Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación is the highest court of law of the Argentinean Republic. 
The Supreme Court functions as a last resort tribunal. Its rulings cannot be appealed. It also decides on 
cases dealing with the interpretation of the constitution (for example, it can overturn a law passed 
by Congress if it deems it unconstitutional).The members of the Supreme Court are appointed by 
the President with the agreement of at least two thirds of the present Senate members in a sesion 
convened for that purpose, and can only be removed by an impeachment process called juicio 
político ("political trial"), initiated by the Chamber of Deputies and carried out by the Senate, 
exclusively on grounds of improper behaviour. See, http://www.csjn.gov.ar/ [last visit September 10, 
2013] 
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parties. The Argentinean authorities requested the American authorities to enforce 
judgment against Deltec International. However, the American courts refused to carry 
out the Argentinean judgment. Although the case Cia Swift de la Plata  was a case 
dealing with a corporate group and insolvency proceedings, the principle established 
in this precedent has been shared in other areas of Argentinean law. 
 
     Regarding labour law, the case Aybar, Ruben E. y otros v. Pizzeria Viturro SRL y 
otros is an example of an abuse of the corporate entity in this context. In this case, the 
defendant company unjustly fired the claimants and transferred their assets to another 
company. The company that was the employer was left without enough assets to 
comply with obligations towards its employees. The Court regarded that the transfer 
of assets was made with no connection to the activities of the employing company. 
Consequently, the Court deduced that the new corporate entity was used as a tool to 
defeat workers rights. If the transfer of assets was made as part of a business strategy 
this could be considered as legitimate, however, that was not the case. Based on this 
precedent, the Argentinean judiciary established that the use of the corporate entity as 
a tool for hiding assets in order to defraud employees’ rights would trigger the 
disregard of the corporate personality.341 It can be appreciated that the Labour Court 
supported its reasoning in the concept of ultra vires. Indeed, this concept plays a 
relevant role when it comes to deal with corporate veil issues in Argentina.  
 
     In the context of family law, the judiciary has established that the use of the 
corporate entity as a tool to defeat hereditary rights triggers the disregard of the 
corporate personality. In the case Astesiano Monica C/Gianina Soc. Com. Acciones, 
the defendant created two shell companies to transfer assets that where part of a 
succession process. The claimants argued that the companies holding the assets were 
part of a “simulation” aimed at defeating their rights. The Argentinean Court of 
Appeal evaluated the facts of the case and decided “the corporate entity cannot be 
used to deprive heirs of their rights. If the corporate entity is balanced against a 
hereditary right the latter will prevail”.342   
                                                        
341
  Sentencia de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Nacional de Trabajo de 9 de Mayo de 1973 dicta da en el 
caso Aybar, Ruben E. y otros v. Pizzeria Viturro SRL y otros D.T 1974-67 
342 La C.N.Com-Sala A 27.2.78 Astesiano M nica c  Gianina Soc.Com.Acciones. “en este fallo se 
sostuvo frente a un derecho de familia y sucesorio , que la personalidad societar ia no es una realidad 
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     In context of tax law, a group of companies may be regarded as an economic unit 
for tax purposes due to the suitability of this structure for schemes of tax evasion; the 
case Parke Davis y Cia de Argentina, SAIC is a prime example.343 In this case the 
Argentinean company Park Davies paid dividends to its parent company domiciled in 
the U.S. The company, Park Davies, wanted to deduct from its taxes the payment of 
dividends to the parent company. Argentinean tax authorities recognise the 
individuality of each corporate entity. However, in this particular case the parent 
company owned 99% of the shares in the Argentinean company. Consequently, tax 
authorities questioned the individuality of both companies. The fact that the parent 
company owned 99% of shares made authorities to consider the payment of dividend 
as a “self-payment”. Authorities emphasised that each corporate entity is recognised 
as an individual tax payer but in circumstances like the case at hand the preservation 
of the corporate entity supports an evident tax evasion. In this case the parent 
company and the subsidiary were reagarded as a unit and the request for tax deduction 
was denied.  
 
Personal Observation 
 
    Based on the cited cases I can argue that Argentinean authorities, since an early 
stage, set ultra vires and fraud as the basis for the later rule of inoponibilidad de la 
persona juridica . The Article 54, in which the rule regarding the inoponibilidad de la 
persona juridica is contained, is not something improvised by Argentinean policy 
makers. Previous to the legal reforms that introduced this rule, Argentinean 
authorities established the basis for this rule in case law. The inoponibilidad de la 
persona juridica evidences the originality of the Argentinean method to deal with 
corporate personality issues. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
sustancial sino más bien accidental y que como tal no puede servir de sostén a una exclusión de 
herederos leg timos y en consecuencia se desestimó la personalidad  ur dica.” 
343
 Sentencia de la Corte Suprema de la Nación de fecha 31 de Julio de 1973, caso Parke Davis y Cia 
de Argentina, SAIC 
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3.4.2 Chile 
 
    The Chilean legal framework does not provide a rule that directly disregards the 
corporation’s legal personality in cases of misuse.344 Alternatively, the judiciary has 
relied on traditional legal concepts such as Simulación, Acción Pauliana, and Fraude 
a la ley in combination with the principles of “buena fe”345 (good faith) and “objeto y 
causa licita”346 (legal purpose) in order to address corporate personality issues.347 
These traditional legal concepts have been adapted to the circumstances involving 
corporate personality issues.  
 
      The legal concept of simulación refers to the performance of a fictitious act with 
the purpose of defrauding the law.348 In company law, simulación applies when a 
company is created with a fictitious object in order to avoid liabilities and obligations. 
Although the objective written in the Memorandum of Association is legal, it is not 
the true reason for the company’s existence. In Chilean law there is not a systematic 
approach to apply simulación in this context;349 instead, the Chilean judiciary has 
followed the premise that “the voluntad real (real intention) will prevail over the 
fictitious object”.350 Based on this premise, the claimant must prove the real intention 
of the individuals behind the veil of incorporation in order to void the acts of the 
corporate entity, a fact that creates a heavy burden for the claimant.   
 
    The acción pauliana is a remedy that voids legal acts carried out to defraud 
creditors.351 The Chilean judiciary has used this remedy as one means to address the 
misuse of the corporate entity.   If a corporate entity, for example, is created to 
transfer assets that are a guarantee in another contractual relationship, the creditor 
may void the transaction and secure the assets.  
                                                        
344
  See, Hurtado, J. Supra note 304. At page 115 
345
  art. 1546: “Los contratos deben cumplirse de buena fe…”. See, Codigo Civil de Chile. Titulo XII, 
Del Efecto de las Obligaciones. Libro Cuarto, de las obligaciones en general y de los contratos. 
346
  art. 1445: “Para que una persona se obligue a otra por un acto o declaración de voluntad es 
necesario: … No 3 que recaiga sobre un ob eto l cito…” See, Codigo Civil de Chile. Titulo II, De los 
Actos y Declaraciones de Voluntad. Libro Cuarto, de las obligaciones en general y de los contratos 
347
 See, Leonelli, P, & Others . Abuso de la Personalidad Juridia. Universidad Catolica de Temuco. 
2004. Thesis. At page 23 
348
 See, Caballenas, G. Supra note 291. See also, Becerra, F. Supra note 277.  
349
 See, Hurtado, J. Supra note 304. At page 117 
350
 Ibid  
351
 See, Caballenas, G. Supra note 291. 
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    The abuso del derecho o fraude a la ley is an action aimed at punishing the person 
who has used his rights and privileges in an abusive way.352 In issues involving the 
corporate entity, the Chilean judiciary have considered that this has to be applied in 
cases where a person has used the benefits of the corporate entity to avoid liabilities 
and obligations. However, the concept of abuso del derecho clashes with the purpose 
of the corporate entity, which is to diminish liability.353 Indeed, what can be 
considered as an abuse in this context?  
 
     In modern commercial practice, it is legally acceptable that shareholders have 
limited liability.354  If creditors did not take measures (request personal guarantee or 
establish interest rates) to protect their credit, it is legally acceptable for them to lose 
if the company has insufficient assets to repay (as long as the company has been 
created and operated legitimately). The concept of abuso del derecho will be applied 
when it is proved that a person uses this privilege to intentionally defraud another 
party.  
 3.4.2.1 Potential Chilean approach  
      
     The mentioned principles and legal concepts have been the means used by the 
Chilean judiciary to address the abuse of the corporate entity. However, in relatively 
recent case law the Chilean judiciary has considered the need of a direct remedy 
against the misuse of the corporate personality.355 In a precedent established in 2006, 
the Corte Suprema de Justicia de Chile (Chilean Supreme Court)356 recognised that 
“the extreme adherence to the separate legal personality may lead to circumstances in 
                                                        
352
 Idem 
353
 See, Neuman, T. La Protección Constitucional de la Empresa: La Individualidad Determinada y 
la Teoria del Levantamiento del Velo in Sentencias Destacadas. 2006. Available at 
http://www.lyd.com/wp-content/files_mf/sentencias/200610.pdf [last visit may 30, 2013] At page 287 
354
 Ibid 
355
 Chilean judiciary addresses the piercing of the corporate veil as levantamiento del velo corporativo. 
356
 The Corte Suprema de Justicia de Chile is the highest court in Chile. It also administrates the lower 
courts in the nation. It is located in the capital Santiago.In the Chilean system, the Supreme Court lacks 
the broader power of judicial review — it cannot set binding precedent or invalidate laws.Instead, it 
acts on a case-by-case basis. Trials are carried out in salas, chambers of at least five judges, presided 
over by the most senior member.Once appointed, a Chilean Supreme Court justice is extremely 
difficult to remove from office. Justices are entitled to remain on the Court until the compulsory 
retirement age of 75. Otherwise, a justice can be removed only if he or she incurs in "notorious 
abandonment of duty" established in the Constitution.The Supreme Court has twenty-one members, 
called ministros. One member is selected to serve a two-year term as President of the Supreme Court. 
See, http://www.minjusticia.gob.cl/ [last visit September 10, 2013] 
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which the legal order is affected. Hence, it is needed to ignore the legal entity when 
used to commit an abuse”.357  
 
     Previous to the statement made by the Supreme Court in 2006, in the context of 
labour law the judiciary had already considered direct exceptions to the corporate 
personality in the context of corporate groups. The purpose of the Chilean judiciary in 
disregarding subsidiary and parent company legal personality has been to regard the 
group as a single economic unit. Addressing the group as a unit has been aimed at 
preventing the evasion of employers’ obligations towards employees and furthermore 
to allow the creation of a pool of assets that allow the execution of a judgment. In the 
case Rodriguez v. J.R.C. Group y otras,358 an engineer sued sixteen companies due to 
unpaid services. The companies had been properly formed and regarded as 
independent entities. However, they were all under common management. Moreover, 
the manager also had the majority of shares in each company. Although the engineer 
had a contract with each company, the court considered the group of companies to be 
a sole unit. The Court supported its decision based on the concept of enterprise 
established in the Labour Code, “An enterprise is an organisation under a common 
direction, created to achieve a purpose”.359 The court established that the common 
management and domicile rendered the group of companies as having been 
performing as a single unit. 
 
     Certainly, the public policy aimed at the protection of workers’ rights was key in 
the decision to regard the group as unit. However, the decision made by the Chilean 
court in the cited labour case is not just the product of a need to enforce workers 
rights, but also to prevent and punish the misuse of the corporate entity.  
 
    Following the direct statement in the 2006 precedent, the Chilean Courts have been 
more open to directly consider ignoring the corporate personality. This can be 
appreciated in the relatively recent case of A.G.F Allianz Compañía de Seguros 
                                                        
357
 Corte Suprema, Sentencia Rol No 1929 del 21 de junio de 2006, considerando sexto, ratificando 
una sentencia de la Corte de Apelaciones de Valdivia Rol No 137-06 de fecha 18 de abril de 2006 
358
 Sentecial de la Corte Suprema de Chile de fecha 27 de octubre de 2003, causa numero 3248-03, 
Rodriguez v J.R.C Group y otras  
359
 Art. 3.3: “ Se entiende por empresa toda organizacion de medios personales, ma teriales e 
inmateriales, ordenados bajo una direccion, para el logro de fines económicos, sociales, culturales o 
beneficos, dotada de una individualidad legal determinada.” See, Codigo de Trabajo de Chile.  
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Generales S.A. v. Sociedad Naviera Ultragas Limitada y Ultramar Agencia Marítima 
Limitada .360 In this case, a company contracted with Ultragas LTD to tug a “floating 
dock”. Ultramar LTD, a subsidiary of Ultragas LTD, received and tugged the floating 
dock. However, during transportation the dock sank. Based on negligence during the 
transportation of the dock, the insurance company sued the group for damages. The 
Chilean court considered ignoring the corporate personality based on facts relating to 
the control and lack of autonomy of the subsidiary. Ultragas LTD owned 99% of 
Ultramar’s shares and both were under common administration. 
 
Personal Observation 
 
    The recent acceptance by Chilean authorities of a direct action against the corporate 
personality supports my premise regarding economic prosperity. Since Chile became 
politically stable, economic development has been triggered and this in turn has 
produced corporate personality issues.361 As I have presented in this section, Chilean 
authorities have dealt with corporate personality issues by using traditional legal 
concepts. No direct approach has been developed. I attribute this to the fact that 
corporate personality issues are on an early stage because the use of the corporate 
personality is relatively recent in Chile.  
3.4.3 Colombia   
 
     The Colombian judiciary, like other civil law jurisdictions, has used the traditional 
legal concepts of Simulacion, Accion Pauliana, and Abuso del Derecho to address the 
abuse of the corporate personality.362 However, unlike Chile, the Colombian judiciary 
has developed a more formal approach. Indeed, statutory rules have been developed 
to address abuses of the corporate personality. These rules are contained in the 
following statutes: 
 
                                                        
360
 Sentencia de la Corte Suprema de fecha 2 de junio de 2009  (ROL N° 1527-2008) A.G.F Allianz 
Compañía de Seguros Generales S.A. v. Sociedad Naviera Ultragas Limitada y Ultramar Agencia 
Marítima Limitada. 
361
 After Agusto Pinochet’s dictatorship and the introduction of a democratic government in Chile, the 
country experienced economic development. Legal certainty provided by democratic governments is 
undoubtedly key for the development of modern economies. See, Dongui T. & others. Supra note 329.  
362
 See, Gaitan, J. Marco General del Levantamiento del Velo Corporativo en Colombia.  Gil, M. & 
others. Levantamiento del Velo Corporativo. Colombia: Universidad del Rosario; 2010. At page 50 -
53 
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  The Ley 190 de 1995 
 
     This statute provides the judge with the competence needed to apply remedies such 
as the disregard of the legal entity in order to punish wrongdoers. In the Article 44 of 
this statute, it is established that, “the authorities can lift the veil of incorporation 
when it is necessary to determine the individuals behind the corporate entity”.363  This 
statute derives from the need of legal devices to combat money laundering and the use 
of the corporate personality to hide assets part of a judicial investigation.  
 
     Before the enactment of this rule, the Colombian judiciary was already aware of 
the potential of the corporation’s legal personality to be a device to practice illicit 
acts. The Colombian judiciary had engaged in determining to what extent the 
corporation’s legal personality should be preserved. In 1993, the Colombian Corte 
Suprema de Justicia  (Supreme Court of Justice)364 established in jurisprudence that 
the separate corporate personality only has effect in commercial and civil acts, not in 
penal law.365 The separate corporate personality has no validity if this is used as a 
device to obstruct the administration of justice and practice fraudulent acts against the 
State.366 This statement by the Colombian judiciary feeds the proposition established 
in the first chapter, which is based on the prevalence of a public interest over the 
fiction of the corporate personality.  
                                                        
363
   Ley 190 de 1995, articulo 44: “ Las autoridades  udiciales podraán levantar el velo corporativo de 
las personas juridicas cuando fuera necesario determinar el verdadero beneficiario de las actividades 
aelantadas por esta.”  
364
 The Corte Suprema de Justicia de Colombia  in Bogotá is the highest judicial body in civil and penal 
matters and issues of criminal and civil procedure in Colombia. The Supreme Court of Colombia is not 
the highest authority in regards to the interpretation of administrative law, constitutional law, and the 
administration of the judiciary. The court consists of twenty three magistrates, elected by the same 
institution in list conformed by the Superior Council of the Judiciary for individual terms of eight 
years. The court meets at the Palace of Justice in the Bolívar Square of Bogota. 
http://www.cortesuprema.gov.co/[last visit September 10, 2013] 
365
 “El que para efectos comerciales y civiles la persona  uridical sea un ente distinto de sus socios, es 
una verdad que no trasciende el ambito penal.” See, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala Penal, auto 
7183 del 20 de enero de 1993.  
366
 See, Arrubla, J. El Levantamiento del Velo Corporativo in Colombia. Gil, M. & others. Supra note 
340. At page 70 
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  The Ley 222 de 1995.  
 
     This law modified the Code of Commerce and the regulation of Companies. One 
of the most relevant aspects was the creation of the “Empresa Unipersonal” (one-
man company). Small businessmen have been interested in acquiring the benefits of 
the corporate entity for individual enterprises. However, the creation of a joint stock 
corporation or a limited liability company requires the compliance of a series of 
formalities. Traditional company law requires a company to have at least a minimum 
of two members. The lack of the required membership may produce the voidance of 
the company. Therefore, the Colombian legislation made a breakthrough with the 
introduction of the empresa unipersonal, which is a device for commerce that 
provides the advantages of the corporate entity to a sole entrepreneur.  
 
    The objective of the empresa unipersonal is to allow a natural or legal person to 
develop a personal business and enjoy the benefits of separate legal personality and 
limited liability.367 This is certainly a device that encourages entrepreneurs. However, 
during the draft of this law, the potential of this device to be used for practising illicit 
and fraudulent purposes was also considered. Therefore, in the same Article 71 that 
creates this entity, the policy makers included an exception. If this form of enterprise 
is used for fraudulent purposes, the entrepreneur shall answer together with the entity 
for its debts.368 
 
     Besides the exception to the empresa unipersonal legal personality, this law also 
included a rule that addressed the disregard of the corporate entity in the context of 
corporate groups. In the Article 148 (derogated by the Ley 1116 de 2006)369 the law 
                                                        
367
 Ley 222 de 1995, articulo 71: “Mediante la empresa unipersonal una persona natural o  uridical 
que reúna las cualidades requeridas para ejercer el comercio, podrá destinar parte de sus activos para 
la realizacion de una o varias actividades de caracter mercantil. La empresa unipersonal, una vez 
inscrita en el registro mercantile, forma una persona  uridical”. 
368
 Idem, articulo 71, Paragrafo: “Cuando se utilize la empresa unipersonal en fraude a la ley o en 
perjuicio de terceros el titular de las cuotas de capital y los administradores que hubieren realizado, 
participado o facilitado los actos defraudatorios responderan solidariamente por las oblugaciones 
nacidas de tales actos y por los perjuicios causados.  
369
 The Ley 1116 de 2006 Law 1116 established the Entrepreneurial Insolvency Regimen in Colombia. 
The article 61 of the Ley 1116 de 2006 addressed some aspects that were not covered by the article 
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established that a parent company may be held liable for the subsidiary’s insolvency if 
the situation of the latter has been the product of the excessive control of the former 
and decisions made against the interest of the subsidiary.370 This rule is founded on 
the dominance of the parent over the subsidiaries, which in some cases is so strong 
that it leaves the subsidiary with some sort of dependence. However, an argument 
against a parent company on grounds of this rule may be refuted if the parent proves 
that the subsidiary’s insolvency is a product of other circumstances. The Corte 
Constitucional (Constitutional Court)371 held in the sentence C-510/97: “… if the 
defendant can prove that its decisions and management was not the cause for the 
subsidiary’s insolvency, the separation of personality and liabilities will be held”.372 
 
    The reforms introduced in the Ley 222 de 1995 definitely supplemented the 
Colombian commercial legislation and brought innovation. Firstly, a legal entity that 
encourages entrepreneurship was introduced. Additionally, an exception to deter its 
misuse was established. Secondly, a parent company’s liability in a case of insolvency 
was addressed. The Colombian judiciary, based on the concept of control, developed 
an exception to separate corporate personality, a breakthrough during that period.  
                                                                                                                                                              
148. First, the article 61 more extensively developed the concept of parent company. It established that 
a parent company could be a holding or could be a group of companies controlling the subsidiary. 
Additionally, the article 62 established the expiration of the action, which is 4 years. This was not 
addressed in the Ley 222 de 1995. The Ley 1116 de 2006 also established that the Superintendencia de 
Sociedades, is the competent authority to address liquidation proceedings in this context.  
370
 Idem, Article 140, Paragrafo Cuando la situación de concordato o de liquidación obligatoria haya 
sido producida por causa o con ocasión de las actuaciones que haya realizado la sociedad matriz o 
controlante en virtud de la subordinación y en interés de ésta o de cualquiera de sus subordinadas y en 
contra del beneficio de la sociedad en concordato, la matriz o controlante responderá en forma 
subsidiaria por las obligaciones de aquélla. Se presumirá que la sociedad se encuentra en esa 
situación concursal, por las actuaciones derivadas del control, a menos que la matriz o controlante o 
sus vinculadas, según el caso, demuestren que ésta fue ocasionada por una causa diferente. 
371The Corte Constitucional de Colombia  is the highest entity in the judicial branch of government in 
the Republic of Colombia in charge of safeguarding the integrity and supremacy of the Colombian 
Constitution of 1991 within the Constitutional laws. However it is not the highest court of criminal 
appeal, civil appeal, administrative law disputes, and the administration of justice. The Supreme Court 
of Colombia, the Council of State of Colombia and the Superior Council of the Judiciary are the 
highest courts of appeal for their respectives areas of law. 
 http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/ [last visit September 10, 2013] 
372
 Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-510/97. 
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  The Ley 1258 de 2008.  
 
     This law creates the Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada . The Sociedad Anónima, 
is subject to regulations that make its creation a burdensome process for small 
entrepreneurs. Consequently, the Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada is created as an 
alternative. The law is flexible in terms of the requirements for its constitution and in 
turn this form of association has the attributes of legal personality and limited 
liability. In addition to this, the policy makers developed an exception to the legal 
personality of this form of business association. In the Article 42 the following is 
established: if the Sociedad por Acciones Simplificadas has been used for fraudulent 
purposes and against third parties, the shareholders and directors that participated in 
the fraud shall be held liable.373  
3.4.3.1 Controversy Between Statutory Exceptions to the Corporate Personality and 
the Colombian Constitution 
 
     The piercing of the corporate veil has been a controversial subject in every 
jurisdiction and has been challenged on different grounds. In the case of Colombia, 
the Colombian statutory exceptions to the corporate personality have been challenged 
at a constitutional level. In Colombia, the case law about piercing the corporate veil is 
mainly based on decisions from the Colombian Corte Constitucional rather than 
decisions from regular courts.374 The exception to the corporate entity has challenged 
rights such as the preservation of the economic order (Article 2)375 as well as the 
                                                        
373
 Ley 1258 de 2008, articulo 42: Cuando se utilice la sociedad por acciones simplificada en fraude a 
la ley o en perjuicio de terceros, los accionistas y los administradores que hubieren realizado, 
participado o facilitado los actos defraudatorios, responderán solidariamente por las obligaciones 
nacidas de tales actos y por los perjuicios causados. 
La declaratoria de nulidad de los actos defraudatorios se adelantará ante la Superintendencia de 
Sociedades, mediante el procedimiento verbal sumario. 
La acción indemnizatoria a que haya lugar por los posibles perjuicios que se deriven de los actos 
defraudatorios será de competencia, a prevención, de la Superintendencia de Sociedades o de los 
jueces civiles del circuito especializados, y a falta de estos, por los civiles del circuito del domicilio del 
demandante, mediante el trámite del proceso verbal sumario. 
374
 See, Garnica, C & others. Corte Constitucional Linea Jurisprudencial 1997-2007, Levantamiento 
del Velo Corporativo. Universidad Sergio Arboleda. 2007. Available at 
http://www.usergioarboleda.edu.co/derecho_comercial/jurisprudencias/linea_jurisprudencial.pdf [last 
visit may 30, 2013] at page 193 
375
 Artículo 2. Son fines esenciales del Estado: servir a la comunidad, promover la  prosperidad 
general y garantizar la efectividad de los principios, derechos y deberes consagrados en la 
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freedom to associate for any legal purpose (Article 38).376 Freedom of association and 
the preservation of the economic order are key for the existence for steady economic 
development and thus for the existence of the corporate personality. In the 
constitution there are no exceptions to these rights. Consequently, can these statutory 
exceptions undermine constitutional rights? If so, to what extent can congress 
legislation override constitutional rights and duties? 
 
     The Sentencia C-865 de 2004 is a relevant precedent in which the Constitutional 
Court has reflected over this controversy.377 In this precedent, the Constitutional 
Court emphasised that the rationale for ignoring the corporate personality is the 
prevention and punishment of fraud. The court established that “the shareholders will 
be liable when the good faith is affected and limited liability is used to achieve an 
objective that is against the purpose of constitutional rights and defrauds third 
parties”.  Indeed, the Constitutional Court approached this dilemma taking into 
account the concept of the abuse of rights. According to this concept, a right cannot 
be preserved if it is used to affect other parties’ rights. Additionally, in this precedent 
the fact that Congress has the authority to regulate the use and limits of the corporate 
personality was clarified.  
 
Personal Observation  
 
    Colombian authorities have, I consider, been practical in dealing with corporate 
veil issues. As already stated in this section, piercing of the corporate veil has been 
established in specific statutes involving circumstances where this remedy is needed. 
The case of Colombia supports my premise regarding the existence of a legal need in 
order for piercing the corporate veil to exist. Were the corporate personality not to be 
frequently misused and were the sociedad por acciones simplificadas to be more 
                                                                                                                                                              
Constitución; facilitar la participación de todos en las decisiones que los afectan y en la vida 
económica, política, administrativa y cultural de la Nación;  defender la independencia nacional, 
mantener la integridad territorial y asegurar la  convivencia pacifica y la vigencia de un orden justo.  
376Articulo 38. Se garantiza el derecho de libre asociación para el desarrollo de las distintas 
actividades que las personas realizan en sociedad. Constitucion Politica de Colombia 1991.  Titulo II, 
de los derechos, las garantias y los deberes  
377
 Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-865 del 7 de septiembre de 2004.  Available at 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2004/C-865-04.htm [last visit May 30, 2013] 
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strictly regulated, there would have been no need for a statutory exception to the 
corporate personality.     
3.4.4 Brazil 
     
     The piercing of the corporate veil has been present in Brazilian case law since the 
1970s.378 Family, labour379 and tax law are some of the areas where case law have 
presented a debate regarding to what extent the corporate personality should be 
preserved.380 Some statutes already extended company’s liabilities to shareholders.381 
However, these statutes did not explicitly prescribe the piercing of the corporate 
veil.382 Therefore, Brazilian Courts were not legally authorised to apply this 
remedy.383 There was no direct statutory approach to address corporate veil issues 
until 1990.  
 
     The Lei No 8.078 de 11 de septembro de 1990 (Consumers’ Protection Code) was 
the first Brazilian statutory regulation that directly addressed the piercing of the 
corporate veil.384 In its Article 28, it is established that a judge can disregard the 
corporations’ legal personality if it has been used to the detriment a of consumer’s 
                                                        
378
 See, Reali, R.  Desconsideração da Personalidade Jurídica no Direito Positivo Brasileiro. 
Universidad Regional de Blumenau. 2003. Available at 
http://www.boletimjuridico.com.br/doutrina/texto.asp?id=327 [last visit may 30, 2013] At page 55 
379
 In labor law the entity doctrine is not a doctrinal issue when workers’ rights are affected. The 
judiciary has established that it is not necessary for the concurrence of fraud or abuse of the corporate 
form. The fact that the company does not have enough assets to comply with its obligation with its 
workers is enough justification to disregard the corporation’s personality and extent liability to the 
shareholders. The lack of validity in this context has been based on the protection of workers against 
the abuse of the employer. Clt, art. 2.º, caput)”. Proceso trt/2 SP, 02429200703102003.  Sentece cited 
by, Andrade, F. And Pasqualotto, A. In the paper “El Levantamiento de la Personalidad Juridica en 
el Derecho Privado Brazileño. 2010. Available at dialnet.unirioja.es descarga articulo 3696745.pdf  
[last visit may 30, 2013] At page 98 
380
 See, Reali, R. Supra note 378. At page 54 
381
 The Lei No 4.137 de setembro de (1962), in article 9, established that directors and managers will 
be personally liable for company’s debts, if they have carried out illegal acts during the course of their 
administrative duties. Available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/1950-
1969/D52025.htm [last visit May 30 2013]. Also, the Lei 4.729 (1965), in article1 established that 
courts were allowed to impose criminal sanctions on directors and members of corporations that 
dishonestly concealed taxes.  Available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/1950-
1969/L4729.htm.  [last visit May 30, 2013] 
382See, Camargo, A. Three Essential Aspects of Corporate Law: A Brief Overview of Brazilian 
and American Approaches. Sourthwestern Journal of Law & Trade in the Americas. (Volume 9) 
2003. At page 105 
383
 Ibid 
384
 The Lei No 8.078 de 11 de setembro de 1990  “Dispõe sobre a proteção do consumidor e dá outras 
providências. Available at http://www3.dataprev.gov.br/sislex/paginas/13/1990/8078.htm [last visit 
may 30, 2013] 
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rights.385  The enactment of this rule is derived from a constitutional initiative. The 
constituição Federal de 1988 in its Articles 5, 48 and 170 established the defence of 
the consumer as one of the commitments of the state. 386 Certainly, the judiciary and 
academia considered that the consumer could be at a disadvantage when against the 
fraudulent acts performed through the corporate entity. Therefore, the rationale for 
giving the judge the authority to disregard the legal entity has been the protection of 
the weaker party (the consumer) against the abuses of a stronger party (the 
enterprise). Although Article 28 addresses the issue only in a consumer-merchant 
relationship, this rule established the parameters for the application of statutory 
piercing of the corporate veil in Brazil.  
 
     From the consumers’ protection statute, Brazilian policy makers gradually 
expanded the application of piercing the corporate veil. The Lei No 8.884 de 11 de 
junho de 1994, aimed at the protection of the economic order, in Article 18 
(derogated by the Lei No 12. 529 de 30 de novembro de 2011) established that the 
corporate entity would be disregarded if it had been used in a fraudulent way, beyond 
its commercial objective or in a negligent manner.387 The Lei No 9.605 de 12 de 
fevereiro de 1998 (environmental law), in Section 4 established that the corporation’s 
                                                        
385
 Artigo 28: O juiz poderá desconsiderar a personalidade jurídica da sociedade quando, em 
detrimento do consumidor, houver abuso de direito, excesso de poder, infração da lei, fato ou ato 
ilícito ou violação dos estatutos ou contrato social. A desconsideração também será efetivada quando 
houver falência, estado de insolvência, encerramento ou inatividade da pessoa jurídica provocados 
por má administração. 
§ 1º (Vetado). 
§ 2º As sociedades integrantes dos grupos societários e as sociedades controladas, são 
subsidiariamente responsáveis pelas obrigações decorrentes deste código. 
§ 3º As sociedades consorciadas são solidariamente responsáveis pelas obrigações decorrentes deste 
código. 
§ 4º As sociedades coligadas só responderão por culpa. 
§ 5º Também poderá ser desconsiderada a pessoa jurídica sempre que sua personalidade for, de 
alguma forma, obstáculo ao ressarcimento de prejuízos causados aos consumidores. 
386
 A constituição Federal de 1988 no seu artigo 5.º inciso XXXII, determina que o Estado promoverá, 
na forma da lei, a defesa do consumidor. No artigo 170 inciso V, preceitua que um dos princípios da 
ordem econômica, fundada na valorização do trabalho humano e na livre iniciativa, é a defesa do 
consumidor. E finalmente, no artigo 48 no Ato das Disposições Constitucionais Transitórias, 
determina que seja elaborado o Código de Defesa do Consumidor.  
387
 Artigo 18: O juiz poderá desconsiderar a personalidade jurídica da sociedade quando, em 
detrimento do consumidor, houver abuso de direito, excesso de poder, infração da lei, fato ou ato 
ilícito ou violação dos estatutos ou contrato social. A desconsideração também será efetivada quando 
houver falência, estado de insolvência, encerramento ou inatividade da pessoa jurídica provocados 
por má administração. 
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legal personality will be disregarded when the environment has been damaged and the 
corporation has frustrated efforts to recover any damage to the environment.388   
 
     The limitation of the power to disregard a corporation’s legal personality to 
determine statutes can be considered as a gradual introduction of piercing the 
corporate veil into the Brazilian legal framework. This remedy has steadily expanded 
from special laws to a whole body of law such as the Civil Code. In 2002, the 
enactment of the new Brazilian Civil Code included a rule that allows the disregard of 
the legal entity when it has been used for fraudulent purposes. This rule empowers the 
judge to consider the disregard of the legal entity throughout any area of Brazilian 
private law. The Article 50 of this code establishes that:  
 
“In the case of abuse of the corporate form characterised by acts against a 
company's purpose or commingling of assets, a judge may decide, at the petition of 
the plaintiff or the State Department, if it has the right to intervene, that liability for 
certain obligations be extended to the personal property or assets of the managers or 
partners of an entity”.389 
 
     The phrase “In the case of abuse…” allows an exception to the corporate 
personality where there has been an evident abuse of its advantages. Definitely, it can 
be considered that the Brazilian exception to the corporate personality is founded on 
the concept of abuso del derecho (Abuse of Rights). As previously addressed, the 
principle of abuso del derecho establishes that a right is a benefit that is conferred by 
the law and this benefit can be confiscated if used improperly. Thus, it can be 
considered that Brazilian law regards corporate personality and limited liability as 
rights and as such it must be exercised without affecting other parties’ rights. 
However, what can be considered as an abuse in this context? The cited article 
provides the answer by establishing the use of the company against its original 
                                                        
388
 Artigo 4: Poderá ser desconsiderada a pessoa jurídica sempre que sua personalidade for obstáculo 
ao ressarcimento de prejuízos causados à qualidade do meio ambiente. Lei No 9.605 de 12 de 
fevereiro de 1998 Dispõe sobre as sanções penais e administrativas derivadas de condutas e 
atividades lesivas ao meio ambiente, e dá outras providências. 
389
 Artigo 50: Em caso de abuso da personalidade juridica, caracterizado pelo desvio de finalidade, 
ou pela conflisio patrimonial, pode o juiz decidir, a requerimento da parte, ou do Ministrrio Publico 
quando the couber intervir no processo, que os efeitos de certas e determinadas relagoes de 
obrigagdes sejam estendidos aos bens particulares dos administradores ou socios da pessoa juridica. 
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purpose and commingling of assets as the basis to determine whether there has been 
an abuse of the corporate entity. Most definitely, the commingling of assets and the 
inadequate use of the corporate entity are situations that may not necessarily involve 
fraudulent behavior but are likely to affect third parties. Thus, to pretend to escape 
liability derived from these circumstances is an abuse of the benefits provided by the 
corporate entity.  
 
     The rationale behind the inclusion of the Article 50 in the new Brazilian Civil 
Code was based on the need for a means to punish and deter the Abuso del Derecho. 
Certainly, the right to associate under the corporate form can be considered as a right 
that each individual has. Hence, if this right is used in a way that it affects other 
parties’ rights, it must be ignored.  
 
     The judiciary and academia have gradually introduced the piercing of the 
corporate veil into the Brazilian legal system. It can be considered that this remedy 
has had a wide acceptance. However, its application is not common. Indeed, the 
judiciary has emphasised the exceptional application of this remedy. In a 1997 
sentence, the Brazilian judiciary held: “The legal existence of a corporation may, in 
certain cases, be disregarded. However, substantial evidence of abuse of rights or 
fraud has to be produced”.390 Although the piercing of the corporate veil was 
introduced as a measure to counter the abuse of the entity doctrine, the Brazilian 
judiciary has been aware of the vital role the corporate personality has had in the 
development of the national economy. Consequently, jurisprudence has emphasised 
the fact that the corporate veil may be pierced only when the abuse of the corporate 
form has been proven.391    
 
Personal Observation  
 
     In Brazil, as in other jurisdictions, piercing of the corporate veil has been product 
of a legal need. However, the introduction of this remedy has not been rushed, rather 
it has been gradual. From specific statutes it expanded to a core regulation such as the 
                                                        
390
 TAPR-2 Ap. No. 77.829-4 Relator: Juiz Eraclés Messias, 29.08.1997, J. 29.08.1997 
391
  “a jurisprudência da Corte, em regra, dispensa ação autônoma para se levantar o véu da pessoa 
jurídica, mas somente em casos de abuso de direito”. See RESP 6932235/mT, Relator: min. Luis 
Felipe Salomão, 4.o grupo, j. 17.11.2009 
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Civil Code. The civil law principle of abuso del derecho is the backbone of the 
current Brazilian statutory approach. Like other Latin American jurisdictions studied 
in this chapter, Brazilian authorities have relied on the tools already provided by the 
civil law tradition. 
Summary 
 
    Latin America qualifies as a region that is currently experiencing economic 
growth. Furthermore, economic growth is a key factor in the development of any 
approach to deal with corporate veil issues. The fact that a country is growing renders 
it necessary to employ all available tools in order to support the economy; among 
these tools is the corporate personality. With the corporate personality gaining more 
relevance in Latin American countries, its misuse is also becoming more common. 
Consequently, policy-makers have reformed existing codes and forged new codes and 
introduced new laws as well as including exceptions to the corporate personality in 
cases of fraudulent use.   
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3.5 Comparison of Approaches  
 
     A method for piercing the corporate veil has been individually developed by each 
jurisdiction. Spain, Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Brazil are countries that follow 
the civil law tradition and consequently their legal framework for companies tends to 
be similar. However, the application of a remedy such as piercing the corporate veil 
varies across these jurisdictions because such a remedy has been developed in 
accordance to the social, economic and legal needs of each society.  
 
     One of the premises this research follows is that the use of the corporate 
personality is common in prosperous countries. Certainly, the common use of the 
corporate entity makes the misuse of the corporate entity more common and thus a 
means to deal with this issue becomes imperative. Spain, Argentina and Brazil are 
jurisdictions where the piercing of the corporate veil has been widely developed; a 
factor that can be attributed to the common use of the corporate personality. Although 
Colombia presents a degree of economic development and thus the corporate 
personality is in common use, it has been more reserved on this subject.   
 
    Spain developed the basis to pierce the corporate veil on case law and later 
developed statutory exceptions to the corporate personality. As a result, statutes and 
case law are currently the basis to pierce the corporate veil in Spain. Argentina and 
Brazil have relied on a statutory exception included in core company law regulations. 
Colombia has also depended on statutes but this remedy has been limited to specific 
circumstance and types of business association. The reason for Colombian authorities 
to create a limited approach can be attributed to the fact that the piercing of the 
corporate veil clashes with the country’s constitution. Hence, in order to avoid major 
conflict this remedy has been limited to circumstances and areas where there is a high 
possibility of the misuse of the corporate personality.  
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     The fact that Spain, Argentina and Brazil have developed this remedy with a wider 
scope of application than has Colombia does not mean that Spain, Argentina and 
Brazil do not preserve the integrity of the corporate personality. These jurisdictions 
share the tendency to preserve the corporate personality due to the socio economic 
benefits provided. This tendency derives from the fear that the excessive and 
uncontrolled piercing of the corporate veil may undermine the corporate personality. 
Therefore, in these jurisdictions the piercing of the corporate veil has been considered 
by the judiciary as a remedy applied in exceptional circumstances.  
 
     In contrast, Chile has not developed any statutory exception or doctrinal approach 
to the corporate personality. In Chile, corporate personality issues have been 
addressed through the use of the traditional legal concepts by adapting these to the 
circumstances of the case. I regard the use of traditional concepts as a provisional 
measure. As I pointed in this chapter, the concept of corporate personality and issues 
in this context are on an early stage in Chile. It is anticipated that gradually the 
Chilean judiciary will develop a formal approach to deal with corporate veil issues. It 
can be argued that Chile may rely on a statute as it chooses to follow the trend of the 
other Latin American countries. This trend is founded on the conservative nature of 
the civil law tradition, which makes a statutory approach more suitable for countries 
with a legal framework based on this tradition.   
 
    Certainly, the piercing of the corporate veil is a subject developed differently in 
each of these jurisdictions. Although, Argentina and Brazil both have a statutory rule 
on core company law regulations which furthermore expressly deals with the 
corporate personality, these statutes are of a different form and wording; a fact that 
has influence on the interpretation and scope of these rules.  
 
     Notably, Spain, Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Brazil follow a similar pattern 
regarding corporate groups in the context of labour law. In labour law, a common 
issue has been the conflict between the corporate group structure and the enforcement 
of employees’ rights. The companies forming the group are considered independent 
from each other and each one has its own liabilities, including employment contracts. 
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In some circumstances a subsidiary does not have assets in order to pay the 
employees or does not comply with its duties towards the employee; or the employee 
was contracted by one of the companies but he nonetheless carries out duties for the 
other companies of the group. Therefore, to what extent are the parent company and 
the other subsidiaries responsible for the duties of one subsidiary towards its 
employee? To solve this dilemma the jurisdictions studied in this chapter have 
decided to regard the companies forming the group as a single economic unit for the 
purposes of labour law enforcement. Each of these jurisdictions has its own means to 
justify the concept of the single economic unit in labour law. However, although the 
approach may be different, the result is the same; to regard the group as a single 
economic unit. 
 
    Another fact that can be established from this research is based on the relevance of 
traditional legal concepts. As can be appreciated throughout this chapter, these 
jurisdictions have built their approaches over traditional legal concepts and principles 
such as abuso del derecho and fraude a la ley. These concepts already existed in their 
legal framework and were suitable to justify an exception to the corporate personality. 
It cannot be denied that these jurisdictions have considered certain aspects of the U.S 
doctrine. However, it cannot be argued that Spain, Argentina, Colombia, Chile and 
Brazil have adopted the U.S doctrine. In fact, Hispano-American jurisdictions and 
Brazil have crafted their own tools to deal with corporate personality issues. Indeed, 
these jurisdictions have been original with regard to their approaches.  
 
    I have to point out the fact that Hispano-American countries and Brazil, share one 
similarity with the U.S doctrine, which is the fact that these approaches aim directly at 
attacking the corporate personality. The exceptions to the corporate personality 
presented in this chapter may be different to the U.S doctrine in structure, but all of 
these attack directly the corporate entity in order to hold liable the wrongdoers hidden 
behind it.  
 
     In comparison to the English approach to deal with corporate veil issues, I consider 
Hispano-American countries and Brazil has been more open to deal with the 
corporate personality. While the English judiciary has looked for alternative means, 
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the Hispano-American countries and Brazil have directly addressed corporate 
personality issues. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
    In this chapter, the way Hispano-American Jurisdictions and Brazil have dealt with 
corporate personality issues has been demonstrated. It has been shown that legal 
tradition has been an influential factor. The passive role of the civil law judge and 
tendency to adhere to positive law are characteristics of the civil law tradition that 
make the U.S. doctrine of piercing the corporate veil incompatible with the legal 
framework of countries that follow this legal tradition. It cannot be denied that the 
U.S. doctrine has been the subject of attention and studied by civil law academia and 
judiciary. However, as explained in Chapter Two, the U.S. is a unique and complex 
jurisdiction. The Hispano-American and Brazilian jurisdictions studied in this chapter 
present a different reality to that of the U.S. Consequently, the piercing of the 
corporate veil has been developed in accord to the legal framework and needs of each 
of these countries.   
 
    In this chapter, it can be noted that traditional legal concepts have played a relevant 
role on the development of approaches to deal with corporate personality issues. The 
use of traditional legal concepts as a basis for exceptions to the corporate personality 
is not only a clever initiative but also an initiative that has produced an approach 
suitable to the legal framework of Spain and Latin American jurisdictions. This thesis 
does not consider the Hispano-American approach better than the U.S. doctrine as 
both approaches have pros and cons. However, the fact that the piercing of the 
corporate veil is a subject addressed individually by each jurisdiction has to be 
emphasised. 
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CHAPTER IV: The Panamanian Sociedad Anónima and the 
Levantamiento del Velo (Lifting the Corporate Veil) 
 
     This chapter is about corporate veil issues in Panama. I have chosen Panama as a 
main case study due to the peculiar Panamanian framework for companies and the 
effect this has had over the development of a means to deal with corporate veil issues. 
Different to the other Latin American jurisdictions studied in Chapter Three, Panama 
has developed as an offshore financial centre. By doing so the country has developed 
as an environment that lends itself to commerce, including a flexible regulation for 
the incorporation and management of companies. Moreover, Panamanian 
corporations are predominately privately owned. This is partly because public 
companies are not part of Latin America business culture in general.392 However, in 
the case of Panama there are other factors that have contributed to the predominance 
of private companies. Notably, its small equity market393 and lack of massive 
industries,394 such as mining or manufacture, have played an influential role.  
 
    The development of Panama as an offshore financial service centre has not been a 
recent event. On the contrary, it has been a slow process that started during the early 
days of Panama being an independent Republic. As a small country with limited 
resources and a small industry, Panama focused on the development of its service 
sector, which in turn has led to the current financial services centre. During the 
development of the Panamanian framework for companies, Panamanian policy 
makers did not considered an exception to the corporate personality. I personally 
                                                        
392
 See, Chong, A. And Lopez de Silanes, F. Investors Protection and Corporate Governance; Firm 
Level Across Latina America. New York: Standford University Press; 2007. At page 1-6 
393
 The Panamanian author Carlos Barsallo consider that Panama has a small equity market due to 
liquidity offered by Panamanian banks, he points that  “ in Panama the major issues are driven by the 
preponderance of banks. Given abundant debt financing, there is little need for equity financing. In 
addition, institutional investors are largely absent from the equity market”. In addition, the Panamanian 
author Miguel Eduardo Magallon considers the fact that listed companies have to disclose information 
to the public as key factor on the lack of interest by the part of Panamanian private companies to go 
public. Indeed, Panamanian companies are traditionally private and the author Magallon perceives this 
tendency as one of the causes for the Panamanian equity market to be small.  See,      Barsallo, C. 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets. Corporate governance and enforcement mechanisms 
in emerging markets. Forum 2. Istanbul, Sabanci Univercity. 17 November 2007 at p 3 . See also 
Magallon, M. Como Crecemos el Mercado de Valores Panameño: Propuestas para atraer mas 
Inversionistas y Emisores. Available at http://www.supervalores.gob.pa/educacion-al-
inversionista/concursos-de-monografia.html [last visit 4 august 2013] 
394
 In the Panamanian equity market are currently listed ninety-nine companies. See, 
http://www.panabolsa.com [last visit 4 august 2013] 
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attribute this omission to the lack of a dynamic economy. Certainly, the concept of 
corporate personality existed in Panamanian company law, but was not exploited until 
the last twenty years.  
 
    During the last two decades, the common use of the corporate personality has 
triggered a debate regarding the corporate veil in Panama and to what extent it should 
be preserved. An offshore financial centre such as Panama would probably be 
inclined to protect the hermetic nature of the corporate personality. However, 
Panamanian authorities have recognised the fact that the corporate entity cannot be 
absolute and this can be ignored when used for fraudulent purposes.395  
 
     Neither a statutory exception nor a doctrinal approach to deal with corporate 
personality issues currently exists in Panama. Nonetheless, in this thesis it is argued 
that Panamanian authorities are likely to introduce an exception in order to fill this 
legal gap. This suggestion is supported by the premise that economic prosperity 
triggers the use of the corporate personality and this in turn renders the abuse of the 
corporate personality more common. This thus makes the means to counter the abuse 
of the corporate entity necessary.  
 
    As pointed out in Chapters Two and Three, the piercing of the corporate veil is 
developed in accord to the legal needs of each jurisdiction. In the case of Panama, I 
consider that the potential exception is aimed at the Panamanian regulation for 
sociedad anónima (the equivalent to the joint stock corporation). The sociedad 
anónima is the type of business association most commonly employed in Panama due 
to the flexibility in its creation and management.396  
 
    In this thesis, the use of the procedural principle of sana critica is proposed to 
supplement the approach to deal with the misuse of the Panamanian sociedad 
                                                        
395
 The Panamanian Supreme Court directly presented its concern in the, Sentencia, Pleno de la Corte 
Suprema de Justicia. 29 de enero de 1991. Later in this Chapter I will present and comment the 
arguments of the Panamanian Supreme Court on the case decided on this judgment. 
396
 The corporation limited by shares is the most frequently used type of business association in 
Panama and is the usual choice for an offshore operation. See, 
http://www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/jpacos.html [last visit may 30, 2013] Excelling as a tax planning 
instrument, Panamanian corporations are widely known and used throughout the world. See, 
http://www.offshorepanamaniancorporations.com/ [last visit may 30 2013] 
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anónima. However, before addressing the research question, this chapter will address 
how the Panamanian framework for companies is composed and how corporate 
personality issues have been addressed to date. In the first section of this chapter, 
general aspects of the Panamanian corporate entity will be discussed. To begin, the 
positive legislation on which the Panamanian corporate entity has been structured will 
be addressed. Moving on, the value that foreigners and nationals place on the 
Panamanian corporate entity will be viewed before proceeding to the second section, 
the levantamiento del velo (lifting the corporate veil) and how this subject has been 
addressed in Panama until now. 
4.1 General Aspects of the Panamanian Sociedad Anónima  
 
     For commercial purposes, different types of business associations in Panama 
(sociedad en comandita, sociedad de responsabilidad limitada and sociedad 
anónima) have the attribute of legal personality and shareholders limited liability.397 
However, the sociedad anónima is the type of business association most commonly 
employed.398 Moreover, this type of business association has been imperative to the 
development of Panama as a financial service provider.399 Consequently, as in other 
jurisdictions studied in this thesis, there is a predisposition of Panamanian courts to 
preserve the corporate personality.  
 
     As explained in Chapter Three, the sociedad anónima  is the Franco-Hispanic 
equivalent to the Anglo American joint stock corporation. Panama, like most Latin 
                                                        
397
 The Sociedad en comandita is regulated in the Código de Comercio de Panama. Created by the Ley 
2 del 22 de agosto de 1916, publicada en la Gazeta Oficial 2418 de 7 de septiembre de 1916;  the 
sociedad anónima is regulated by Ley 32 de 26 de febrero sobre Sociedades Anonimas. Publicada en 
la Gazeta Oficial 5067 de 16 de marzo de 1927; and the sociedad de responsabilidad limitada is 
regulated by the Ley 4 de 9 de enero 2009, Publicada en Gazeta Oficial 26202-A.  
398
 The corporation limited by shares is the most frequently used type of business association in 
Panama and is the usual choice for an offshore operation. See, 
http://www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/jpacos.html [last visit may 30, 2013] Excelling as a tax planning 
instrument, Panamanian corporations are widely known and used throughout the world. See, 
http://www.offshorepanamaniancorporations.com/ [last visit may 30 2013] 
399
 The Republic of Panama is an attractive jurisdiction for the establishment of off-shore corporations. 
There are many advantages of the Panamanian jurisdiction such as, the competitive costs of 
incorporation and annual maintenance, the flexibility of the incorporation law and non-taxable income 
arising out of off-shore business. See, Doing Business in Panama. Guide prepared by Baker Tilly 
Panama S.A, available at 
http://www.bakertillyinternational.com/media/36926/doing%20business%20in%20panama.pdf [last 
visit may 30, 2013].  
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American countries, is a former Spanish colony and the Panamanian legal framework 
has been strongly influenced by Spanish law. Consequently, legal principles and 
concepts applied to the sociedad anónima in Spain and Latin American countries may 
be similar to those applied in Panama.  
4.1.1 Legal Framework for Sociedades Anónimas in Panama   
 
     The Franco-Hispanic sociedad anónima was introduced in Panama in 1916 with 
the enactment of the Panamanian Código de Commercio (Code of Commerce).400 The 
Código de Comercio establishes the types of business associations that can be used in 
Panama as well as the general rules regarding their attributes, requirements for 
existence and also management.401  
 
    During the decade of the 1920s, a generation of Panamanian Scholars educated in 
Europe and the U.S. proposed innovations in order to boost the development of the 
country; among these proposals was the draft of Panamanian corporate law.  By that 
time, the joint stock corporation had become the main vehicle for investment in 
industrialised countries and developing countries were adopting this type of business 
association in their company’s regulation. Panamanian policy makers envisaged the 
sociedad anónima would play a key role in the development of the country as a 
financial service provider. However, the regulation of sociedades anónimas contained 
in the Código de Comercio was incomplete. Thus, the Ley 32 de 26 de febrero sobre 
Sociedades Anónimas (Ley 32) was enacted in 1927 as a body of law dedicated to this 
type of business association.402 This law established the requirements and the 
proceedings necessary to create a sociedad anónima . Furthermore, it established 
parameters for the issue and types of shares as well as the rights that each type of 
share confers. In turn, this regulation established rules for mergers and established the 
parameters for the distribution of assets in case of dissolution of the sociedad 
anónima.403 
                                                        
400
 See, Supra note 397. 
401
 Código de Comercio de Panama, Libro Primero del Comercio en General. Titulo VIII de las 
Sociedades Comerciales. Capitulo V sobre sociedades anónimas.  
402
 See, Supra note 397. 
403
 Among Panamanian law professionals there is a tendency to regard the Ley 32 as a law based on 
company law from the U.S (mainly from the State of Delaware). In his research on the Panamanian 
sociedad anonima, the Panamanian author Jorge Fabrega did not find any evidence in the records of 
the Panamanian Parliament (Asamblea Nacional de Diputados) of Panamanian policy makers 
Page 167 of 239 
 
 
     With the enactment of the Ley 32, the rules of the Código de Comercio that 
directly regulate the sociedad anónima were derogated.404 However, the general rules 
applicable to the different types of business association contained in the Código de 
Comercio continued to be applicable to the sociedad anónima .405 Moreover, some of 
the articles contained in the Código de Comercio derogated by the Ley 32 were later 
restored in order to fill the gaps in the Ley 32.406 The Ley 32, since its enactment, has 
not been subject to any legal reform. Rather, the Código de Comercio and other laws 
have supplemented this law. 
4.1.2 The Panamanian Sociedad Anónima , a privately owned entity and vehicle for 
offshore operations 
 
     The Panamanian sociedad anónima has been predominantly privately owned. 
Evidence of this is found in the small equity markets, which are currently undergoing 
development.407 Company law regulations in Latin America have been developed 
mainly to deal with privately owned companies and Panamanian corporate law is not 
an exception. The Ley 32 does not establish a distinction between public and privately 
owned sociedades anónimas. Moreover, the fact that the Ley 32 has gaps in aspects 
such as shareholders’ rights and directors’ duties among other corporate governance 
aspects give ground to consider that the original purpose of the law was mainly to 
regulate privately owned companies rather than public companies. The reason for 
                                                                                                                                                              
consulting foreign laws when drafting the Ley 32. However, the fact that Panamanian policy-makers 
were influenced by the legal innovations and trends in the U.S and Europe during that time may justify 
the argument regarding the American roots of Panamanian Corporate law. See, Fabrega, J. Tratado 
Sobre la Ley de Sociedades Anónimas, Comentada por Articulos. Panama: Sistema Juridicos S.A; 
2008. At page17 
404
 In article 95 the Ley 32 establishes that “Quedan derogadas todas las disposiciones hoy vigentes 
relativas a las sociedades anónimas.” [the rules that regulate the sociedades anónimas are derogated] 
405
 Since the enactment of the Ley 32 there has been confusion among Panamanian lawyers regarding 
which rules contained in the Titulo VIII of the Code of Commerce were still applicable to the sociedad 
anónima . Indeed, article 95 is not clear. This article just mentions that the rules applicable to the 
sociedad anónima are derogated. It can be considered as obvious that the article 95 makes reference to 
the rules contained in the Capítulos V and VI Code of Commerce (article 359-469), which directly 
applied to the sociedad anónima . However, some lawyers have been confused and considered the 
whole Titulo VIII as not applicable to the sociedades anónimas. The Supreme Court of Justice in a 
sentencia dated 31 de Mayo de 1994 cleared this doubt by establishing that the general rules contained 
in the Titulo VIII of the Code of Commerce were applicable to the sociedad anónima. The court 
supports this statement on the fact that there are certain aspects covered by the Code Commerce that 
are not addressed in the Ley 32. 
406
 The articles 417-418-420-425-426-427-444-517-524-531-548-556 were reestablished with the 
article 1 of the Ley 9 del 2 de Julio de 1946, publicada en la Gazeta Oficial 10,051 de 19 de Julio de 
1946 
407
 See, Chong, A. And Lopez de Silanes, F. Supra note 392. At page 1 
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public companies not to be common in this jurisdiction can be attributed to the fact 
that Panama is a country that has had a slow economic development and consequently 
the capital market where companies could offer and buy stock was non-existent until 
the early 1990s.408 With the economic boost that Panama experienced during the 
1990s, the creation of a legal framework for public companies became necessary. 
However, the Ley 32 was not reformed; instead, supplementary laws were created in 
order to deal with matters concerning public companies.409  
 
    The fact that the Panamanian sociedad anónima  is predominantly private has 
encouraged the incorporation of offshore companies. Panama has developed as a 
financial service provider and one of the main services offered by Panama is the 
incorporation of offshore companies. In order to structure offshore operations as part 
of a business strategy, foreign investors seek jurisdictions with flexible regulations 
regarding the incorporation of companies; an example being tax incentives. A 
company may be set up in Panama in order to benefit from the Panamanian territorial 
taxation system thus reducing the tax charges that have to be paid in the country from 
where the profit originates.410  
 
     The Ley 32 offers the type of flexibility sought by foreign investors through 
establishing flexible requirements for the creation and management of sociedades 
                                                        
408
 See, http://www.panabolsa.com/ [last visit may 30 2013] 
409
 The Decreto de Gabinete 247 del de16 de Julio de 1970 established the first parameters for the issue 
of public equity and created the first Comision Nacional de Valores as an institution that supervised the 
issue of public equity. This law was aimed at motivating the development of a Panamanian equity 
market. However, it was limited. Moreover, the Comision Nacional de Valores was a department of the 
Ministerion de Comercio e Industrias and lacked autonomy. With the creation of the Bolsa de Valores 
de Panama in the 1990s, policy makers became aware of the need of a more complete regulation and 
stronger institution to regulate the growing Panamanian equity market. Therefore, the Decreto Ley 1 de 
8 de Julio de 1999 (Published in the Gazeta Oficial 23,837 del 10 de Julio de 1999) was enacted to 
cover the legal needs in this context. This Decreto created the Comision Nacional de Valores as an 
autonomous entity in charge of supervising the Panamanian equity Markets and established the 
regulations for the Mercado de Valores de Panama.  See, 
http://www.supervalores.gob.pa/informacion-general/historia.html [last visit may 30 2013] 
410
 Territorial taxation consists in the payment of taxes only for the income generated inside the 
territory of the country. Income generated abroad will not be subject to tax. In Panama the historical 
principle of “territorial taxation” has been in force throughout the fiscal history of the country. Strict 
adherence to this principle in legislation, administrative regulation and court decisions partly accounts 
for the extraordinary development of Panama as a base for offshore companies. See, Fabrega, J. 
Panama como centro para la Estructuracion de Transacciones Internacionales o 
Extraterritoriales y su diferencia con los Paraisos Tribiutarios o Tax Havens. 2004. Available at 
JP Fábrega - fabamm.com [last visit may 30, 2013] At page 20 to 27. See also,  Spitz & Clarke. 
Offshore Service, Introduction: Comentary in Offshore Services.U.K: Butterworths; 2005. At page 
6 [Pan. 62] 
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anónimas. In this law there is no minimum capital requirement nor is there a 
restriction regarding the persons that can use this type of entity. It is established that 
two or more persons with legal capacity (of any nationality, not necessarily a 
Panamanian resident) can create a sociedad anónima  as long as it is for a licit 
purpose.411 Moreover, the Ley 32 did not create an authority to supervise the activities 
of the sociedades anónimas such as the Superintendencia de Sociedades, which is an 
institution that exists in other jurisdictions such as Colombia and Chile.412   
 
    The use of the Panamanian sociedad anónima on a domestic level, on the other 
hand, differs from the use that a foreigner commonly gives to the sociedad anónima . 
Panamanian domestic corporations are employed for their traditional purpose, which 
is to participate in a commercial enterprise and benefit from the rule of limited 
liability. However, the fact that Panamanian nationals also use the sociedad anónima 
for other purposes such as tax avoidance and the protection of assets should not be 
overlooked.  
 
    Certainly, there are differences between the Panamanian offshore and domestic 
sociedades anónimas regarding the objective of their existence. However, 
Panamanian offshore and domestic companies have legal personality, which tends to 
be equally preserved by the Panamanian judiciary. 
4.2 Corporate Personality and the Principle of Limited Liability 
in the Panamanian Legal Framework 
 
     As mentioned in the first chapter, legal personality and limited liability are 
different concepts but closely related. The Panamanian sociedad anónima, as an 
equivalent to the Anglo-American corporate entity, has the attributes of legal 
personality and limited liability. Panamanian courts tend to preserve the integrity of 
                                                        
411
 Ley 32, article 1: Dos o más personas mayores de edad, de cualquier nacionalidad, aun cuando no 
estén domiciliadas en la República, podrán  constituir una sociedad anónima para cualquier objeto 
lícito, de acuerdo con las formalidades prescritas en la presente ley.  
412
 A Superintendencia de sociedades can be defined as a regulatory agency that oversees the creation 
and management of corporations. In Colombia this agency was created by the Ley 58 de 1931. See, 
http://www.supersociedades.gov.co/ss/drvisapi.dll?MIval=ppal [last visit may 30 2013] In chile the 
existence of an entity that oversees the activity of sociedades anónimas, was considered since the 
enactment of the Chilean Code of Commerce in 1865 but was formally established by the DFL Nº251 
del 22 de mayo de 1931. http://www.svs.cl/sitio/acerca/quees_resena.php [last visit may 30, 2013] 
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the joint stock corporation. Indeed, besides the flexible regulation for sociedades 
anónimas, the Panamanian courts’ tendency to preserve the corporate personality is 
another factor that has motivated foreign investors to create Panamanian offshore 
companies. However before explaining the rationale on which Panamanian courts 
preserve the corporate personality, the legal framework on which the legal entity and 
limited liability were founded shall be briefly addressed.  
 
      Panama, like other civil law jurisdictions, establishes the concept of person for 
legal purposes in its Código Civil (Civil Code). 413  The Código Civil is structured in 
five Libros (Books) but for the purpose of this section only the “Libro Primero”, 
whose title is “De Las Personas”, shall be mentioned. This book establishes the 
definition of “person”, the types of person (natural and legal) and all matters 
concerning the existence, capacity, relationships and extinction of the “person”.  
 
     In Article 38, the Código Civil establishes, “a person can be natural or juridical.  
Natural persons are all humans of any age, sexual gender and social status. Juridical 
persons are the religious, political, public or commercial entities with rights and 
obligations, who are represented by a natural person.”414  The concept of “person” and 
the rules established in the Libro Primero of the Código Civil form one of the pillars 
of the Panamanian Corporate personality. However, the attribute of legal personality 
is not conferred to the sociedad anónima through the rules contained in the Civil 
Code. The Libro Primero of the Civil Code establishes that business associations can 
be considered as juridical persons415who can own assets, sue or be sued.416 However, 
the same rules establish that business associations will be regulated by the rules in the 
Code of Commerce.417 As is previously mentioned, the Code of Commerce regulated 
                                                        
413
 Código Civil de la Republica de Panama. Created by the Ley N° 2 de 22 de agosto de 1916. 
Publicada en la Gaceta Oficial N° 2.404 de 22 de agosto de 1916. 
414
 Código civil Article 38 establishes “Las persona son naturales o jurídicas. Son personas naturales 
todos los individuos de la especie humana cualquiera que sea su edad. Sexo, estirpe o condición. Es 
persona juridical una entidad moral o persona ficticia de caracter politico, público, religioso, 
industrial o comercial, representada por persona o personas naturales, capaz de ejercer derechos y de 
contraer obligaciones.”  
415
 Idem Article 64: “ Son personas  uridicas: … (6º) Las asociaciones civiles o comerciales a las que 
la ley concede personalidad propia independiente de la de cada uno de sus asociados.  
416
 Idem Article 71: “Las persona jurídicas pueden adquirir o poseer bienes de todas clases, así como 
contraer obligaciones y ejercitar acciones civiles o criminals, conforme a las leyes y reglas de su 
constitución.” 
417
 Idem Article 70: “Las sociedades a que se refiere el ordinal 6º del articulo 64 se regirán por las 
disposiciones de este Código relativas al contrato de sociedad y por las del Código de Comercio.” 
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all matters relating to business association in the early days of the Panamanian legal 
system. The Code of Commerce in its Article 251 established “the types of business 
associations created in accordance to the rules of this code will have legal personality 
different from that of its members”.418  Article 251 is part of the rules contained in the 
Titulo VIII of the Code of Commerce that apply to all the forms of business 
association regulated in this Code, including the sociedad anónima.  
 
     The enactment of the Ley 32 diminished the influence of the Code of Commerce 
on the regulation of the sociedad anónima . However, rules like the one contained in 
Article 251 still play a relevant role in the legal framework for sociedades anónimas. 
 
     The Ley 32 was enacted with the purpose to cover aspects, which the Code of 
Commerce did not cover such as the powers of the sociedad anónima, which are 
contained in its Article 19. Some of the powers established in this article are that a 
sociedad anónima  can sue and be sued; and manage its own assets. However, a 
curious detail that is worth mentioning is the fact that the Ley 32 does not expressly 
mention that the sociedad anónima is a legal person that exists apart from its 
shareholders; rather, the Panamanian Código de Comercio confers the attribute of 
legal person to the sociedad anónima . The Ley 32 can be considered to have left the 
attribute of legal personality as something that can be deduced from the interpretation 
of the law.  
 
    In contrast to the situation of the concept of legal personality, the Ley 32 has been 
clearer regarding the principle of limited liability. The Article 39 of the Ley 32 
expressly establishes that shareholders are only liable to the creditors of the company 
to the extent of their share in the company’s assets.419 In contrast, the rules of the 
Código de Comercio, which are still applicable to the sociedad anónima , do not 
directly refer to the principle of limited liability. Rather, in the Article 267, it is 
established that the shareholders will receive profit and be liable for the company’s 
loses in accordance to what has been agreed among the shareholders. In the case of 
                                                        
418
 Código de Comercio Article 251 establishes “La sociedad mercantil constituida con arreglo a las 
disposiciones de este codigo, tendra personalidad juridical propia distinta de la de los socios par a 
todos sus actos y contratos”  
419
 Ley 32 article 39 establishes “Los accionistas solo son responsables con respecto a los acreedores 
de la compañ a hasta la cantidad que adeuden a cuenta de sus acciones;…” 
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not reaching an agreement, each shareholder will receive profit and will be liable for 
the company’s losses in accordance to his contribution to the corporate assets.420  
 
     It can be considered that the Código de Comercio established limited liability to be 
optional, while the Ley 32 established limited liability to be a fixed rule. 
Unquestionably, limited liability can be established or put aside by, for example, 
creating a contract clause. However, the fact that the Ley 32 established limited 
liability as a formal rule strengthened the existence of shareholders´ limited liability 
in the context of sociedades anónimas.  
 
    The concept of legal personality and limited liability are to be found in the midst of 
in the regulations that compose the Panamanian legal framework for sociedades 
anónimas. They are not grouped together under one regulation nor extensively 
defined.  The Panamanian Corte Suprema de Justicia421 has done the task of 
condensing and systematically explaining these concepts. In the legal precedent 
established in the sentencia de 22 de julio de 1994 the Supreme Court concluded that 
“…the sociedad anónima is an entity with legal personality different from that of its 
shareholders. The obligations of the shareholders are limited to their contribution to 
the company’s assets.”422 Although Panamanian law and case law have recognised 
that the sociedad anónima is a legal entity that confers limited liability to its 
shareholders, in the same sentencia  the Panamanian Corte Suprema de Justicia also 
recognised the fact that the sociedad anónima  could be used to commit illicit acts. In 
this precedent the court also states: 
 
 “ Debe entenderse que el instrumento de la personaría juridica con mucha 
frequencia ha sido utilizado para sanear ilícitos, llegando la jurisprudencia a 
adentrarse a ella con el propósito de determinar quiénes se encubren detrás, a fin de 
aplicarles la ley como si la persona juridica no existiera. [If the juridical person has 
                                                        
420
 Código de Comercio article 267 establishes “La participacion de los socios en los beneficios o las 
pérdidas se ajustará a lo que estuviere convenido. A falta de estipulacion cada socio capitalista deberá 
tener una parte de los beneficios o las pérdidas proporcional al valor de su aporte. …” 
421 See, Supra note 15. 
422
 “… la sociedad anónima es un ente con personería jurídica propia, distinta a sus accionistas. Las 
obligaciones del accionista se limitan exclusivamente a sus aportes…” See,  Sentencia. Pleno de la 
Corte Suprema de Justicia. 22 de Julio de 1994, precedent cited by Fabrega J, Supra note 403. At 
page 223 - 224 
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been used as a vehicle to carry out illicit acts, the existence of corporate personality 
would be ignored so that the law could be enforced on the wrongdoers hiding behind 
corporate personality].”423   
 
    The wording in this precedent demonstrates that the Panamanian judiciary 
recognise the fact that the existence of the corporate personality cannot be supported 
if it is used to achieve an illicit purpose. As argued throughout this thesis, the use of 
the corporate personality creates situations that may produce an unfair result for 
creditors and third parties. Thus, illicit, immoral and/or fraud are words that must not 
be used loosely. In this statement Panamanian Supreme Court was not clear regarding 
what could be considered as illicit in this context. However, in the cited statement the 
phrase “to carry out illicit acts”, I consider, refers to the intention to affect another 
party, which in Panamanian criminal law is addressed as “Dolo”.424 Indeed, the 
corporation is a fiction that performs based on the intentions of the individuals behind 
it.  
 
    The Panamanian Supreme Court has considered the piercing of the corporate veil. 
However, this remedy has not been widely applied in Panama.425 The incorporation of 
offshore companies represents a profitable business for Panamanian banks and law 
firms and is also a good source of income for the State. Moreover, on a domestic level 
the corporate personality has allowed small Panamanian entrepreneurs to grow. 
Consequently, Panamanian courts have carefully analysed the application of this 
remedy due to the negative effects it could produce. Notably, if the corporate 
personality were to be easily disregarded, Panama would lose ground against other 
                                                        
423
 Ibid  
424 The concept of dolo refers to the intention to harm or achieve an unlawful result. In the article 26 of 
the Panamanian Penal Code it is considered necessary the concurrence of dolo in order to consider an 
act as criminal. See, Código Penal de la República de Panama. Adoptado por la Ley 14 de 2007,con 
las modificaciones y adiciones introducidas por la Ley 26 de 2008, la Ley S de 2009, la Ley 68 de 2009 
y la Ley 14 de 2010. Publicado en la Gazeta Oficial, lunes 26 de abril de 2010.   
425
 The author Pedro a Barsallos in his Paper “La Doctrina del Velo Corporativo” describes the 
Panamanian sociedad anónima as “hermetic”. He used this adjective to describe this type of business 
association because of the tendency that Panamanian courts have to preserve the separate existence of 
the corporation from that of its shareholders. However, the adjective used by the Author Barsallos is, I 
consider, too strong. The conference paper written by Barsallos was presented in 1996, a period when 
piercing the corporate veil was a relatively recent subject in Panama. Therefore, this was an early 
moment to consider Panamanian corporate personality as absolute. Certainly, Panamanian courts may 
be reluctant to ignore the corporate personality. However, this does not mean that the Panamanian 
judiciary cannot adopt a more balanced posture regarding the application of this remedy, a point I will 
address through the next section of this chapter. See, Barsallo, P. Supra note 32. 
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offshore financial centres. For foreign investors, the advantages provided by the 
Panamanian corporate personality are essential for their business strategy. I believe 
the easy disregard of the legal personality may make investors lose interest in the 
Panamanian sociedad anónima . Furthermore, on a domestic level the uncontrolled 
disregard of the corporate personality would make Panamanian entrepreneurs 
reluctant to participate in commercial adventures that in turn may produce a positive 
effect in the country due to the risk enterprise may pose to investors’ personal assets.  
 
    There is a dilemma regarding the application of piercing the corporate veil. On the 
one hand, the fact that the corporate personality cannot be used as an instrument for 
the practice of illicit acts is accepted. On the other hand, the corporate personality 
should not be ignored merely because someone alleges fraud, since this would 
produce a negative effect on the country. However, despite this controversy, piercing 
the corporate veil is a remedy that has been acknowledged by Panamanian authorities.  
4.3 The Panamanian Corporate Personality and the Levantamiento 
del velo 
 
     The Panamanian legislation for companies had not and still has not any direct 
exception of the corporate personality. It was not until the early 1990s that the 
Panamanian Supreme Court of Justice directly applied the disregard of the legal entity 
based on grounds of criminal fraud.426 Since then, in the few cases where the 
Panamanian courts have considered ignoring the personality, this remedy has been 
addressed as “Levantamiento del Velo Corporativo” (lifting the corporate veil).  
 
     The levantamiento del velo has been developed based on case law and the range 
for its application has been mainly in cases involving fraudulent acts. Throughout this 
thesis the reader’s attention has been drawn to the fact that fraud in this context does 
not have a concrete definition. Thus, each jurisdiction has defined, in accordance to 
its own particular needs, what can be considered fraudulent behaviour and what may 
trigger the piercing of the corporate veil. In the case of Panama, the Panamanian 
Supreme Court of Justice has limited the circumstances that can be considered as 
fraud in this context. These are: 
                                                        
426
 See, Sentencia, Pleno de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. 29 de enero de 1991 
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 1) The use of the corporate entity to hide assets that are part of a judicial 
investigation regarding a criminal act that happened inside the territory of the 
Republic of Panama. 
 
2) Circumstances where the corporate personality has been used as part of a scheme 
to evade obligations. 
 
     Pleas to disregard the corporate veil are likely to be rejected should they not fall 
under one of these circumstances; for example the case Sentencia del 31 de enero de 
1995.427 In this case, the defendant was a company called Petromin Shipping 
Company (Petromin). It was sued for breach of contract. During the proceedings, the 
claimant requested the seizure of a ship that belonged to one of Petromin’s 
subsidiaries called “Borzesti Inc”.  The Panamanian Maritime Court decided in favour 
of the claimant and seized a ship that belonged to Borzesti, Inc.  The defendant 
appealed and argued that the ship belonged to Borzesti Inc, a company with a legal 
personality and autonomy and which was not part of the contract subject of 
controversy, thus not being part of the proceedings. Although Petromin owned the 
majority of shares of Bozesti Inc., the Supreme Court decided in favour of the 
defendant and reversed the decision of the Maritime Court based on the fact that there 
was no fraud or abuse derived from the control of Petromin over Borzesti Inc. Borzeti 
Inc was a legitimate company with its own operations. Consequently, there was no 
reason to omit the separate legal personality of both companies and allow the issues 
of Petromin affect Borzeti Inc. The Supreme Court determined that both were 
different legal persons with their own rights and obligations. 
 
     In addition to establishing the trigger for applying the levantamiento del velo, 
Panamanian case law has also established that this remedy is to be applied in 
exceptional circumstances.428 As previously mentioned, Panamanian authorities have 
been careful when considering the piercing of the corporate veil. Although a ground 
                                                        
427
 See, Sentencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Panamá, Sala I Civil, de fecha 31 de enero de 
1995.  
428
 “La desestimacion de la personal jurídica sólo puede adoptarse en circumstancias exceptcionales 
como las previstas en este caso…” See, Supra note 426. At page 78 
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for the application of this remedy has been established, its exceptional nature has been 
emphasised in order to prevent its uncontrolled application.  
4.3.1 Early Panamanian Corporate Veil Issues 
 
     Although the piercing of the corporate veil is a relatively new subject in Panama, 
corporate personality issues have never been left uncontrolled by the Panamanian 
judiciary. Before the levantamiento del velo was introduced as an available remedy 
against corporate entity issues, Panamanian authorities ignored the corporate 
personality in public law cases; an example is the Sentencia de 24 de febrero de 1964, 
which is one of the earliest Panamanian precedents in which the corporate personality 
is ignored.429 In this case, Mr. Maruicio Menasche was an individual investor 
sanctioned with the inability to contract with the government because he had 
previously failed to comply with other governmental institutions. However, Mr. 
Menasche used the legal personality of a company to participate in a licitación 
pública (a call for bids). The Supreme Court did not mention the disregard of the 
corporate personality. However, in the Sentencia  the court considered that Mr. 
Menasche used the legal entity as an instrument to avoid his sanction. Therefore, the 
existence of the corporate entity was omitted by the Court to impede Mr. Menasche 
avoiding his sanction. In the cited case, the Supreme Court ignored the corporate 
entity to enforce a penalty. Indeed, the imposition of a public law sanction was 
deemed to prevail over the principle of corporate personality.  
 
     In Panama, early exceptions to the corporate personality arose mainly in areas of 
public law such as tax and administrative law. Following the premise established in 
Chapter One, the cases that occur in the realm of public law can be considered not to 
present a real corporate veil issue. This statement is supported by the fact that the 
state is usually a party in public law cases. The fact that the State is a party to a public 
law case creates a different scenario from that presented in a private law case. The 
State acts to defend and execute public policies and in this circumstance, public 
interests tend to prevail over the corporate personality 
 
                                                        
429
 See, Sentencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Panamá, Sala III de lo Contencioso 
Administrativo, de fecha 24 de febrero de 1964, caso Mauricio Menasche y Cía .  
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     Throughout this thesis, when explaining the piercing of the corporate veil in the 
other jurisdictions subject of study, the piercing of the corporate veil in private law 
and public law has been kept separate. However, in Panama, the few cases involving a 
situation where the legal entity has been directly or indirectly ignored and on which 
the current Panamanian levantamiento del velo has been shaped, have involved 
elements of public law. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis the considerations of 
the Panamanian Supreme Court on cases involving the corporate entity and the State 
cannot be omitted. 
 
     Early Panamanian corporate personality issues were also handled through statutory 
rules that contained a direct or indirect exception to the corporate personality. An 
example is in the Panamanian Labour Code, Article 92, in which it is held that the 
extension of liability to the shareholders is triggered by the creation or use of an 
already existing juridical person with the intention to avoid liabilities towards the 
employees of the company.430 An example regarding the application of this regulation 
is the case decided by the Sentencia dated 21 de enero de 1982. 431 This judgment 
decided a labour case in which an employer tried to use a corporate entity to avoid his 
obligations towards his employee. The employer owned a workshop in which the 
employee worked. After the judgement was awarded in favour of the employee, the 
defendant created a sociedad anónima to transfer out assets. The employer and 
members of his family owned the shares of the sociedad. Moreover, the workshop and 
the sociedad shared the same facilities. The court did not expressly mention the 
disregard of the legal entity but it held the employer liable on grounds that a legally 
established company was used as a means to avoid an obligation toward the 
employee. 
 
 
                                                        
430
 Panamanian Labour Code, article 92: “Cuando por actos simulados o fraudulentos y a travéz de 
la creación u operación de la persona jurídica se elude el cumplimiento de obligaciones laborales de 
una persona juridica, el trabajador de dicha persona jurídica podrá, además, reclamar sus créditos 
laborales a los accionistas, socios o miembros.”  See, Decreto de Gabinet 252(Publicado por la Series 
Legislativa. 1971- Pan. 1)- (this code was modified by the Ley Nº 44 de agosto de 1995). See also 
http://www.leylaboral.com/panama/Normaspanama.aspx?item=1&bd=45 [last visit may 30 2013] 
431
 See, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Recurso de Casación Laboral. Magistrado Ponente: Lao Santizo 
Pérez. Gladis Chichao vs Taller Quirós y Elia Quiroz. 21 de enero 1982 
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     Certainly, statutes in different areas of law have rules that override the corporate 
personality in order to protect a public interest. Another example is contained in the 
Ley de Contratación Pública de 1995 (currently derogated).432 Although the Ley de 
Contratación Pública de 1995 is no longer in force, the wording of its Article 46 
(Section 3) provides a good example of a measure that is intended to prevent 
anticompetitive practices, which are against public interest. Under this rule, the 
circumstances in which a public institution may suspend the call for bids are 
contained. In the Section 3 of this Article, it is established that if the companies which 
participate in the call for bids are related, the call for bids will be suspended. In this 
section, the law establishes that if at least 50% of the shares of one company belong to 
another company, both share a similar board of directors and there is a degree of 
control of one company over another, then there is a corporate group. In this section 
there is no mention of the disregard of the legal entity. However, for the purposes of 
the call for bids, the participating companies cannot be related. If they are related, 
they will be regarded as a single unit despite each having its own legal personality.  
4.3.2 The current Levantamiento del Velo Corporativo in Panama 
  
    The piercing of the corporate veil was directly addressed and recognised by the 
Panamanian Supreme Court of Justice in a sentencia (dated January 1991) to be an 
available remedy.433 In the case decided by this sentencia, the defendant tried to use a 
Panamanian sociedad anónima called Diberor S.A to hide assets that were related to 
criminal operations. The fact that these assets were transferred to a corporate entity 
made the judicial investigation part of the proceedings difficult.  However, during 
investigations, the authorities found that Diberor S.A was constituted and controlled 
by the defendant and members of his family.  The Supreme Court recognised that in 
normal circumstances the separation of assets of the corporate personality and the 
controlling shareholder must be preserved. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
considered that in cases in which the corporate entity has been used to hide assets in 
order obstruct the investigations part of judicial proceedings, the legal personality 
cannot be preserved. Therefore, the legal entity was disregarded in this case.  
 
                                                        
432
 This law was derogated by the Nueva Ley de Contrataciones Públicas, Ley No 22 de 27 de junio de 
2006.  
433
  See, Supra note 426. 
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     In this precedent, the disregard of the legal entity was catalogued as a remedy 
applied in exceptional circumstances, such as the one dealing with the decided case 
where the corporate entity was used to hide assets that had had a connection to a 
criminal act committed inside the territory of the Republic of Panama.  
 
     In the precedent established in the Diberor case, the Supreme Court created the 
grounds on which the levantamiento del velo corporativo in Panama has been 
founded. The position of the Panamanian Supreme Court in the Diberor case was 
later followed in a controversial Panamanian case decided under the Sentencia de 16 
de febrero de 1996.434 In this case, foreign authorities requested the Panamanian 
Ministerio Público (Prosecutor’s Office) to investigate a Panamanian company 
suspected of receiving illegal funds from an Italian company. The Ministerio Publico 
proceeded to confiscate documents that were held in the office of the company’s 
resident agent, the law firm Patton Moreno & Asvat. The resident agent presented the 
Supreme Court with an Acción de Amparo (writ of amparo). The resident agent 
claimed that the constitutional rights of the legal person were violated and 
information obtained from the confiscated documents had to be kept as confidential. 
On the other hand, the prosecutor in charge of the investigation argued that he decided 
to pierce the corporate veil in order to avoid the use of the Panamanian sociedad 
anónima for illicit acts on an international level (i.e. the use of the corporate entity for 
money laundering).435 In this sentencia, the Supreme Court decided in favour of the 
resident agent. Firstly, the request was made to the wrong authority. When requiring 
the investigation of an issue in the territory of Panama, international authorities must 
present their request to the Supreme Court “Sala Cuarta de Negocios Especiales”. 436 
Therefore, the request to the Ministerio Público was invalid based on the fact that this 
authority did not have competence in the matter. Secondly, the argument of the 
prosecutor was invalid based on the fact that the prosecutor did not have the 
competence to determine whether or not to ignore the corporate personality. 
Moreover, the argument on which the prosecutor tried to justify his action against the 
corporate personality did not fall under the scope of what had already been 
                                                        
434
 See, Sentencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Panamá, Sala en Pleno, de fecha 16 de 
Febrero de 1996. (Ref. núm. 199602) 
435
 Idem., At page 2 
436
 The Panamanian Supreme Court is divided in four Salas: The Sala Primera , deals with civil law 
matters, the Sala Segunda deals with Penal law matters, the Sala Tercera deals with administrative law 
matters and the Sala Cuarta  sobre Negocios Especiales.  
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established in the Diberor case as a trigger for piercing the corporate veil (“The 
corporate personality will be disregarded if it is used to hide assets that have a 
connection with a criminal act committed inside the territory of the Republic of 
Panama”). In the wording of this sentencia, the Supreme Court also emphasised the 
fact that the corporate personality must be respected unless strong reasons motivate 
the disregard of this principle existed.    
 
     The use of the Panamanian corporate personality as a device to hide assets related 
to criminal acts was the only circumstance accepted by the Panamanian judiciary to 
justify ignoring the corporate personality.437 However, the misuse of the Panamanian 
corporate entity has not only been limited to hiding assets. The fact that this entity 
could be used as part of a scheme to evade obligations became present in this 
jurisdiction in the case decided by the Sentencia de 20 de diciembre de 1999.438 This 
sentencia decided a liability issue in a case involving a Panamanian group of 
companies. In this case, the company Casa Blanca Holding Corporation (CB) was 
considered to have been manipulated by its shareholders (the Homsany family). 
Moreover, it was suspected of receiving funds in a fraudulent manner derived from 
loans given by the Panamanian Banco Nacional to companies’ forming a corporate 
group called “Grupo Homsany” (GH).  As in the previous cases, the interest of the 
State was at stake because the creditor was the Panamanian National Bank, whose 
claim was presented through the Dirección de Responsabilidad Patrimonial (a 
department of the Contraloria General de la República (National Audit Office)). 
However, although the state was the claimant, the case was not directly against a 
corporate personality. Rather, the decision in this case was justified by a series of 
facts. This case is of interest because in order to determine CB’s liability, the 
Panamanian court considered a series of facts that had not been considered in 
previous cases. Firstly, the controlling shareholder was another company part of the 
                                                        
437
 The Panamanian Author Francisco Ferreira in the conclusions of his paper “Acción de Amparo, 
Confidencialidad y Levantamiento del Velo Corporativo” established that the corporate veil will only 
be pierced in cases in which the corporate entity has been used to hide assets that are part of a judicial 
investigation regarding a criminal act that happened inside the territory of the Republic of Panama. 
Ferreira wrote his paper in 1996 and like the author Barsallos, he described the Panamanian 
levantamiento del velo in its early stage. Moreover, he describes this doctrine as limited to the 
circumstance already mentioned. See, Ferreira, F. Acción de Amparo, Confidencialidad y 
Levantamiento del Velo Corporativo. Editorial Portobelo. Panama. 1996 
438
 See, Sentencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Panamá, Sala Tercera Contensioso 
Administrativo, de fecha 20 de diciembre de 1999. (Ref. num. 199912) 
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group; secondly the fact that the Homsany family owned the shares of the companies’ 
forming the group but moreover CB and companies part of GH had the same 
directors; thirdly, the facilities where CB practiced its business belonged to the 
Homsany family (who were shareholders and controllers of CB and GH); and lastly, 
the Homsany family used assets of CB as if they were the family’s assets (the 
separation of personalities was not respected). Based on these facts, the court reached 
the conclusion that it was necessary to disregard the corporate personality in order to 
reach the persons (CB and Homsany Family) who had committed a fraudulent act and 
had sought to hide behind the corporate entity.  
 
    The levantamiento del velo is a relatively recent subject in Panama. The three cited 
precedents might be considered as the most relevant among the few cases regarding 
this subject. Indeed, the “Diberor” case and Sentencia de 16 de febrero de 1996 have 
emphasised the fact that the corporate personality cannot be ignored without strong 
justification. The precedent established in the Sentencia de 20 de diciembre de 1999, I 
consider, expanded the grounds on which the Panamanian doctrine of levantamiento 
del velo can be applied. In this case, the Panamanian court faced an issue based on the 
use of the Panamanian corporate entity to structure a fraudulent scheme. Therefore, 
the Panamanian Court took much trouble to analyse this case methodically because 
the precedent established in the Diberor case did not apply. Factors such as the degree 
of influence of the shareholders over the company’s decisions and the compliance 
with formalities were considered when determining whether or not to ignore the 
corporate entity. The court decided to ignore the corporate personality in order to 
prevent and prohibit the company’s participation in part of a scheme to evade 
obligations.  
 
     These precedents serve as evidence that the Panamanian doctrine of levantamiento 
del velo is at an early stage and parameters for it application are only been gradually 
developed. Although there is much negative academic opinion regarding the 
application of the doctrine in Panama, it is suggested that the doctrine is in its infant 
stages of development and does have the potential to develop to meet the potential 
abuses of corporate personality. 
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4.3.3 The Levantamiento del Velo Corporativo in Current Panamanian Statutory Law 
 
    Currently, in Panamanian company law there is not a statutory rule that directly 
addresses the disregard of the legal entity in Panama. Originally, the rules that 
composed the Panamanian legal framework for companies did not include an 
exception of the corporate personality. Furthermore, throughout the Twentieth 
Century no attempt was made to develop a statutory exception to the corporate veil in 
Panamanian company law. The previously mentioned rules that directly or indirectly 
produce the disregard of the legal entity in labour and administrative law are the 
closest to a statutory exception to the corporate personality in this jurisdiction.  
 
    The reason for not developing a statutory exception to the corporate personality can 
be supported by a fear of undermining the corporate personality and thus foregoing 
the benefits provided. Certainly, Panama benefits from the foreign investors who 
decide to use Panamanian sociedades anónimas to practice offshore operations, as 
well as from domestic investors who use the sociedad anónima as a means to engage 
in risky enterprises. However, the benefits that produce this type of business 
association have not completely blinded the Panamanian policy makers to the 
negative effects that produce the misuse of the corporate entity. Therefore, during the 
last decade Panamanian policy makers have considered the introduction of exceptions 
to the corporate personality. 
 
    It can be considered that Panamanian policy makers’ intention has not been to 
directly attack the framework for companies; rather, the strategy has been to introduce 
exceptions to the corporate personality in other areas of law that may be affected by 
the corporate entity. A relevant example is the proposal to introduce an exception to 
the corporate personality in Panamanian Family law (in 2004, the Anteproyecto de 
Ley número 030 was presented in the Asamblea Nacional de Diputados).439 This 
proposal was intended to establish measures to prevent and punish the non-
compliance of duties towards the family. This proposal consisted of modifying and 
introducing articles to the Código de Familia y el Menor (Family Law). Among the 
                                                        
439
 Anteproyecto de Ley núm. 030 “por el cual se adoptan medidas para prevenir y sancionar el 
incumplimiento de los deberes familiares” proponente H.D, Jose I. Blandón, presentado en fecha 7 de 
septiembre de2004 ante la Secreteria General de la Asamblea Legislativa (la presente Asamblea 
Nacional de Diputados).   
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proposed modifications was the introduction of a rule that allowed the judge the 
levantamiento del velo corporativo in cases where the corporate personality has been 
used to hide assets in order to avoid the payment of money owed as a pension. 
However, the proposal was not approved.  
 
     Certainly, the proposed rule to deal with the misuse of the corporate veil in the 
context of family law can also be justified on social and moral grounds. However, it is 
important to remember that the piercing of the corporate veil is a relatively recent 
subject in Panama and it can be considered as not being wholly understood by the 
Panamanian judiciary and academia. Therefore, a degree of rejection regarding any 
law proposal that aims to disregard the corporate personality in any area of law has 
been produced. As a personal observation, with the gradual development of this 
subject, the Panamanian academia and judiciary will understand the application of 
this remedy. Moreover, with the understanding of this subject, proposals to create an 
exception in areas such as family law will be properly drafted and accepted. As has 
been discussed throughout this thesis, there are areas of law, such as family and 
labour law, which involve interests that are vital for society, and which tend to 
overcome the concept of corporate personality.    
4.4 Influence of other Latin American Jurisdictions over Panama 
in the Context of Corporate Personality Issues 
 
     The comparison of Latin American jurisdictions in Chapter Three supports my 
argument regarding the influence of legal tradition and economic development in the 
context of corporate personality issues. Indeed, Latin American countries that have 
dealt with the corporate personality are those with considerable economic 
development and the exceptions have been developed in a way compatible with the 
values that are pillars of the legal tradition followed by Latin American countries. 
Certainly, each of the Latin American jurisdictions under study has presented a 
different legal need. However, these jurisdictions follow a similar legal tradition and 
consequently their method to deal with corporate personality issues has been similar: 
introducing an exception to a statutory rule.  
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    Throughout my thesis, the civil law inclination for positive law and the need of a 
statutory basis to ignore the corporate personality in a country with civil law tradition 
have been emphasised. Additionally, the reader’s attention has been drawn to the fact 
that an exception to the corporate personality cannot be limited to a statute and 
requires a judge´s ability to use judicial creativity. The civil law tradition tends to 
limit a judge’s judicial creativity for the sake of legal certainty yet modern civil law 
has developed principles and concepts that aid to mitigate the strict nature of this legal 
tradition. In the context of corporate personality issues, the Latin American countries 
studied in this thesis have relied on traditional legal concepts such as ultravires, abuso 
del derecho and fraude a la ley, to provide a judge with the means to deal with 
corporate personality issues. Indeed, if a company has acted beyond its power or 
whether there has been an abuse of rights, a judge’s ability to reason is required. By 
supplementing statutory exceptions with these concepts, Latin American judges have 
been provided with a basis to justify the use of legal reasoning.  
 
      Panama has not developed an exception to the corporate personality but the 
concurrence of corporate personality issues makes the introduction of an exception to 
the corporate entity likely. I consider that Panama, as a Latin American jurisdiction, 
may follow the same trend as other countries in the region; i.e. the development of a 
statutory exception. Moreover, the fact that other Latin American countries have used 
traditional legal concepts to provide a degree of judicial creativity supports my 
suggestion of using sana critica as a supplement for this exception.  
 
     Certainly, I have argued that the methods against the misuse of the corporate 
personality are developed individually by each jurisdiction. However, the structure on 
which this is developed in Latin America is similar, a statutory rule. The difference 
lies in the extent for the application of the rules contained in the statute and the tools 
provided for the judge to enforce the statute. In the next chapter, the facts that have 
motivated me to choose sana critica, instead of other traditional concepts already 
used by other jurisdictions, shall be addressed.  
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Chapter Conclusion  
 
    The sociedad anónima  is currently a pillar of the Panamanian economy. Panama 
developed the legal framework for sociedades anónimas in a way that is accessible 
for nationals and foreigners alike who want to trade under the benefits of legal 
personality and limited liability. Panamanian authorities, however, are aware of the 
potential of the sociedad anónima to be a device to practice illicit acts and fraudulent 
schemes. Therefore, the levantamiento del velo has been considered by Panamanian 
authorities as a means to combat the misuse of the corporate personality. 
 
     Panama gives the impression of being a jurisdiction that is pro-corporate 
personality. However, the fact that corporate personality issues are relatively recent in 
Panama cannot be omitted. Panamanian authorities are aware that the corporate 
personality cannot be absolute. Evidence of this fact lies in the gradual introduction of 
the levantamiento del velo in Panama. The fact that the levantamiento del velo is a 
subject that has gained relevance proves that this jurisdiction is balanced in regard to 
the application of this remedy.  Moreover, since the introduction of this remedy in 
1991, the scope for its application has been gradually expanded and Panamanian 
policy makers have considered the introduction of this action in certain statutes to 
address specific circumstances. 
 
    In Panama traditional civil law concepts have not been used to deal with corporate 
veil issues. However, this does not mean that traditional legal concepts cannot be 
considered. Differing from the civil law jurisdictions studied in Chapter Three, in 
Panama the piercing of the corporate veil is not only recent in practice but also a 
recent topic also among academia. Therefore, there is a probability that with the 
development of this subject, academics may propose to implement a traditional legal 
concept as the basis for a statutory exception to the corporate veil in Panama. Indeed, 
it is likely that Panama follows the trend of the Latin American countries studied in 
Chapter Three not only because of the historical connection that the legal framework 
of Latin American countries have, but also because a statutory exception is more 
compatible with the nature of the civil law tradition.  
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CHAPTER V: The rules of Sana Critica: a set of rules that 
can Supplement an Approach to Apply the Levantamiento 
del Velo in Panama 
 
 
    This chapter is the last but not least of this thesis. This chapter will develop the 
question on which this research has been founded; to what extent the Hispano-
American principle of sana critica can supplement an approach to pierce the 
corporate veil in a civil law jurisdiction such as Panama?  
 
     In the previous chapters, general aspects of piercing of the corporate veil, together 
with the application of this remedy in Anglo-American jurisdictions, Spain and Latin 
American countries, were addressed. In addition, throughout this thesis it has been 
explained that the legal tradition followed by a country has been a factor that has had 
a heavy influence over the application of this remedy. On the one hand, the common 
law tradition allows judges the judicial creativity in order to deal with issues not 
covered by positive law or cases were the application of positive law might produce 
an unfair result. On the other hand, the civil law tradition strictly requires the civil law 
judge to apply positive law. This factor not only limits a judge’s judicial creativity but 
also limits his capacity of interpretation. Based on this difference, both legal traditions 
have relied on a different method to deal with corporate veil issues; common law 
jurisdictions rely mainly on doctrine, while civil law jurisdictions rely mainly on a 
statutory rule based on traditional legal concepts. 
 
     It has been observed in previous chapters that doctrinal and statutory approaches 
present advantages and disadvantages in this context. However, the fact that civil law 
jurisdictions tend to rely on a statutory approach does not affect the application of a 
remedy such as piercing of the corporate veil. Rather, in this thesis, it is considered 
that the strict adherence to statutory law is the factor that interferes with the 
application of this remedy in a civil law country like Panama. The piercing of the 
corporate veil is not just the simple application of a statutory rule; it is a remedy that 
depends on legal reasoning being correctly applied. Corporate personality cases 
involve a different set of circumstances which make the judge question whether the 
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situation established in the statute has concurred or not. Consequently, the judge’s 
ability to analyse and interpret the law cannot be completely restricted. Therefore, in 
this chapter, the use of the rules on which is founded the principle of sana critica as a 
means to supplement an approach to pierce the corporate veil in a civil law 
jurisdiction such as Panama is suggested. 
 
    My interest in the principle of sana critica  lies in the English concept of equity. 
During my studies regarding piercing the corporate veil in Anglo-American 
jurisdictions, my attention has been drawn to the fact that some common-law judges 
have justified their decisions on grounds of equity. This fact led me ask whether the 
civil law tradition has an equivalent concept. In my search for an equivalent, I have 
found the principle of sana critica. As will be explained in this chapter, sana critica is 
not the same as the English concept of equity. However, sana critica and equity 
shares a similar objective, to render the administration of justice more flexible.  
 
     Sana critica is a principle that is currently used to aid the judge on the evaluation 
of evidence and facts. However, in this chapter it is argued that sana critica  is 
something more than a tool to deal with the probatory aspects of the process. Sana 
critica is founded on a set of rules aimed at encouraging and guiding reasoning. These 
rules are logic, experience, proven knowledge and justification.  In this chapter, this 
set of rules is addressed as “rules of critical thinking” and it is argued that these rules 
can supplement an approach to deal with corporate veil issues.  
 
     I begin this chapter by properly addressing the concept of sana critica, its origins 
and current use. Following this, I will explain how “the rules of critical thinking” can 
be used to deal with corporate personality issues; each rule shall be addressed. Lastly, 
I will draw the reader's attention to the rules of critical thinking as part of an approach 
to deal with corporate veil issues in Panama. 
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5.1 The Procedural Principle of Sana Critica 
 
     The concept of sana critica refers to a set of rules that encourage critical thinking 
and guide legal reasoning. The Argentinean jurist, Hugo Alsina, defined sana critica 
as “the rules based on logic and derived from experience”.440 The Uruguayan jurist, 
Couture, defined sana critica as “the rules of human understanding”.441 Definitely, 
this can be a regarded as a concept related to reasoning. However, currently the 
concept of sana critica is used by Ibero-American jurisdictions to address a system to 
assess evidence and facts.442 The reason to introduce this chapter by stating sana 
critica as being a procedural principle is because this is the name of one of the 
principles on which Ibero-American civil procedural law has been founded.443 
However, sana critica is more than a procedural principle. In this thesis, the rules that 
are the foundation of sana critica are regarded as a means to encourage the use of 
reason rather than the mechanical application of the law. This is a subject addressed in 
the second section of this chapter. In this first section, the general aspects of sana 
critica will be addressed.  
                                                        
440
 See, Alsina, H. Tratato Teorico Practico de Derecho Civil y Comercial. Buenos Aires: Ediar S.A.; 
1956. At page 127 
441
 See, Couture, E. Estudio de Derecho Procesal Civil. Buenod Aires: Ediciones de Palma; 1979. At 
page 195 
442
 The author Joel Castillo in his paper “La fundamentación de las sentencias y la sana cr tica” quotes 
definitions of sana critica drafted by the authors Hugo Alsina (Tratado Teórico Práctico de Derecho 
Procesal Civil y Comercial, Buenos Aires, Ediar S.A Editores 1956) and Eduardo Couture (Estudios 
de Derecho Procesal Civil, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Depalma 1979) both recognized civil law 
academics.The short definition of sana critica I have provided is based on my understanding of 
Castillos’ analysis over the concept of sana critica . See, Castillo, J. La Fundamentación de las 
Sentencias y la Sana Crítica. Revista Chilena de Derecho.(Volume 33) 2006. At page 95 See also,  
Fabrega, J. Procesos Civiles. first edition. Panama: Editorial Juridica Panameña;1999. 
443
 Civil procedural law is founded in twenty one principles. Some of these principles are igualdad de 
las partes (equity among the parties) principio de economia procesal (procedural eficiency) Principio 
de cosa juzgada  (principle of no retrial). The purpose of this footnote is not to engage on explaining 
each principle because are not part of my research. However, to point out the existence of these 
principles in Ibero-American civil procedural law gives an insight to the reader who is not familiar with 
this subject. For further information see, Chiovenda G. Instituciones de Derecho Procesal Civil, 
Volumen 2. Argentina: Valleta Editions; 2005. 
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5.1.1 Origins of the Principle of Sana Critica  and its Introduction in Latin American 
Countries 
  
     The origins of this principle can be traced back to Spain in the year 1855 with the 
enactment of “La Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil Español” (Spanish Civil Procedural 
Law).444 This law, in its Article 317, established “Judges will use the rules of sana 
critica to assess the validity of a statement made by a witness”.445 The rationale 
behind the enactment of this Article was to provide the judge with the ability to 
critically assess both the witness and the elements that influenced his/her statement 
(such as mental capacity and relationship between the witness and the parties). The 
ability of the civil law judge to use critical thinking was almost restricted in medieval 
civil law. The introduction of sana critica in Spanish civil procedural law was the 
product of the intellectual revolution that had taken place during the Nineteenth 
Century. This was a period of intellectual enlightenment in which scientific, logical 
and technical principles were applied in different areas of study.446 During this period 
judicial reasoning was encouraged in opposition to the erroneous conception 
concerning the mechanical application of law, which was present at the time in the 
civil law tradition.447 Medieval civil law was full of inconsistencies.448 Thus, 
intellectuals such as Cesar Becaria identified the rudimentary practices of medieval 
civil law which in turn triggered the process of reform. It is important to add that 
                                                        
444
 See, Hincapie, E. and Ramirez, J. El Sistema de Valoración de la Prueba Denominado la Sana 
Critica y su Relación con el Estándar mas allá de la Duda Razonable Aplicado al Proceso Penal 
Colombiano. Universidad EAFIT. 2009. Available at 
http://repository.eafit.edu.co/bitstream/10784/436/1/Elizabeth_HincapieHincapie_2009.pdf [last visit 
may 30, 2013] At page 27 
445
 “Los Jueces y tribunales apreciaran, según las reglas de la sana critica, la fuerza probatoria de las 
declaraciones de los testigos.”  This article from the La Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil Español, is cited 
by the profesor Boris Barrios Gonzales in his paper “Teoria de la Sana Critica” at page 5. Available at 
http://www.academiadederecho.org/upload/biblio/contenidos/Teoria_de_la_sana_critica_Boris_Barrios
.pdf [last visit may 30, 2013] 
446
 Idem. At page 27 
447
 The civil law tradition follows the strict application of statutory law and judges have little room for 
judicial creativity, a factor that in some circumstances has produced unfair decisions. The imperfection 
of this legal tradition was a determinant factor in the development of principles such as sana critica 
See, Inguza, B. La Sentencia Arbitraria por Falta de Motivacion en los Hechos y el Derecho. 
Universidad San Martin de Porres. 2010. Available at 
http://www.uigv.edu.pe/facultades/derecho/documentos/biblioteca/Articulo03_BeatrizFranciskovic.pdf 
[last visit may 30, 2013] At page 6 
448
 During the Midle Age the legal system followed by Europe was based on Roman civil law compiled 
in the Justinian Corpus Juris Civilis and Cannonic law, and was addressed as Jus Commune.  See, 
Perdomo, R. and Marryman, J. Supra note 17. At page 10 
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English common law was also influenced by the Nineteenth Century wave of 
enlightenment and development. English common law had flaws as did civil 
continental law. In England, medieval common law was full of undeveloped practices 
and its rigid application produced unfairness.449 This was the reason for the creation 
of the Chancery Courts (also known as Courts of Equity), which became a means to 
mitigate unfair decisions made under the common law.450 However, the Chancery 
Courts gradually gained relevance to the point when they became a parallel system 
with the common law. Lawyers and academics considered the two systems as 
inadequate, thus Chancery Courts were merged with common law through the 
Judicature Act in 1870.  
 
    While European countries where experiencing this period of intellectual 
enlightenment, Spain was gradually losing its influence over its colonies in America 
and different separatist movements had taken place throughout the region. 
Consequently, new republics were born. Certainly, Latin American countries became 
politically and economically independent from Spain. However, these new Republics 
lacked a legal framework. Therefore, Spanish colonial law was still applicable in the 
new Latin American Republics. During the colonial period, two bodies of law, 
                                                        
449
 For example, regarding the legal proceedings medieval English law relied on the “Forms of action”.  
The form of action consisted of a determined proceeding for a determined circumstance. The affected 
party had to purchase a writ from the king’s chancery. There were different writs for different types of 
dispute and the proceedings were governed by the chosen writ; for example there was a writ aimed at 
dealing with trespass. However, trespass is a wide subject. Therefore, this writ had the categories of 
land, chattels and person. This made proceedings a burdensome task because there was no procedural 
uniformity; type of trial and concepts varied depending of the writ. Therefore during the nineteen 
century an attempt at rendering uniformity lead to the abolishment of most actions as distinct 
procedures. The Uniformity of Process Act 1832 and Common Law Procedure Act 1852 were some of 
acts in which these changes were included. See, Baker, J. An Introduction to English Legal History. 
3rd Edition. U.K: Butterworths; 1990. At page 63-83 
450
 By the 13th century, common law rules and doctrines were at an early stage. Early on, this system 
developed into a rigid, circumscribed set of procedures and remedies applied according to inflexible, 
technical rules. As a consequence people, dissatisfied with the remedy available to them, could choose 
to complain about the fairness of the decision with a plea for the king’s relief. The king had the power 
to vary the operation of the system of justice and to handle these pleas the king delegated a royal 
official called the Chancellor. The increase of these pleas and the development of rules and procedures 
led to the creation of chancery or equity courts. The court of chancery was a prerogative jurisdiction in 
which a Lord Chancellor appointed by the king made the hearings. By the 16th century, the appointed 
Chancellors became lawyers, and records of proceedings in chancery courts were kept. Consequently, a 
body of precedent that supported equitable doctrines was developed, and above all, equity courts 
started to compete with common law courts. However, the rationale of equity courts was lost during the 
coming years. Equity courts provided an option to rigid and inconsistent positive law by providing a 
solution through exercise of the logic, experience and conscience. However, throughout the years the 
organisation of equity courts and accumulation of precedents made this a complete body of law. See, 
Perdomo, R. & Marryman, J. Supra note 17. At page 49 
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addressed as the Siete Partidas and the Ordenanzas de Bilbao, were applied in the 
Spanish Colonies.451 A bond between Spain and its former colonies was maintained 
by the fact that Latin American countries kept colonial law.  
 
    By the mid Nineteenth Century colonial law was not a body of law compatible with 
the economic and institutional changes of the period. Thus, the draft of new codes 
was a response to the legal, social and economic needs of the countries in the region. 
However, despite Latin American countries having enacted codes suitable to their 
legal needs, the codes were still influenced by developments in Spain.452 The above 
mentioned Ley de Enjuciamiento Civil Español was one of the main legal instruments 
used by Latin American countries as a guide for the development of their civil 
procedural law. Moreover, innovations introduced in this law, such as the principle of 
sana critica, were adopted by Latin American countries.  
 
    Chile was the pioneer in the development of a regulation similar to the Ley de 
Enjuciamiento Civil Español.453 Other Latin American countries took the Chilean 
work of codification as a reference. An example is Colombia who, based on Spanish 
and Chilean regulations, drafted the Código de Cundinamarca, which was to become 
an early civil procedural law borrowed by Panama.454 It is important to add that after 
becoming independent, Colombia was the head of a confederation of countries called 
Nueva Granada .455 My case study, Panama, was part of this confederation and 
consequently was influenced by Colombian codes. By 1903, due to political 
differences, Panama separated from Colombia and became an independent Republic. 
During the early days of the Republic, authorities had to rely on Colombian law until 
                                                        
451
 The Siete Partidas was a Spanish statute drafted during the medieval period. It has been considered 
one of the most important works of codification since the Justinian Corpus Juris Civilis. The 
Ordenanzas de Bilbao is a commercial regulation that was developed due to the increase of colonies 
and trade and demand for a proper commercial legal framework. The Siete Partidas and the 
Ordenanzas de Bilbao were the laws applicable in Spanish colonies. These were the most important 
bodies of law during the colonial period from 16th to early 19th century. The Siete Partidas and 
Ordenanzas de Bilbao regulated aspects such as the regime for contracts and business associations. 
See, Mirow, M. Latin America Law: A History of Private law and Institutions in Spanish 
America. Texas: University of Texas Press; 2004. At page 75 
452
 Idem. At page 160  
453
 See, Fabrega, J. Instituciones de Derecho Procesal Civil § TOMO I. Panama: Editora Juridica 
Panameña; 2004. At page 26-27 
454
 Ibid 
455
 The Granadine Confederation was a federal republic that comprised Colombia, Panama and 
Northwest of Brazil. See, LaRosa, M. & Mejia, G. Colombia: a Concise Contemporary. U.K. 
Rwoman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.; 2012.  
Page 192 of 239 
 
the Panamanian Codes were enacted between 1916 and 1919. The Panamanian Codes, 
especially the civil procedural code, can be considered as having been heavily 
influenced by Spanish, Colombian and Chilean law. As a result, legal institutions are 
shared among these countries.   
 
     In the early days of modern Ibero-American jurisdiction, sana critica had a limited 
role. However, with the later development of modern procedural legislation, sana 
critica became the main means for the assessment of proof in Ibero-American 
jurisdictions.456 Moreover, the use of the principle of sana critica has not been limited 
to civil procedural law but has also been expanded to criminal procedural law and 
labour law proceedings in some jurisdictions; for example, Panama and Chile. The 
Panamanian Code of Criminal Proceedings establishes in its Article 380 that the judge 
will evaluate facts of the case based on sana critica.457 The Chilean labour code in its 
Article 456 established that the Court would assess the proof and facts in accordance 
with the rules of sana critica.458 Indeed, the principle of sana critica is currently 
widely accepted by modern Ibero-American procedural law.  
 
      In Panama, not only the Panamanian positive law but also the Panamanian 
Supreme Court has embraced sana critica as a tool for interpretation of law and facts. 
The Panamanian Supreme Court, like other Hispano-American courts, has evaluated 
aspects of the civil law tradition that are not compatible with the modern 
administration of justice, such as the restriction of judicial creativity. Evidence of this 
statement is the Sentencia de 13 de Septiembre de 1984 in which the Panamanian 
Supreme Court regarded the tendency of rigidly interpreting law as “out-of-date”. The 
Supreme Court in this Sentencia  strongly recommended the application of and 
adherence to sana critica , a more suitable principle.459 It is addressed as a more 
                                                        
456
 See, Fabrega, P. Diccionario de Derecho Procesal. Colombia: Plaza & Janes Editores; 2004. 
457
 Art. 380 “Los jueces apreciaran cada uno de los elementos de prueba de acuerdo con la sana 
critica…” See, Código Procesal Penal de Panamá. Asamblea Nacional. Republica de Panama 
458
 Art. 456 “Los tribunales valoraran la prueba basados en la reglas de la sana critica” See, Código 
de Trabajo, Dirección Nacional de Trabajo. Gobierno de Chile. 
459
 “En nuestro sistema de tarifa legal el dicho de los testigos hábiles y contestes hace plena prueba y 
lleva al juzgador irremediablemente a la conviccion mediante un sistema aritmético , de sumas o de 
restas, pero es precisamente en las circumstancias que ahora se resuelven en que el juez puede 
desatarse de ese antiguo sistema de valoración que constituye un fósil jurídico, para sin estar atado a 
la rigidez de la prueba legal ni a la excesiva incertidumbre de la libre convicción, aplicar la fórmula 
que más se aviene con la  nueva doctrina en materia de valorizacion de pruebas que es la sana crítica 
por cuanto en esta se integran las reglas del correcto entendimiento humano basado en la lógica y la 
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suitable principle as it allows the judge to interpret the law and facts from a less 
restricted perspective. Definitely, the principle of sana critica, since its development 
in Spanish law and its introduction in Ibero-American jurisdictions in the Nineteenth 
Century, has become the backbone of modern procedural law. The objective behind 
the acceptance of sana critica  in jurisdictions such as Panama has been to make the 
administration of justice less mechanical.  
5.1.2 The Objective of Sana Critica    
  
     Originally, the probatory aspects of the legal proceedings were governed by the 
principle of prueba tasada .460 Under this principle, the legislator pre-established the 
way in which judges must assess evidence and facts.461 The principle of prueba 
tasada  undeniably limits the logical reasoning of the judge and his ability to interpret 
the facts of the case. Consequently, this principle can be considered as being 
incompatible with the nature of the action to provide a judicial decision; such depends 
on the judge’s reasoning.  
 
     Certainly the legislator should establish the proper means by which to obtain the 
proof and furthermore, what could be considered as licit or illicit proof in order to 
provide guidance and prevent abuse.462 However, it can be considered that the 
                                                                                                                                                              
experiencia del juez.”   See, Sentencia de 13 de Septiembre de 1984, de la Sala I Civil de la Corte 
Suprema de Justicia. 
460
  See, Arauz, H. Fundamentos de la Prueba Judicial. Panama: Universal Books; 2006. At page 68 
461
 The principle of prueba tasada can be linked to the civil law tradition notion about the creation and 
administration of law: the legislator has the power to make the law and the judge is strictly limited to 
applying the law. See, Fabrega, P. Supra note 456.  
462
 In order to prevent abuse, limits have to be established regarding the means used to obtain evidence. 
Rights such as privacy of domicile and correspondence cannot be ignored because these rights are 
protected by constitutions, international conventions and treaties. It may be argued that in the interest 
of justice and to comply with public policy, these rights must be ignored. Whilst interest of justice and 
public policy make a strong argument, to allow the easy disregard of the right to privacy will produce a 
chain of abuse. In order to prevent violation of privacy and other rights, legislators in different 
jurisdictions have established mechanisms to obtain proof without affecting any personal right; for 
example, a company as a person with rights is entitled to privacy. Thus, in order to confiscate 
documents regarding a company’s finances, the public servant must request authorisation from a 
competent authority. If the public servant confiscates the documents without proper authorisation, the 
evidence obtained from the documents would be considered as illicit and therefore invalid. Moreover, 
the use of illicit proof may produce the suspension of proceedings. The effects of illegal proof have 
been explained in U.S and Latin American jurisdictions through the metaphor “fruit from the 
poisonous tree” (doctrina del árbol envenenado). Based on this metaphor, if the source of the proof 
(the tree) is poisonous, the fruit (the evidence) will be poison. Therefore, when applied, it will corrupt 
the proceedings. See, Midon, M. Derecho Probatorio, Parte general. Argentina: Ediciones Jurisdicas 
Cuyo; 2007. At page 267. See also,  Garcia, E. Eficacia de la Prueba Ilícita en el Proceso Penal ( a la 
Luz de la STS 81/98 de 2 de Abril). Valencia: Guarda Impresores S.L.; 2003. At page 75. See Also, 
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legislator cannot predetermine how the judge must assess the evidence. Every case 
involves a set of circumstances that make it unique. Although cases may be similar, 
there are aspects (such as type of offence, type of commercial relationship and the 
intentions of parties) that make a different assessment of the facts and evidence by the 
judge necessary. Therefore, the principle of sana critica was introduced to diminish 
the influence of the rigid principle of prueba tasada.463 
 
     Sana critica is a principle that provides authority to the judge to evaluate the facts 
and evidence from his own perspective rather than from that predetermined in law.464 
However, the principle of sana critica must not be confused nor regarded as 
something that confers absolute power to the judge, like the principle of Libre 
Convicción”. 465 The principle of libre convicción is a principle part of the civil 
procedural rules consisting of the complete freedom of the judge to interprete facts 
and the evaluation of evidence.466 This principle allows the judge, based on his own 
rational analysis, to decide over the matters without the need to justify the rationale of 
his decision.467  Under libre convicción, the analysis of the judge is based on the 
ideologies and culture that have shaped his way of thinking. As a consequence, the 
judge may decide over a matter without a proper legal foundation and thus an 
arbitrary judgment may be produced. In a case involving a corporate entity, the judge 
may have a pro-corporate entity or an anti-corporate entity opinion. Consequently, 
allowing libre convicción may produce unjust and arbitrary judgments. The former 
will support the prevalence of the corporate entity over the affected party, whilst the 
latter will disregard the existence of the corporate entity without a solid argument. 
The principle of Sana Critica can be regarded as an intermediary between libre 
convicción and the previously explained prueba tasada . Sana critica stimulates the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Mellifont, K. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: Evidence Derived from Illegally or Improperly 
Obtained Evidence. Australia: Federation Press; 2009. At page 102 
463
  See, Arauz, H. Supra note 460. At page 67 
464
 See, Taruffo, B & others. Consideraciones Sobre la Prueba y Motivación. Fundación Coloquio 
Europeo Juridico. 2007. Available at http://www.fcje.org.es/wp-
content/uploads/file/Libros_Publicados/Cuadernos_Fundacion/CONSIDERACIONES_____.pdf [last 
visit may 30, 2013] At Page 2  
465
 See, Santas, C. El Juez, la Prueba y el Delicado Arte de Juzgar. Revista de Opinión Juridica. 
Available at http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2192720 [last visit may 30, 2103]. At 
page 7  
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 See, Taruffo, B. & others. Supra note 464. At page 2 
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Page 195 of 239 
 
use of legal reasoning yet not to such an extreme that legal certainty may be 
affected.468  
 
    In summary, sana critica  was developed as a principle aimed at the interpretation 
of facts and evaluation of evidence and Ibero-American jurisdictions have used this 
principle for this specific task. However, sana critica is composed of a series of rules 
(addressed in Section Two) that make this principle a potential tool not only for the 
interpretation of facts but also for the interpretation of law. The principle of sana 
critica has been explained to this point and described as a tool that has been used to 
deal with the probatory aspects of proceedings. In the next following sections of this 
Chapter it will be demonstrated that the components of sana critica make the 
principle a tool for the interpretation of law that can be used as a device to deal with 
corporate veil issues.  
5.2  Sana Critica as a means of dealing with Corporate Veil Issues   
  
     In the civil law tradition, the judge’s ability to assess, from a critical perspective, 
the circumstances of the case and the applicable law, tends to be constrained. This is a 
fact that can be attributed to the tendency of civil law tradition to adhere to positive 
law for the sake of legal certainty. This tendency is definitely not compatible with the 
nature of a remedy such as piercing of the corporate veil, which depends on the 
judge’s ability to reason.  
 
     Critical thinking is key in dealing with corporate veil issues. However, to create an 
approach that gives a similar degree of judicial creativity to that provided to common 
law judges is definitely incompatible with the civil law tradition. The common law 
judge has a high degree of judicial creativity that allows him not only to rely on 
critical thinking but also to contribute to the development of the law. The common 
law tradition allows the judge to participate in the process of law making.469 The civil 
law judge, on the other hand, has only the ability to apply the law. Moreover, in the 
early days of civil law, the judge’s capacity of interpretation was constrained. 470 
                                                        
468
 See, Enciclopedia Juridica OMEBA § TOMO XVIII. Mexico: Driskill S.A. Ed.; 1979. At page 
655-657 
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 See, Perdomo, R. & Merryman, J. Supra note 17. At page 34- 38 
470
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     Currently, in the modern civil law tradition, the civil law judge is allowed to 
interpret the law and a degree of critical thinking has concurred. An example of a 
means used to free the civil law judge’s mind can be found in Spain, a jurisdiction 
that has permitted judges the ability to act on equity through statutory rules in certain 
circumstances.471 The concept of equity consists of the ability to provide a solution to 
a controversy that cannot be solved through statutory law. As is explained in Chapter 
Three, Spanish equity differs from the common law rules of equity based on the fact 
that Spanish equity is not a set of principles and ethics. In Spain, the concept of equity 
describes a liberty that has been conferred to the Spanish judge to reach decisions 
beyond the boundaries of positive law. Allowing a civil law judge to make decisions 
from an equitable perspective clashes with the conservative nature of the civil law 
tradition, hence the facility to decide under this concept is limited to specific 
circumstances. An example of a circumstance where the exercise of equitable 
thinking is allowed is in the context of liability derived from negligence. In this 
context, liability cannot be predetermined in a statute because each case contains 
factors that mitigate or increase liability. Thus, in the Spanish Civil Code Article 1103 
it is established that “liability arising from negligence is equally enforceable in the 
performance of all kinds of obligations; but may be moderated by the Courts on a 
case-by-case basis”.472 Certainly, there is no direct mention of the concept of equity 
but the fact that Courts are allowed to measure the extent of liability in this context 
evidences a detachment of the strict adherence to positive law.  
 
     Conferring the ability to decide from an equitable perspective is an option to deal 
with corporate veil issues. However, the ability to decide from an equitable 
perspective not only frees the judge from constrains of positive law, but also gives 
room for personal biases. Consequently, in this thesis, it is considered that the concept 
of equity is not adequate to deal with such a sensitive subject as the piercing of the 
corporate veil. A tool for the interpretation of law and facts, on the other hand, can be 
considered as more appropriate to supplement an approach to pierce the corporate veil 
                                                        
471  See, Chapter Three. At page 123-124 
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 Article 1,103: “La responsabilidad que proceda de negligencia es igualmente exigible en el 
cumplimiento de toda clase de obligaciones; pero podrá moderarse por los Tribunales según los 
casos.”  
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in civil law tradition countries. This tool for interpretation can be found in the rules 
that support the principle of sana critica .  
 
    The proposed approach of sana critica should not be confused with an approach 
based “on grounds of English equity”. On the one hand, if the judge is allowed to 
decide from an equitable perspective, room for personal biases exists. Alternatively, 
the rules of sana critica establish parameters that must be followed by the judge when 
he/she exercises critical thinking, thus preventing arbitrariness and inconsistent 
judgments. Other Latin American jurisdictions have supplemented their statutory 
exceptions to the corporate personality with traditional concepts such as ultravires 
and abuso del derecho. Statutory exceptions have established that the corporate 
personality will be ignored when this is used as an improper purpose; to define what 
is improper in this context, the Courts in Latin American jurisdictions have used the 
aid of the mentioned concepts. A degree of judicial creativity is required to determine 
whether an act falls within the concept of ultravires or abuso del derecho. These 
concepts provide judicial creativity and simultaneously control biases because proper 
justification of the alleged unauthorised or abusive conduct is required. I consider the 
rules of sana critica provide similar advantages. Moreover, the rules of sana critica 
give a higher degree of certainty. I support this statement by the fact that rules of sana 
critica are rules that apply to general legal thinking and are not limited to a specific 
behavior such as ultravires and abusive conduct.   
 
     However, as has been mentioned before, Ibero-American jurisdictions have used 
sana critica as a means of addressing the action of critically evaluating proof and 
evidence. Consequently, the fact that the use of the concept of sana critica is 
currently limited to a specific task raises the following question: can the concept of 
sana critica be used as part of an approach to deal with corporate veil issues? Sana 
critica is known and used as a probatory principle in Ibero-American jurisdictions. 
However, the rules on which sana critica  is founded cannot be reduced and limited to 
one specific task. These rules guide critical thinking in a legal context and can be 
considered as something applied by the judge in his/her daily activity. Therefore, an 
approach to deal with corporate veil issues supplemented by the rules of sana critica 
can most definitely be developed, but to solely use the concept of sana critica itself is 
not possible because it would create confusion. For that reason, an approach that is 
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based on the foundations of sana critica  should be addressed under another heading 
that makes reference to the rules of sana critica; for example, the “rules of critical 
thinking”. 
 
     The “rules of critical thinking” as a tool for interpretation can complement an 
approach to deal with corporate veil issues by allowing the judge to evaluate the 
concurrence of facts, such as control of the company and concurrence of fraudulent 
behavior, from an analytical rather than mechanical point of view. Furthermore, 
personal biases can be prevented from interfering with the judge’s decision. In the 
following section, the set of rules that compose the “rules of critical thinking” will be 
addressed and explained in addition to the way in which these rules can free the mind 
of the judge and prevent arbitrariness. 
5.2.1 The foundations of Sana Critica or “Rules of Critical Thinking”  
 
      The judge as a arbitrator cannot fall on arbitrariness because he would be acting 
against his duty, which is the administration of justice. By administration of justice, I 
make reference to the action of providing a solution to a conflict of interest. Certainly, 
positive law presents the basis to solve a conflict of interests, but there are 
circumstances in which positive law cannot be mechanically applied because it would 
produce an inequitable result. Thus, the judge is required to apply critical thinking.  
The rules of critical thinking establish the parameters that the judge must work within 
when applying critical thinking in order to avoid arbitrariness. The line of “critical 
thinking” is founded on: logic, experience, scientifically proven knowledge and 
judgment justification.  
 5.2.1.1 Rules of Logic  
 
     The judge is not free to think nor act based on his own bias since this would be an 
action based on personal notions of justice rather than sana critica.473 An act based on 
sana critica consists of an operation based on logic or rules of reasoning. Thus, there 
are rules of logic that cannot be ignored by judges. By rules of logic to which I refer 
are the laws that guide reasoning; the law of identity, law of non-contradiction and 
law of excluded middle. These rules have their origin in Greek philosophy and as a 
                                                        
473
 See. Arauz, H. Supra note 460. At page 95  
Page 199 of 239 
 
part of a method aimed at establishing validity or invalidity of arguments are grouped 
under the heading of “Laws of Thought”.474  
  Law of identity - this is the first of the laws of thought and emphasises the 
individuality conferred to things; “each thing is the same with itself and 
different from another”.475 For example, the corporation is a business entity 
with capital divided in shares. The subject (the corporation) and the predicate 
(a business entity with capital divided in shares) are one; the law of identity 
prohibits addressing another subject with this predicate. If the judge treats the 
corporation as a limited liability company (LLC), he would be acting against 
the law of identity. The LLC is a business entity, but it cannot be asserted that 
its capital is divided in shares. The LLC has its capital structured 
differently.476 The law of identity, I consider, contributes to the decision 
making process by preventing inconsistent decisions. Inconsistency is 
prevented because the judge is required to respect the identity of the subjects 
and objects throughout the decision making process. Returning to the previous 
example, when it comes to the corporation and the LLC, both are legal persons 
but with a different essence. Besides capital structure, there are other aspects 
(such as less formalism) that make the LLC predicate unique. The judge 
cannot address the LLC as a corporation since doing so would undermine the 
identity of the LLC and produce an inconsistent decision.  
   Law of non-contradiction - this law makes reference to the fact that 
contradictory statements cannot, obviously, both be true at the same time.477 
An example is the following statement: the corporation and the shareholder 
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 The laws of thought were firstly conceptualised by Aristotles as part of a method to determine the 
validity or invalidity of arguments. This method consitent in the analysis of the premises from which it 
is derived a conclusion.This is one of the basis of modern logic. See, Corcoran, J. Aristotle’s Prior 
Analytics and Boole’s Laws of Thought. History and Philosophy of Logic (issue 24) 2003. At page 
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 See, Politis, V. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle and Metaphysics. New York: 
Routledge; 2004. At page 64 
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more exclusive. See, Fabrega, J. Ley Panameña sobre Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada. 
Panama: Sistema Juridico S.A.; 2010. At page 53 
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 See, Politis, V. Supra note 475. At page 64 
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are different persons but the corporation and the shareholder are the same 
person. Certainly, both predicates can be applied to the same subject (the 
corporation), but not at the same time because doing so would produce 
confusion. A court dealing with corporate personality issues cannot accept 
both statements. It has to state whether it will preserve the separate corporate 
personality or ignore it. The law of contradiction aids critical thinking because 
it emphasises the impossibility of contradictory thoughts. Like the law of 
identity, the law of non-contradiction is a foundation on which thoughts are 
built. Thus, when it comes to the administration of justice, the judge has to 
respect the law of non-contradiction in order to prevent inconsistent decisions. 
Returning to the previous example, in corporate personality cases the judge 
starts with the premise that the corporate entity is a separate entity from its 
shareholders. The judge cannot contradict this belief unless acceptable 
justification is provided. Throughout the proceedings, different elements will 
provide the basis upon which the judge will decide whether to accept this 
predicate or not.  
  Law of excluded middle - this law supplements the law of non-contradiction. 
The law of excluded middle demonstrates that between two contradictory 
statements, there is not an intermediary option. This law establishes that only 
one of two arguments will prevail. There is no room for a third possibility; for 
example, the corporation and the shareholder are different persons yet the 
corporation and the shareholder are the same person. In corporate personality 
cases, the judge (based on the facts of the case) has to decide which of these 
predicates to accept. If a third option were accepted, uncertainty would be 
produced. By allowing a third option, the judge could enter into an argument 
that does not provide an answer to the question about whether to preserve or 
ignore the corporate personality. Like the law of identity and the law of non-
contradiction, the law of excluded middle supplements the administration of 
justice by creating the basis for consistent arguments. 
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     The laws of thought create a deterrent against erroneous and inconsistent legal 
arguments.478 Indeed, judgments are a source of knowledge and as such, cannot be 
full of vagueness nor inconsistent arguments because this would undermine the 
process of administration of justice.  
 
     The fact that the civil law tradition relies mainly on statutory law does not mean 
that doctrine develop from case law is less important. Case law presents a judge’s 
analysis of a law and this definitely provides judges with knowledge to deal with a 
determined matter. In the context of piercing of the corporate veil, this is a recent 
subject and case law is a key for the proper understanding of this subject in civil law 
countries. Therefore, the rules of logic referred to must be followed in order to create 
consistent precedents.  
 
     As a personal observation, I consider that Anglo-American judges have omitted 
the laws that constitute the rules of logic in decisions where the corporate personality 
has been ignored. Consequently, these decisions have been subject to criticism due to 
their inconsistencies. An example of this is the U.S case, Sea Land Services Inc, v The 
Peper Source, cited in Chapter Two.479 In this case, the decision of the first instance 
court was reversed because there was not strong proof regarding the concurrence of 
fraud. Therefore, the plaintiff presented evidence that the defendant company was 
used as a device for tax evasion and the Court accepted this in order to fulfill the 
requirement of fraud and thus ignored the corporate personality.  The case was based 
on a claim for breach of contract. However, its outcome was decided on tax evasion, a 
fact that had no relation to the original claim. I consider that in this case, the 
American Court omitted the law of excluded middle. Indeed, the case was a about 
breach of contract and the issue was based on whether the company was used as a 
device to frustrate the contract. By permitting the tax argument, the court allowed an 
alien element into the case. Indeed, there was concurrence of fraud in the context of 
tax but this was not related to the matter of discussion regarding the case Sea Land 
Services Inc, v The Peper Source. Consequently, this case cannot be considered as 
having been properly justified and is therefore not a reliable source of knowledge. 
Another example is the English case, DHN Food Distributors v Tower Hamlets 
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London Borough Council, also cited in Chapter Two.480 The Court of Appeal decided 
to ignore the legal personality of the companies, which were part of the group and 
regard them as a unit for the purposes of receiving compensation. The decision was 
heavily influenced by the comments of Lord Denning who was considered to support 
the disregard of the legal entity.  Lord Denning based his argument on the control that 
DHN had over the other companies and compared this group with the concept of 
partnership. The DHN decision has been the subject of criticism because the argument 
on which it was supported was not consistent and was considered to be based on Lord 
Denning’s notion of justice. I consider that in this case, Lord Denning omitted the 
principle of identity. It is already believed that the corporate group is a cluster of 
companies that have a separate corporate personality, liabilities and rights. The fact 
that the companies´ part of the group act under the direction of one company called 
the parent, does not undermine the individuality of each company part of the group. 
However, by comparing the concept of a corporate group with a partnership, the 
individuality of the former concept was undermined because a partnership is a form of 
business association with a different essence to that of the corporate entity.  
   
     The “rules of critical thinking” require the judge to follow the rules of logic to 
avoid arbitrary decisions. This is a characteristic which I personally believe makes the 
“rules of critical thinking” appropriate to supplement an approach to deal with 
corporate personality issues.  
5.2.1.2 Experience 
 
     A judicial decision cannot be considered as an “inactive premise”, which can be 
given a priori.481 Judgment is an engaging task that involves reasoning influenced by 
ideological, cultural and political matters that produce different conclusions 
concerning the matter discussed. In other words, the judge requires the experience he 
has gained and learned from his constant activity in Court in order to supplement a 
decision based on critical thinking. 
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     Experience can be defined as the knowledge gained by a man from his daily 
activities and from the environment in which he exists. In the legal context, however, 
the role of experience must be addressed carefully. Extreme ideologies formed from 
experience cannot prevail over the reality of the case because this would produce 
arbitrary judgments. Rules of logic must be applied together with experience in order 
to avoid arbitrariness.  
 
     In the context of corporate personality, it is important to keep judges’ ideas 
balanced in order to prevent judgments based on pro or anti corporate personality. In 
Panama, for example, commercial judges’ perception and knowledge have been based 
on the fact that the corporate personality should not be disregarded because it may be 
damaging for the economy. On the other hand, in case law it has been established that 
the corporate personality cannot be allowed to be used for illicit purposes.482 These 
two premises stimulate a balanced position regarding the Panamanian levantamiento 
del velo. Indeed, Panamanian judges have been provided with the notion that 
corporate personality has a degree of importance for society and will not be 
disregarded unless an illicit or fraudulent situation is present.   
5.2.1.3 Scientifically Proved evidence  
 
     The knowledge acquired by the judge cannot be unsupported nor based on 
accidental or fortuitous facts.483  Evidence and facts presented in the process and 
considered by the judge when developing his decision, must be supported and 
certified by an expert in the area.484 It can be considered that the rule of “scientifically 
proved evidence” is not key to the decision about whether or not to pierce the 
corporate veil because it focuses mainly on the assessment of the elements used to 
charge or defend the defendant. In a corporate personality case, the plaintiff may 
collect evidence such as certified financial statements to prove that the company was 
under capitalised or that shareholders transferred assets. However, the judge will 
make his/her decision based not only on the evidence presented by the plaintiff, but 
also based on other facts such as what has been established in case law and whether 
                                                        
482
 See Chapter Four. At page 174-177 
483
 See, Salinas, F. Que es la Sana Critica? La Valoración Judicial del Dictamen Experto. 2004. 
Available at http://www.juecesdemocracia.es/publicaciones/revista/articulosinteres/ZUBIRI.pdf [last 
visit may 30, 2013] At page 52 
484
 Ibid 
Page 204 of 239 
 
there has been a concurrence of fraud. In other words, the piercing of the corporate 
veil depends more on the judge’s ability to reason. Hence, proper judicial training is 
so crucial. In jurisdictions where fresh law graduates are made judges may pose a 
challenge to the proper application of sana critica . 
  
     I consider the role of scientifically proven evidence has more relevance for the 
defendant. For example, imagine a construction company that cannot finish a project 
due to an increase in the cost of materials and it has not enough assets to cover the 
compensation for the affected parties. This company must provide legitimate proof 
that the rise in material cost has had a devastating effect on the project and they 
should also give certified accountability statements in order to prove that the funds of 
the company had been used in a legitimate way. Therefore, the disregard of the legal 
entity, which will then make the company’s shareholders liable for the failed project, 
can accordingly be prevented. The defendant can mitigate the harsh effects of a 
judgment by properly justifying his acts.  
 
      The control of the legitimacy of evidence and the scientific methods that are used 
to prove the veracity of the facts are subjects that have gained more relevance 
throughout the years.485 The increase in the use of scientific knowledge by the 
judiciary reduces the weaknesses of common sense to some degree, such as 
uncertainty and subjectivity. Furthermore, it reinforces confidence in the judiciary 
because the decision making process will be less affected by subjectivity. However, it 
does not prevent a judge’s personal bias from interfering with a judicial decision. 
Evidence will provide the judge with necessary information. However, the collection 
of evidence is a systematic process that has to be followed for such evidence to be 
accepted. The way in which the judge will evaluate the presented evidence will 
depend on other factors.  
5.2.1.4 Judgment Justification 
 
     The judicial authority cannot rely on his/her authority to support his/her decision 
because that would be an arbitrary action. A justification of the facts must be provided 
to feed and shape decisions. However, it is important not to get an erroneous 
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perception of the judgment justification. Certainly, an erroneous idea is to consider 
this justification as a sort of log or register about each piece of evidence and all facts 
studied by the judge. The justification of the judgment is a deeper process, which is 
divided in Razones Explicativas and Razones Justificativas.486The former makes 
reference to the psychological facts that motivate the judge to make his decision. The 
latter makes reference to the arguments that motivated the decision and show its 
adherence to the current legal framework.  
 
      The requirement for judges to justify their decisions not only prevents 
arbitrariness, but also allows the questioning of a judicial decision. 487 By presenting 
the motives for his/her judgment, the judge gives room to question and debate the 
decision. A judgment may have omitted a key regulation, which can be identified on 
the motives presented by the judge. Rather than negative, this can be considered as a 
positive aspect of the rule of judgment justification. By debating the rationale of a 
judgment, unclear points are clarified and guidance for future cases is established.  
 
     The requirement to present the motives that lead to a judgment can be regarded as 
key to the development of piercing the corporate veil in common and civil law 
jurisdictions. Definitely, the debate over the corporate personality has been triggered 
by the justification presented for decisions over controversial corporate personality 
cases. An example is the English case of Salomon (discussed in Chapter Two), which 
has involved an intense debate about the decisions made by the First Instance Court, 
the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. 488 
 
    I have to add that judgment justification is not an exclusive rule of sana critica . I 
consider that the principle of judgment justification is present in the civil law and 
common law courts. Justification is not just a guiding value of Sana Critica  but of the 
judicial procedural system. It is necessary to have a degree of public control over 
judicial decisions in order to achieve credibility and enhance the image of the judicial 
system. In fact, this is a principle that can be regarded as having its roots in 
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democracy.489 Society confers great powers to the judiciary and the principle of 
justification represents a mode of external control over the judiciary.490  
5.3 An Approach to Apply the Levantamiento del Velo in Panama  
 
    In Chapter Four, the piercing of the corporate veil in Panama was addressed. In this 
jurisdiction, there is no direct exception to the corporate personality. However, in case 
law, Panamanian authorities have already addressed this subject. Certainly, in this 
thesis, reference has been made to the limitation of the civil law judge in regard to 
exercising critical thinking. However, in modern civil law, the judge has been allowed 
to critically assess the facts of the case in some circumstances. In Panama, in the few 
cases involving corporate entity issues, it can be noted that judges have adopted 
critical thinking to decide matters.  
  
     In the precedent that decided an acción de amparo (writ of amparo) presented by 
the law firm, Patton, Moreno & Asvat, foreign authorities suspected that the 
defendant company was being used for illicit purposes. Therefore, foreign authorities 
presented a claim in Panamanian Courts to obtain documents kept by the company’s 
resident agent. However, the channels used to present the claim were not appropriate 
and furthermore, the Panamanian public functionaries dealing with the case did not 
have the authority to ignore the existence of the corporation as a person with rights. 
As a result, the lawyers of the defendant company presented an acción de amparo. 
They claimed that the company’s constitutional right to privacy was violated and that 
there was an abuse of authority on the part of the public functionaries. Definitely, in 
this case, it can be considered that, aided by the rules of critical thinking, the judge 
decided the outcome. Based on the rule of experience, the judge developed his 
reasoning from the notion that “the corporate personality is preserved and will be 
ignored only in exceptional circumstances”. Upon the basis of this notion, the judge 
had to assess critically whether the circumstances of the case were sufficient to justify 
the actions against the defendant company. The fact that the plaintiff did not follow 
the proper procedures and judicial authorities acted without proper authorization, 
created grounds for the Court to preserve the corporate personality and protect its 
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rights. Moreover, the Court in this case followed the rule regarding justification by 
supporting its decision with the constitutional right to privacy and the fact that there 
was no justification to apply the levantamiento del velo. 
  
     The case, Borzeti Inc., in which the Court had to determine whether a contractual 
obligation of a parent company could extend to its subsidiary, is another example of 
critical thinking in this context. In this case, the plaintiff wanted to enforce a 
judgment and requested a freezing injunction over the assets of a subsidiary. The 
plaintiff supported this action citing the dominance the parent company had over the 
subsidiary. Panamanian Courts, however, considered that the subsidiary was free from 
any liability because it was not a party in the contract subject of dispute. Moreover, 
the subsidiary complied with the necessary formalities for it to be considered an 
independent legal entity. Therefore, there were no exceptional circumstances that 
justified ignoring the corporate veil.  
 
     These are just some of the Panamanian cases on this subject. Unquestionably, it 
can be appreciated that authorities have exercised critical thinking to deal with 
corporate veil issues. However, in these cases, the Panamanian judges had the facility 
to exercise critical thinking due to the circumstances of each case. Indeed, to decide 
over a writ of amparo or a freezing injunction, the civil law judge is allowed to 
critically assess the facts which have triggered the action and thus determine whether 
they can be accepted or not. Nonetheless, no formal approach to deal with corporate 
veil issues has been developed from these precedents.  
 
    The existence of an approach to deal with corporate veil issues is linked to the 
prosperity of a country; this premise has been proved in this thesis. The fact that 
Panama currently enjoys a steady economic growth has produced circumstances such 
as the ones in the cited cases, which in turn have made the Panamanian judiciary 
question the existence of the corporate personality. This fact will definitely lead to the 
development of a consistent approach to deal with corporate veil issues.  
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5.3.1 The Basis of a Panamanian Approach to Deal with Corporate Veil Issues  
 
     The “rules of critical thinking”, as a tool for interpretation, can supplement an 
approach to deal with corporate veil issues in Panama. However, what sort of 
circumstances should a Panamanian approach evaluate in order to decide whether or 
not to ignore the corporate personality? In this thesis, it is considered that a 
Panamanian approach to deal with corporate veil issues ought to be based on the 
concurrence of control, fraud and causation. Unquestionably, these are the same 
judicial considerations evaluated by U.S. Courts when deciding a corporate veil issue 
on grounds of instrumentality or alter-ego doctrine. However, to suggest the use of 
these concepts in a Panamanian approach does not mean that Panama should blindly 
copy nor strictly follow the American doctrine. The concepts of control, fraud and 
causation have been organised by the American doctrine. However, these concepts 
cannot be considered as exclusive to the American doctrine; rather, these concepts can 
be regarded as universal.  
 
     The corporate personality and all its components are, in essence, the same. In 
regard to corporate veil issues, the control of the company, fraudulent intention and 
causation are circumstances that every court scrutinises (directly or indirectly) when 
considering whether or not to ignore the corporate personality. Indeed, statutory 
exceptions to the corporate personality, such as the ones established by Argentina and 
Brazil, provide that the corporate personality will be ignored when shareholders, 
based on their control over the entity, use the corporate personality fraudulently.491 
The concepts of fraud and control, however, have not been introduced “unrefinedly” 
in the Latin American jurisdictions studied in Chapter Three. Control and fraud are 
not easy to define in a statute, so statutes have used traditional legal concepts as a 
basis. In Chapter Three, the concepts commonly used in this area are defined; these 
are the concepts of fraude a la ley, simulación, abuso del derecho and ultra-vires.492 
 
      Panama, as a country that follows the civil law tradition, has to establish an 
approach that must be supported by statutory rules. Certainly, the concepts of control 
and fraud in the context of corporate personality are not easy to define in a statutory 
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rule. Therefore, another question arises: how can these concepts be adapted in a civil 
law country like Panama? The answer lies in traditional legal concepts and principles 
that already exist in the civil law tradition. The concepts of fraude a la ley, 
simulación, abuso del derecho and ultra-vires are concepts that exist in civil law 
traditions and have been adapted in order to be applied to deal with corporate veil 
issues. As shown in Chapter Three, Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Brazil have 
structured their approaches to deal with corporate veil issues over one of the 
aforementioned concepts. Nonetheless, each of these jurisdictions did not randomly 
decide upon the concept used as the basis for its statutory approach. Rather, a concept 
was chosen based on different facts, such as the use given to the corporate entity and 
the perception academics and judiciary have of the corporate entity.  
  
     In the case of Panama, concepts such as control and fraud must be drafted in 
accordance with the situation of the corporate personality in Panama. As I previously 
mention, the concept of corporate personality is universal but certain aspects of its 
structure and use tend to differ in each jurisdiction. Consequently, this may influence 
the definition of excessive control and fraudulent behaviour. In the case of Panama, 
the economy has a small equity market and consequently most Panamanian 
corporations are privately owned. As explained in Chapter Four, public companies are 
not common in this jurisdiction and thus requirements for incorporation are less 
strict.493 In addition, Panama has developed as a financial service provider. Moreover, 
one of the main services provided by this country is the incorporation of offshore 
companies. Offshore companies are not only employed as an instrument to diminish 
the risks that are involved in a commercial venture but they also tend to be used as a 
means to protect assets. Therefore, Panamanian corporate entity can be considered as 
largely comprised of private and shell companies.  
 
      Based on the nature of the Panamanian corporation, the concepts ultravires and 
abuso del derecho should be discarded as the basis for a Panamanian approach to deal 
with corporate veil issues. Firstly, in Panama there is no impediment for a company to 
act beyond the objective established in its Memorandum of Association.494 As an 
offshore service provider, Panama has to offer a flexible regulation for companies. 
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Requiring a company to modify the Memorandum of Association in order to act 
beyond the original objective is a burdensome process that can make Panama less 
competitive against other financial services providers. Secondly, the use of the 
corporate entity for offshore operations and business strategies involves practices that 
may be considered by other jurisdictions as abusive but are allowed by the 
Panamanian framework for companies. An example is the fact that the existence of 
shell companies is tolerated providing they comply with the minimum requirements 
established by Panamanian legislation.  
 
   The concepts of simulación and fraude a la ley are the most compatible with the 
nature of the Panamanian corporation. In fact, in Panamanian relevant precedents on 
this subject, Panamanian authorities evaluated conducts that fall within the scope of 
these concepts. In the Diberor case, the reasoning of the Courts led them to consider 
the use of the corporate entity as part of a simulated act to obstruct the process of 
administration of justice and defraud the law.495 In the case involving the Homsany 
Group, the Court evaluated the aspects of the case in order to determine the existence 
of a simulated act aimed at achieving a fraudulent purpose.496  
 
    To rely on concepts such as simulación and fraude a la ley is the most appropriate 
means to deal with corporate veil issues in Latin American civil law countries.  
Indeed, the strict nature of the civil law tradition leads Latin American policy makers 
to use the tools already provided by civil law tradition and adapt these to corporate 
veil issues. The Latin American countries studied in this thesis have structured their 
exception to the corporate personality on traditional concepts. This is a trend that is 
likely to be followed by other countries in the region. The rationale for other 
jurisdictions to follow this trend lies in the fact that an exception built on these 
concepts is more compatible with the legal framework of Latin American civil law 
countries. The proposed “rules of critical thinking” can, I consider, supplement an 
approach based on traditional legal concepts, not only by encouraging critical 
thinking, but also by providing grounds for consistent decisions.  
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Chapter Conclusion 
 
 
     In this chapter, it has been noted that that the piercing of the corporate veil cannot 
be mechanically applied; rather, it is a remedy that depends on judges’ critical 
thinking.  Certainly, the existence of the corporate personality and the legitimacy of 
the acts under the cover of this fiction create different premises and conclusions about 
whether or not to ignore it. In this chapter, it has been suggested that a statutory 
approach to deal with corporate veil issues in Panama should be based on judicial 
considerations such as excessive control over the company, fraud and causation. 
However, it was also pointed out that these concepts cannot be introduced “without 
refinement” because of the limitations of civil law judges´ judicial creativity. Thus, 
the key to define and determine the concurrence of control and fraud in a Latin 
America civil law environment is found in civil law traditional concepts of fraude a la 
ley, simulación, abuso del derecho and ultra-vires. However, in this chapter, attention 
has been paid to the fact that the values of sana critica (“rules of critical thinking”) 
are more suitable to supplement a statutory approach aimed at piercing of the 
corporate veil in Panama.   
 
     The “rules of critical thinking”, in opposition to the mechanical application of the 
law, encourage the employment of rules of logic and experience. The rules of logic 
require the judge to follow principles that prevent wrongful and inconsistent 
reasoning; the concept of experience makes reference to the knowledge the judge has 
gained from his daily activity. Knowledge gained through experience involves the 
basis of a person’s ideologies and thus may produce the concurrence of personal 
biases in the process of administration of justice. However the “rules of critical 
thinking” also require the judge to present the motives for his her decision. By 
providing a judge’s motive, the opportunity for the decision to be questioned is also 
given and thus errors on the interpretation of law, omission of principles and 
arbitrariness are prevented.  
 
     The piercing of the corporate veil is a remedy that each jurisdiction develops 
individually in accord to its legal needs. Panama, as a civil law jurisdiction, is likely 
to follow the trend followed by other civil law jurisdictions and that is to introduce a 
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statutory exception to the corporate personality. The suggestion of systematically 
applying the rules of critical thinking in this context can, I consider, make more 
efficient the application of this remedy. As commented throughout this thesis, the 
civil law tradition is cautious when it comes to judicial creativity. The “rules of 
critical thinking” can, I believe, create a balance between the conservative nature of 
the civil law tradition and the need for judicial creativity in the context of piercing the 
corporate veil.  
Page 213 of 239 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
    Throughout this thesis I have validated the premises on which my perception of 
piercing the corporate veil has been shaped.  Firstly, economic prosperity is a factor 
that is definitely relevant for the existence of an approach to deal with corporate veil 
issues. Indisputably, the use of the corporate personality is more common in countries 
with considerable economic growth. Consequently, corporate personality issues are 
more probable in prosperous countries. Evidence of this lies in the region of Latin 
American, where not all countries have introduced an exception to the corporate 
personality due the lack of economic dynamism. This in turn makes the corporate 
personality unnecessary. The Latin American countries studied in this thesis 
(Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, Chile and Panama) are some of the few countries in the 
Latin American region that have introduced or at least considered an exception to the 
corporate personality. The Latin American countries subject of study have dynamic 
economies in which the corporate personality is a pillar for development and thus 
issues in this context have become more common.  
 
   In the case of Argentina, Colombia and Brazil, was introduced an exception to the 
corporate entity in a period in which each of these countries was experiencing to have 
more dynamic economies. With regard Chile and Panama, these countries have not 
introduced an exception to the corporate personality. However, these are economies 
with steady economic growth and the corporate personality has been a pillar in their 
current development.  Consequently, authorities in these jurisdictions have considered 
the need of an exception to the corporate personality to counter the misuse of the 
corporate personality. In this thesis it has been demonstrated that economic prosperity 
produces a legal need in the context of the corporate personality.  
 
     The legal need produced by economic development has created circumstances for 
my second premise, which is based on the factors that influence the development of 
an exception to the corporate personality; namely legal tradition and politic-economic 
factors. In this thesis, I have referred to these factors as being the basis on which the 
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corporate personality and its exceptions are developed. Moreover, the legal tradition 
followed by a country, in addition to its internal political and economic factors, 
contributes to the uniqueness each jurisdiction has when dealing with corporate 
personality issues.  
 
     This thesis has emphasised that legal tradition establishes the principles and rules 
on which a country’s legal framework is developed. In the context of the piercing of 
the corporate veil, an exception should be drafted in accord to the principles 
established by that particular jurisdiction’s legal tradition.  
 
     Latin America is a region that follows the civil law tradition. Consequently, 
ignoring the corporate personality has been developed in accord to the principles 
established in this legal tradition. Under the civil law tradition, one of the most 
important values is the adherence to positive law. It is considered that legal certainty 
is achieved through the strict observance of positive law and thus there is no 
opportunity for judicial creativity since it is believed to undermine legal certainty. As 
a result, in Latin America any exceptions to the corporate personality have been 
developed in statutory law.  
 
    The fact that Latin American countries follow the same legal tradition does not 
mean that corporate veil issues are handled on similar grounds. Certainly, the Latin 
American countries that have introduced an exception to the corporate personality 
have done it through a statutory rule. Nonetheless, each of the jurisdictions addressed 
in this thesis has drafted (or is in the process of developing) a statutory exception to 
the corporate personality in accord to internal legal needs.  
 
     Internal legal needs are derived from political and economic factors. By political 
factors I make reference to the policies implemented by a government to deal with 
specific issues; for example, policies aimed at the protection of workers rights. 
Political factors most definitely influence the development of an exception to the 
corporate personality due to the interests that are at stake. Certainly, a policy may not 
be aimed at the corporate personality. However, the effects of the policy may collide 
with the concept of corporate personality. The concept of corporate personality is not 
absolute and the interests that are protected by a policy may motivate an exception to 
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the corporate personality. Additionally, in this thesis I have argued the capacity of 
some public policies to override the concept of corporate personality. In this thesis, I 
have addressed as public policies those that contain a collective or public interest that 
the State has the duty to protect; for example, in the context of criminal law the 
corporate personality is likely to lose validity when used as a vehicle for financial 
crimes since there is a collective interest regarding the prevention and punishment of 
such crimes and this has been enhanced by international conventions. Mainly in the 
context of public law, policies tend to prevail over the corporate personality due to the 
public interest that may be affected.  
 
     With regard to economic factors, it can be argued that they are the result of 
policies implemented to encourage economic growth; for example, the development 
of a flexible legal framework for companies. Certainly, economic prosperity triggers 
the common use of the corporate personality. However, each jurisdiction nonetheless 
adapts the corporate entity in accord to its own economic needs; an example being my 
case study Panama, an offshore financial centre that has adapted the concept of 
corporate personality in accord to its relating economic needs. Economic factors are 
significant because an exception to the corporate personality without considering 
economic factors would undermine the benefits provided by the corporate personality.  
 
    In the politic-economic factors lies the uniqueness of each jurisdiction in the 
context of corporate personality issues. Evidence has been provided not only in the 
comparative study of Latin American countries and Spain, but additionally in the 
comparison with Anglo-American jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction has individually 
addressed the subject of piercing the corporate veil and has established an exception 
in areas or circumstances where doing so would be required in order to support the 
enforcement of law.  
 
    It must be noted that the internal aspects that make piercing the corporate veil a 
subject that is addressed individually by each jurisdiction have produced exceptions 
that apply to other types of business associations. In some jurisdictions the joint stock 
corporation is subject to stricter regulation and formalities. Thus, instead of adopting 
a more flexible regulation for companies, other types of business association 
(sociedad por acciones simplificadas and Limited Liability Company) with similar 
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attributes but less rigorous regulation have been developed. The fact that other types 
of business associations have legal personality and provide limited liability triggers 
corporate personality issues. Consequently, the action of ignoring the corporate 
personality has also been aimed at these other types of business association. 
Definitely, in modern corporate law to talk about piercing of the corporate veil is not 
exclusive to the joint stock corporation. 
 
      The notion of piercing the corporate veil as an American doctrine that has been 
borrowed by other common law and civil law jurisdictions has been challenged in this 
thesis on grounds of the uniqueness that each jurisdiction has when dealing with 
corporate veil issues. In this thesis, I have presented and proved premises that support 
the uniqueness of each jurisdiction in this context (legal tradition and the need of law 
derived from political and economic factors). Moreover, by supporting my argument 
regarding the uniqueness of each jurisdiction I have justified my research question; 
each jurisdiction uses concepts and principles already provided by the legal tradition 
in order to supplement an exception to the corporate personality. I regard the 
preference for concepts or principles already provided by the legal tradition because 
the transplant of foreign concepts or principles may clash with principles established 
by the legal tradition. Current traditional legal concepts and legal principles are used 
in order to make the application of an exception to the corporate personality 
compatible not only with the legal framework for companies that each jurisdiction 
has, but also with the values on which the legal system has been structured.  
 
     My case study, Panama, as an offshore financial centre gives the impression of a 
pro-corporate personality jurisdiction. Certainly, as in other jurisdictions, in Panama 
the piercing of the corporate veil is a delicate subject because its uncontrolled 
application would undermine the benefits produced by the corporate personality. 
Nonetheless, the Panamanian Supreme Court has considered the subject of piercing 
the corporate veil in determined circumstances. Indeed, in this thesis I have cited case 
law in which the Panamanian Supreme Court demonstrates concern regarding the 
misuse of the Panamanian corporate personality. I have regarded this fact as grounds 
for the later draft of an exception to the corporate personality in this jurisdiction. I 
have supported this believe with the legal need created by the common use of the 
corporate personality. 
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     Legal tradition, as I have demonstrated, is an influential factor. Therefore, the fact 
that Panama follows the civil law tradition makes the introduction of an exception to 
the corporate personality through statutory law more probable. Moreover, civil law 
traditional legal concepts or principles may supplement a statutory exception to the 
Panamanian corporate personality.  
 
     In this thesis, I have proposed the Hispano-American principle of sana critica to 
supplement an exception to the Panamanian corporate personality. I have considered 
the use of sana critica  because it is a principle that allows a degree of judicial 
creativity, something which is absolutely necessary when dealing with corporate 
personality issues. In this thesis, I have emphasised that corporate personality issues 
present circumstances that cannot be summarised in a statutory rule. I have supported 
this believe with the nature of the corporate personality; i.e. to transfer the risk of an 
enterprise to creditors or a third party, a situation that provides opportunity to argue 
fraud and unfairness. Definitely, a company may default and its assets may not be 
enough for the creditors, yet no fraudulent intention by the part of the shareholders 
may exist. Thus, the corporate personality cannot be ignored by the mere allegation of 
fraud on grounds of a statutory rule because not only will the integrity of the 
corporate personality be affected, but also that of innocent parties. Corporate 
personality issues cannot be strictly addressed through a statutory rule. Judicial 
creativity is also required to measure whether the facts of the case fall under the rules 
contained in the statute. In this context, it is not easy to define what can be considered 
as fraud or unfairness. It is a question to be dealt with on grounds of judicial 
creativity. Certainly, judicial creativity is not widely applied in the civil law tradition. 
Nonetheless, in this thesis it has been demonstrated that the modern civil law tradition 
provides the means to apply judicial creativity when required.  
  
     Latin American jurisdictions studied and compared in this thesis have dealt with 
the limitation of a statutory rule by using traditional concepts such as ultra-vires, 
fraude a la ley and abuse of rights. The traditional legal concepts used by Latin 
American jurisdictions were not originally created to deal with corporate personality 
issues, but they have been successfully adapted to this context. It has been possible to 
adapt these concepts to deal with corporate personality issues not only because they 
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are a source of judicial creativity, but also they are concepts dealing with 
circumstances that can be applied to the corporate personality. Indeed, an argument 
against the corporate personality can be supported on grounds of non-authorised acts 
and fraudulent or abusive use of rights, as long as the facts of the case present the 
elements to prove these circumstances.   
 
    I have considered sana critica  instead of other available concepts or principles 
because of the rules on which sana critica  has been developed. The principle of sana 
critica is composed by a group of rules that in this thesis I have addressed as “rules of 
critical thinking”. They are rules that are aimed at guiding reasoning. The principle of 
sana critica was originally created as a means to reduce the rigid administration of 
justice by adapting the “rules of critical thinking” in a legal context. In other words, 
sana critica is a system to guide judges’ thinking and to prevent the concurrence of 
personal biases in judicial decisions. In this thesis, I have stated that sana critica can 
be adapted to deal with corporate personality issues. I have supported my statement 
on the fact that sana critica  is not only a source of judicial creativity, but also a 
concept that tends to preserve legal certainty. 
 
    In this thesis, judicial creativity has been considered essential with regard to 
piercing the corporate veil. To deal with the corporate personality requires a judge’s 
ability to act beyond the boundaries of statutory law. I regard sana critica as a more 
suitable concept than others employed by some other Latin American jurisdictions 
due to the fact that ‘the rules of critical thinking’ are not limited to deal with a 
corporate personality issue from a perspective restricted to abuse or extra limitation of 
powers. Generally, the “rules of critical thinking” give the judge the ability to 
evaluate the corporate personality issues from a wider perspective. Certainly, in civil 
law tradition countries there is concern about the concurrence of personal biases 
should judicial creativity be allowed. However, the “rules of critical thinking” require 
the judge not only to decide based on rules of logic and experience, but also to present 
the motives and reasons for his decision. By requiring justification the occurrence of 
inconsistent decisions is reduced.  
 
    Sana critica can supplement a statutory exception to the Panamanian corporate 
personality. It is a concept that can be adapted to the Panamanian legal framework for 
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companies and furthermore respects the principles of the civil law tradition on which 
the Panamanian legal system has been developed.  
    
Suggestions for Further Research  
 
    The corporate veil issue in this thesis has been addressed in Ibero-American 
jurisdictions and Brazil. Latin America follows the civil law tradition, however, the 
way this region have dealt with corporate personality issues differs to that of other 
regions in the world, such as Northern-Europe. North-European countries follow the 
civil law tradition. Nonetheless, North-European countries have not dealt with the 
corporate personality issues as have Latin American countries. Indeed, Northern-
Europe has had a different economic development and corporate personality was 
active in this region before it being so in Latin American countries. I consider that a 
study about piercing the corporate veil in Northern-European civil law countries will 
provide an insight about this subject in this region. This study can provide a wider 
ground for the development of future comparative studies regarding the piercing of 
the corporate veil in a civil law context.   
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